!p5       N 


UE^ 


THE 


DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  XAPOLEON 


THE 


Decline  and  Fall 


OF 


NAPOLEON 

BY 

FIELD  -  MARSHAL 
VISCOUNT     WOLSELEY,    K.P. 

H^ITH   PLANS    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS 


THIRD      EDITION. 


LONDON 
SAMPSON    LOW,    MARSTON    AND    COMPANY 


INTRODUCTION. 


When  the  proposal  for  a  series  of  republications  in 
book  form  of  some  of  the  more  important  articles  and 
short  stories  appearing  in  the  pages  of  the  Pall  Mall 
Magazine  was  first  made  to  us  by  Mr.  R.  B.  Marston, 
we  accepted  it  without  hesitation,  perceiving  at  once 
that  an  admirable  medium  would  thus  be  provided  by 
which  much  valuable  literary  matter  might  be  made 
known  to  an  even  wider  circle  of  the  public  than 
the  readers  of  the  periodical  of  which  we  have  the 
conduct.  Field-Marshal  Viscount  Wolseley's  graphic, 
and  analytical  papers  on  the  "  Decline  and  Fall  of 
Napoleon,"  which  constitute  this,  the  first  volume 
of  the  Pall  Mall  Magazine  Library,  achieved, 
as  we  are  able  to  say  from  personal  knowledge, 
a  very  remarkable  success  not  only  in  England 
and  America,  but  on  the  Continent ;  especially  in 
Paris,  where  they  were  translated  and  published  in 
book  form.  Much  the  same  may  be  said  with  regard 
to  General  Lord  Roberts'  valuable  and  instructive 
articles    on    the   "  Rise  of  Wellmgton,"   which   found 


INTRODUCTION. 


especial  favour  with  military  readers  in  all  branches 
of  the  Service,  and  we  have  reason  to  think  that  the 
collection  of  these  into  a  single  and  handy  volume 
will  meet  with  the  general  approval  of  military  men, 
and  might  form  a  valuable  text-book  for  military 
students.  The  articles  commenced  by  Viscount 
Wolseley  and  continued  by  Lord  Roberts  are  now 
being  followed  in  the  pages  of  the  Pall  Mall 
Magazine  by  Lieut.-General  Sir  Evelyn  Wood's 
papers  on  "Cavalry  in  the  Waterloo  Campaign,"  and 
we  hope  from  time  to  time  to  be  able  to  secure  other 
able  military  writers  as  contributors  to  deal  with 
subjects  having  an  equal  historical  interest.  We 
conclude  by  saying  that  the  Publishers  have  our 
hearty  sympathy  and  will  have  our  lively  co-operation 
in  the  publication  of  the  Pall  Mall  Magazine 
Library,  and  so  far  as  lies  in  our  power  we  shall 
endeavour  to  assist  them  in  making  each  successive 
volume  such  as  to  entitle  it  to  a  foremost  place  in 
the  literature  of  the  day. 

Frederic  Hamilton. 
Douglas  Straight. 

Editors  Pall  Mall  Magazine. 


March.  1895. 


THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL 
OF  NAPOLEON. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   CAMPAIGN   OF    l8l2. 

The  expression,  "  Decline  and  Fall,"  adopted  as  a  title 
for  these  chapters,  seems  to  imply  an  unquestioned 
falling  off  in  Napoleon's  brain-power  as  well  as  in  his 
bodily  vigour  towards  the  end  of  his  marvellous  career. 
From  many  different  sources  we  have  irresistible 
evidence  that  upon  several  occasions  during  his  later 
years  he  was  subject  to  periodic  attacks  of  a  mys- 
terious malady.  Its  nature  has  been  variously  de- 
scribed ;  but  it  was  so  much  his  interest  and  that  of 
those  around  him  to  conceal  the  facts  and  disguise  the 
symptoms  that  the  world  is  still  ignorant  of  what  the 
disease  really  was.  On  three  critical  occasions,  at 
least,  he  was  affected  by  it  during  the  four  years  of 
his  life  with  which  I  propose  to  deal  in  these  pages. 
It  usually  followed  upon  periods  of  enormous  mental 
and  physical  exertion  and  generally  during  great 
exposure.      It    may,   perhaps,  be   best   defined   as    a 

B 


THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


sudden  attack  of  lethargy  or  physical  and  moral 
prostration,  sometimes  accompanied  by  acute  bodily 
pain.  Its  effects,  as  known  to  lookers-on,  were,  that 
at  some  critical  moment  of  a  battle  his  wonderful 
power  of  quick  and  correct  decision  seemed  to  desert 
him  ;  so  much  so,  that  for  the  time  being  he  almost 
abandoned  the  reins  to  chance. 

Throughout  his  active  life  he  always  worked  at  very 
high  pressure,  and  so  overstrained  the  machinery  of  his 
mind  and  body  that  both  deteriorated  with  more  than 
ordinary  rapidity.  The  sword  as  well  as  the  scabbard 
showed  unmistakable  signs  of  wear-and-tear  when 
they  had  been  only  a  dozen  years  in  constant  use, 
and  the  sharp  and  startling  contrast  between  the 
manner  in  which  he  gave  effect  to  his  great  plans  in 
his  earlier  and  in  his  later  campaigns  is  very  re- 
markable. 

The  most  abstemious  of  young  officers  had  become 
m  1812  the  pampered  ruler  of  a  court  Oriental  in  its 
luxury  and  had  already,  at  the  age  of  forty-four, 
impaired  his  general  health  by  indulgence  in  its 
dissipations.  Even  those  who  hate  his  memory  will 
admit  that  his  brain  was  almost  superhuman  in  its 
grasp  of  subjects  that  interested  him.  Probably  no 
other  man  has  ever  dealt  so  energetically  for  an  equal 
number  of  years,  and  with  such  direct  responsibility, 
with  so  great  a  variety  of  involved  and  complicated 
public  questions  of  the  first  magnitude.  But,  during 
this  process,  his  clear,  nimble  brain  had  suffered  from 
exhausting  anxieties  and  the  unceasing  work  they 
entailed.  His  splendid  constitution  gradually  yielded 
to  the  frequent  exposure   and   constant   fatigues,  by 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1812. 


night   and    day,    which    the   peculiar   nature    of    his 
position  imposed  upon  him. 

Beyond  all  doubt  the  Republican  General  Bona- 
parte who,  "  rushing  down  from  the  Apennines  with 
the  rapidity  of  a  torrent,"  overran  Piedmont  and 
Lombardy  in  1 796  was  both  mentally  and  bodily,  to 
a  large  extent,  a  different  man  from  the  Empero; 
Napoleon  who  was  defeated  at  Waterloo.  Many 
careful  students  of  this  Colossus  amongst  men  have 
been  compelled — unwillingly  perhaps — to  admit  that 
had  the  Corsican  general  who  fought  at  Rivoli  been 
in  command  of  the  French  army  when  it  crossed  the 
Sambre  in  1815  our  "Iron  Duke"  would  not  have 
been  allowed  to  add  the  "  crowning  mercy "  of 
Waterloo  to  the  list  of  his  glorious  achievements. 
Nay,  more :  had  it  been  the  Emperor  of  the 
"  Hundred  Days "  who  assumed  command  of  the 
army  of  Italy  in  1796  and  not  the  young  citizen 
Bonaparte  one  feels  instinctively  that  all  the  brilliant 
operations  of  that  year  in  the  valleys  of  the  Po  the 
Mincio  and  the  Adige  would  not  have  been  what  the} 
were.  Beaulieu  and  Wurmser  might  be  still  grate- 
fully remembered  by  their  countrymen,  and  whatever 
peace  had  been  won  its  terms  would  not  have  been 
so  favourable  to  France  as  those  contained  in  the 
Treaty  of  Campo  Formio.  As  the  world  flies 
onwards,  with  apparently  increasing  velocity,  the 
sayings,  doings,  aspirations,  even  the  villanies  of  this 
great  history-maker  are  all  the  naore  closely  studied. 
A  year  seldom  passes  without  the  publication  of  some 
new  work  about  him  in  which  his  character,  genius, 
and  performances  are  examined  from  every  side  by 

B   2 


THE  DECLINE  AND   FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


every  sort  of  thinker  and  writer ;  and  the  more  we 
discover  about  him  and  the  more  we  strive  to 
measure  his  greatness,  the  vaster,  the  more  infinitely 


immense,  it  seems  to  be.  A  superlatively  bad  man, 
dishonest  and  untruthful  and  whose  career  embraces 
some  serious  mistakes  in  national  policy,  whose  public 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  \%\2.  5 

life  ended  in  a  disastrous  defeat  and  who  died  in 
prison,  is  yet  so  great  a  man  that  his  name  fills  more 
pages  in  the  world's  solemn  history  than  that  of  any 
other  mortal. 

Everything  connected  with  him  is  deeply  in- 
teresting, not  only  to  the  military  student  but  also  to 
the  philosopher  and  the  statesman.  No  other  mortal 
has  been  praised  and  blamed,  deified  by  some  and 
abused  by  others,  as  he  has  been.  To  men  of  action 
prone  to  worship  the  great  history-makers  of  the 
world,  he  is  the  most  remarkable  and  the  greatest 
human  being  who  has  ever  walked  this  earth  ;  but,  at 
the  same  time,  to  a  large  class  of  thinkers  and  philo- 
sophers his  greatness  is  merely  that  of  Belial,  all 
"false  and  hollow."  Fashioned  from  his  cradle  to 
rule  men  and  direct  events  for  many  years  the 
civilised  world  rang  with  his  name  ;  and  even  when 
in  prison  nations  shook  with  dread  as  they  con- 
templated the  possibility  of  his  escape  from  the  rock 
to  which  they  had  tied  him.  He  is  one  of  the  few 
great  figures  in  history  whom  the  perspective  of  time 
does  not  cause  to  dwindle  in  size  or  diminish  in 
importance. 

Up  to  the  year  1S12  he  had  carried  out  no  war  in 
Europe  under  his  own  personal  direction  which  had 
not  been,  in  the  long  run,  brilliantly  successful. 
From  that  year  onwards  he  entered  upon  none  which 
did  not  end  disastrously.  By  his  invasion  of  Russia 
m  1812  he  lost,  almost  entirely,  the  most  magnificent 
army  he  had  ever  marshalled  under  his  banners, 
returning  in  haste  to  Paris  a  solitary  fugitive.  As  the 
result  of  his  campaign  in  181 3  he  had  to  lead  back 


6  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

the  remnants  of  a  beaten  army  behind  the  shelter  of 
hk  own  frontier-fortresses.  His  brilliant  operations 
of  1 8 14  between  that  frontier  and  Paris  ended  in  his 
forced  abdication  and  his  acceptance  of  the  little 
island  of  Elba  as  his  only  dominion  ;  and,  having 
returned  to  France  in  1815  he  was  hopelessly 
defeated  at  Waterloo  and  sent  to  spend  the  re- 
mainder of  his  days  at  St.  Helena. 

To  what  are  we  to  attribute  this  change  in  the 
fortunes  of  him  who  had  long  been  the  "  spoiled  child 
of  Victory"  }  Were  his  plans  faulty  or  did  he  fail  in 
their  execution  }  Was  the  invasion  of  Russia  less 
ably  planned  and  the  wants  of  his  mighty  host  less 
carefully  provided  for  than  in  his  invasion  of  Austria 
by  that  wonderful  march  from  Boulogne  to  Vienna 
which  ended  in  Austerlitz  }  Surely  not  ;  for  the  more 
we  study  his  voluminous  correspondence  of  1811-12. 
the  more  we  are  struck,  not  merely  with  the  stupendous 
nature  of  the  task  he  undertook  when  he  crossed  the 
Niemen,  but  with  the  careful  provisions  he  made  foi 
overcoming  the  difficulties  with  which  that  mighty 
operation  bristled.  The  general  scheme  was  worked 
out  with  a  splendour  of  conception  and  a  mastery  of 
detail  which,  I  think,  stands  unrivalled  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  And  yet  the  campaign  of  18 12  was  an 
appalling  failure.  Nevertheless  it  is  impossible  for 
any  careful  student  of  his  later  campaigns  to  deny 
that  again  and  again  throughout  them  he  displayed, 
often  in  a  remarkable  manner,  his  old  brilliancy  in 
strategical  and  tactical  combinations  and  his  former 
supremacy  over  events. 

The  invasion  of  Russia  in  18 12  was  about  the  most 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OP  1812. 


stupendous  undei taking  upon  which  any  man  has 
ever  ventured.  But  many  are  apt  to  treat  it  as  if  its 
only  serious  difficulties  lay  in  the  nature  of  the 
country  to  be  overrun  in  its  very  severe  winters  and 
in  its  great  distance  from  the  French  frontier.  At 
any  rate  these  difficulties  have  been  commonly 
recognised  as  the  direct  causes  which  led  to  Napo- 
leon's failure  ;  indeed  so  much  is  this  the  case  that 
Russia  seems  to  have  enjoyed  a  long  immunity  from 
invasion  because  it  was  in  the  heart  of  Russia  that 
Napoleon's  first  failure  occurred.  But  there  were 
causes  other  than  the  difficulties  peculiar  to  military 
operations  in  Russia  which  made  well-nigh  impossible 
the  task  which  he  had  set  himself  to  do. 

He  did  not  really  wish  for  a  war  with  his  old  ally 
and  personal  friend,  the  Czar  Alexander.  The  war 
was  forced  upon  him  as  part  of  the  "  Continental 
system "  he  had  designed  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
stroying the  commercial  prosperity  of  England.  It 
was,  in  fact,  merely  a  very  important  episode  in  the 
life-and-death  struggle  with  l^nglajid  upon  which  he 
had  entered.  The  destruction  of  her  maritime  ascen- 
dency—  her  maritime  tyranny  he  called  it  —  was 
essential  before  he  could  hope  for  any  realisation  of 
the  universal  dominion  he  aspired  to.*  From  the 
battle  of  Trafalgar,  and  more  especially  after  the  war 
with  Austria  in  1809,  up  to  the  invasion  of  Russia  his 
whole  energies  were  directed  to  effecting  the  complete 

"  La  Russie  ^tait  la  derniere  ressource  de  I'Angleterre  ;  il 
s'agissait  de  ramener  Alexandre  au  systeme  continental  ;  la 
cause  etait  europeenne,  et  toute  I'Europe  marchait  devant  moi.'' 
— "  Napoleon  k  Ste.  Heline." 


8  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

exclusion  of  all  British  merchandise  from  every  port 
in  Europe.  England  was  apparently  the  only  serious 
obstacle  to  his  ambition  ;  and,  as  he  had  utterly  failed 
in  his  combinations  against  her  fleet,  he  now  sought  to 
ruin  her  by  the  destruction  of  her  commerce. 

But  her   goods   still   poured    into   central    Europe 


ALEXANDER  THE   FIRST, 

through  Russian  ports  ;  and  it  consequently  became  a 
question  whether  he  should  declare  war  against  the 
Czar  or  abandon  his  "  Continental  system "  as  a 
failure.  But  his  pride  was  involved  in  the  latter 
alternative  ;  and  much  as  he  disliked  any  breach  in 
the  alliance  that  had  been  hatched  at  Tilsit  he 
elected  for  war.     It  has  been  well  said,  he  made  "  a 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1812. 


dispute  about  tariffs  the  ground  for  the  greatest 
military  expedition  known  to  authentic  history."  But 
the  selection  of  alternatives  he  then  made  ended  in 
his  ruin  not  in  that  of  England. 

War  with  Russia,  for  a  man  in  Napoleon's  position, 
meant  the  invasion  of  that  vast  empire,  and  for  it 
armies  were  required  far  beyond  the  power  of  France 
to  supply  from  her  own  population.  He  was  there- 
fore obliged  to  depend  upon  the  military  forces  of 
Austria,  Prussia,  and  other  doubtful  allies.  He  was 
compelled  to  lead  them  through  states  of  ancient 
military  renown  whose  inhabitants,  humbled  to  the 
dust  in  his  previous  wars,  had  become  bitterly  hostile 
to  his  armies  by  whom  they  had  been  so  cruelly  ill- 
treated.  Indeed,  his  campaigns  had  begun  to  carry 
the  conviction  into  every  home  throughout  central 
Europe  that,  however  terrible  it  might  be  to  embark 
in  a  war  against  France  it  was  necessary  either  to  do 
so  or  to  succumb  from  misery  and  starvation. 

In  his  war  against  British  merchandise  he  had  so 
bullied  and  irritated  European  nations,  great  and 
small,  that  not  only  every  Cabinet  but  almost  every 
family  longed  for  the  despot's  overthrow,  and  were 
prepared  to  make  any  sacrifice  to  that  end.  In 
France  itself  this  spirit  was  alive  and  began  to  show 
itself,  for  the  misery  of  its  people  had  reached  a 
climax.  And  yet,  whilst  England  added  about  three 
hundred  million  sterling  to  her  already  large  national 
debt  during  this  war  against  Napoleon,  France,  under 
his  rule,  did  not  borrow  a  franc.  But  the  conscrip- 
tion, rigorously  enforced,  was  draining  her  life-blood, 
and  of  the  conscripts  intended  for  the  "  Grand  Army  " 


lo         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

in  1812  some  50,000  had  proved  so  refractory  that  it 
was  necessary  to  place  them  in  islands  from  which 
they  could  not  escape,  until,  having  been  manu- 
fictured  into  soldiers  they  were  marched  off  under 
escort  to  distant  parts  of  the  Empire. 

The  Marshals,  whom  Napoleon  had  created  and 
loaded  with  riches  and  honours,  were  sick  of  war  and 
wanted  to  enjoy   the   result  of  their   labours.     They 


ST.   CYR. 


already  dreaded  his  plans  for  this  new  and  distant 
conquest.  Although  French  garrisons  held  all  the 
most  important  fortresses  along  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation between  the  Rhine  and  the  Vistula,  the 
difficulties  of  maintaining  and  protecting  those  com- 
munications were  well-known  to  men  like  Grouchy, 
Desaix,  St.  Cyr,  Vandamme,  Ney,  Davoust,  Au- 
gereau,  Murat,  and  the  others  whom  he  selected  for 
commands    in   this  gigantic   enterprise.       They  were 


bONAPARTE   AT  THE    BRIDGE  OF  ARCOLA. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1812.  13 

aware  that  although  the  new  theatre  of  war  was 
fertile  it  was  practically  without  roads  and  devoid  of 
those  towns  and  villages — the  usual  centres  of  popu- 
lation— which  enable  armies  on  the  march  to  obtain 
daily  the  food  and  transport  they  require. 

A  startling  contrast  may  well  be  drawn  between  the 
abject  poverty  of  the  gloomy  young  Corsican  lieu- 
tenant, struggling  to  find  food  for  himself  and  his 
brother  on  his  slender  pay,  and  the  affluence  and 
luxury  of  the  French  Emperor,  with  Marie  Louise  by 
his  side,  distributing  large  fortunes  amongst  his 
relatives  and  his  newly-created  peers.  But  any  such 
pictures  lack  the  dramatic  incidents  and  stage-like 
trappings  which  cling  round  the  contrast  between 
Napoleon  as  the  central  figure  at  the  Dresden 
pageant  of  May  1812  and  as  he  appeared  seven 
months  afterwards,  when  he  arrived  at  the  gates  of 
the  Tuileries  in  a  hackney  coach  by  night,  fresh  from 
the  horrors  of  his  ghastly  retreat.  The  astounding 
ups  and  downs  in  his  career  are  almost  as  remarkable 
as  his  genius.  Before  the  battle  of  Actium,  it  is  said, 
that  upon  one  afternoon  there  were  fourteen  kings  in 
Antony's  reception-room.  But  at  Dresden,  upon  the 
occasion  I  refer  to,  Napoleon  received  the  homage  of 
nearly  all  the  sovereigns  and  princes  between  the 
Pyrenees  and  the  Carpathians.  The  Emperor  of 
Austria,  the  Kings  of  Prussia  and  Saxony,  the 
Viceroy  of  Italy,  and  many  reigning  dukes  and 
margraves  and  ministers  of  European  renown,  were 
there  to  do  him  honour,  and  settle  the  strength  of  the 
various  contingents  they  were  to  send  for  the  invasion 
of  Russia  under  his  banner. 


14  THE  DECLINE  AND   FALL   Of   NAPOLEON. 

His  published  correspondence  tells  us  how  he  sur- 
mounted the  diplomatic  difficulties  he  experienced 
at  the  outset ;  and  it  is  an  evidence  of  the  skilful 
elaboration  with  which  he  worked  out  the  complex 
scheme  for  utilising  the  resources  of  states  whose 
rulers  and  people,  he  knew,  longed  for  his  overthrow. 
The  arrangements  he  made  for  repressing  with  ade- 
quate and  reliable  forces  all  possible  disaffection  in 
his  rear  when  he  crossed  into  Russia  are  now  before 
us,  and  those  who  study  his  letters  must  be  struck 
with  the  care  and  foresight  he  bestowed  upon  the 
great  but  disastrous  undertaking  into  which  he  was 
led  by  his  pride  and  an  overweening  confidence  in  his 
"  star." 

The  "  Grand  Army,"  which  he  collected  on  the 
Niemen  for  the  invasion  of  Russia,  nurhbered  over 
half  a  million  of  men  and  consisted  of  eleven  Army 
Corps, — exclusive  of  the  Old  and  Young  Guard,  of 
four  splendid  Corps  of  Cavalry,  and  of  the  Austrian 
contingent  of  32,000  men  :  all  included,  it  was  about 
600,000  strong,  but  of  these,  not  more  than  one-third 
were  French.  He  took  with  him  over  1200  guns  into 
the  field. 

To  meet  this  imposing  array  of  invaders  the  Czar 
had  collected  three  armies  having  a  total  strength 
of  about  215,000  men.  There  was  also,  in  addition, 
a  fourth  Russian  army  in  the  field  of  about  40,000 
men,  but  it  was  engaged  in  operations  on  the 
Moldavian  frontier  of  Turkey.  Napoleon  hoped  it 
would  there  find  ample  employment  and  be  unable 
to  influence  his  operations  in  any  way.  These  were 
small   forces  with  which   to   defend  "  Holy  Russia " 


THE    CAMPAIGN  OF  i%i2.  17 

against  the  liosts  now  arrayed  against  her  under  the 
most  renowned  captain  of  any  age  ;  but  they  were  all 
Russians  fired  with  the  deepest  enthusiasm,  both 
religious  and  patriots,  and  about  to  fight  on  their 
own  soil  in  defence  of  everything  that  man  holds 
most  dear. 

The  French  armies  were  all  commanded  by  well- 
known  generals  of  proved  ability  in  the  field.  But 
the  Czar  was  no  great  strategist  himself,  ^and  his 
generals,  unknown  U)  fame  as  commanders,  pos- 
sessed no  special  skill  in  war  or  aptitude  in  the 
movement  of  troojxs.  At  the  very  outset  they  had 
been  led  into  faulty  dispositions,  the  result  of  false 
reports  spread  by  Napoleon  that  he  meant  to 
occupy  Volh\-nia.  In  consequence  of  these  rumours 
they  had  scattered  their  troops  over  so  wide  a  front 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  concentrate  them 
in  time  to  meet  any  sudden  blow  from  Napoleon. 
Divided  councils  the  mutual  jealousies  of  generals 
and  uncertain  and  undigested  projects  still  further 
tended  to  confuse  and  weaken  the  nature  of  the 
resistance  they  might  offer. 

Napoleon  reached  the  Niemen  at  Kovno  and 
crossed  it  on  June  24th.  He  had  long  hesitated  to 
take  this  final  step,  and  would  gladly  have  made 
peace  on  easy  terms  if  only  Alexander  would  close 
his  poits  to  English  goods.  WuX.  at  last  his  mind  was 
made  up.  and  he  dctjrmincd  to  invade  Russia.  The 
faulty  distribution  of  the  enemy's  forces  lent  itself  to 
an  attack  upon  their  centre.  His  plan  was  to  force  a 
way  through  it  to  Smolensk — then  still  commonly 
regarded  as  the  bulwark  of  the  empire — operating  in 

C 


i8         THE  DECLINE  AND   FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

the  Polish  province  of  Lithuania  where  he  was  sure 
to  meet  with  many  sympathisers. 

His  passage  of  the  Niemen  met  with  no  resistance 
and  the  Russians  fell  back  on  Smolensk  before  his 
advancing"  troops.  This  pob'cy  of  "  retreat "  was  no 
carefully  designed  plan,  as  many  have  asserted,  to 
lure  the  French  on  to  their  destruction  in  the  roadless 
wilds  of  Russia.  Under  the  circumstances  the 
Russian  commander  could,  in  fact,  do  nothing  else  ; 
for  by  skilful  movements  Napoleon  with  his  central 
force  had  separated  the  Russian  armies  like  a  wedge 
well  driven  home,  and  he  was  too  strong  at  all 
points  for  any  force  the  Russians  could  then  pos- 
sibly bring  against  him.  In  thus  falling  back 
Alexander's  generals  hoped  to  concentrate  at  Smo- 
lensk to  make  a  stand  there.  Public  opinion,  as  far 
as  it  could  be  said  to  exist  then  in  Russia,  cried 
out  loudly  for  a  battle  and  roundly  abused  Barclay 
de  Tolly  for  his  Wellingtonian  policy  of  cautious 
retreat. 

Napoleon  entered  "VVilnaon  June  28th  and  remained 
there  until  July  i6th,  a  loss  of  time  it  is  impossible 
to  explain  away  when  we  remember  how  late  in  the 
year  it  was  when  he  opened  the  campaign.  Many 
specious  excuses  for  it  have  been  urged  ;  but  it  was  a 
fatal  mistake  if  he  had  mapped  out  in  imagination,  as 
without  doubt  he  had  done,  the  probable  course  the 
war  was  likely  to  take.  This  mistake  was  all  the  more 
serious  if  he  meant  to  advance  beyond  the  Dnieper 
in  the  event  of  his  terms  being  rejected  after  his 
first  great  victory.  He  calculated  upon  winning 
that  victory  between  the  upper  waters  of  that  riy^r 


THE    CAMPAIGN  OF  1812.  19 

and  the  Dvvina,  somewhere  on  or  about  the  Witepsk- 
Orcha  line. 

During  his  stay  at  Wihia  he  evinced  an  undoubted 
desire  for  peace  and  seems  to  have  realised  the  danger, 
if  not  the  unwisdom,  of  forcing  the  despot  Alexander 
into  the  ranks  of  his  active  and  declared  enemies.  A 
want  of  power  over  himself  to  decide  such  great 
questions  as  that  of  war  or  peace  already  began  to 
show  itself,  and  there  was  an  unwonted  hesitation, 
even  then,  in  the  policy  he  followed. 

The  Polish  question  now  thrust  itself  most  incon- 
veniently before  him.  In  early  life  all  his  sympathies 
— and  they  were  strong  then^were  with  the  Poles  and 
he  had  regarded  the  partition  of  their  country  as  a 
crime  which  demanded  expiation  from  all  who  took 
part  in  it  or  shared  in  the  spoil.  He  knew  that  the 
most  serious  blow  he  could  strike  the  Czar  would  be 
the  restoration  of  Poland  and  that  he  could  obtain 
the  consent  of  Austria  and  Prussia  to  that  measure  by 
giving  them  equivalents  elsewhere  for  their  Polish 
provinces.  As  a  very  young  man  liberty  was  his 
only  religion  ;  but  he  had  now  learned  to  hate  and  to 
fear  that  term.  The  poor  and  friendless  Corsican 
subaltern  could  afford  to  entertain  lofty  notions  about 
freedom  ;  but  the  rich  and  powerful  French  Emperor, 
endowed  with  despotic  authority,  had  forgotten  his 
youthful  aspiration  in  the  pursuit  of  personal  ambition 
He  had  no  desire,  as  he  put  it,  to  be  the  Don  Quixote 
of  Poland  by  reconstituting  it  as  a  kingdom  on  those 
Republican  principles  which  would  have  alone  been 
acceptable  to  the  Polish  nationalists  of  that  day. 

Lately  received  into  one  of  the    greatest   reigning 

C  2 


THE  DECLIXE  AXD   FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


houses  in  Europe  he  seems  to  have  acquired,  with  his 
bride  all  the  royal  prejudices  of  her  race,  and 
especially  a  hatred  of  republicanism  in  any  form. 
This  feeling  was  shared  by  all  the  kings  and  princes 
with  whom  he  now  associated  on  equal  terms.  In 
their  society  he  forgot  that  he  had  risen  from  the 
people  and  acted  as  if  he  had  been  born  in  the 
purple.  To  fight  Russia  by  the  re-establishment  of 
Polish  independence  was  not  therefore  to  be 
thought  of. 

Although  he  hesitated  to  launch  his  armies  into  the 
heart  of  Russia  the  very  greatness  of  the  plan  he  had 
made  for  the  capture  of  Moscow  seems  to  have 
fascinated  him.  Without  doubt  he  was  under  the 
influence  of  the  great  successes  he  had  gained  in 
former  years.  His  magn  ficent  victories,  and  the 
flattery  they  brought  in  their  wake,  made  him  believe 
himself  invincible.  He  remembered  how  those  vic- 
tories hatl  in  every  instance  given  him  i)cace  quickly 
and  upon  his  own  terms,  and  he  could  see  no  good 
reason  why  a  great  victory  near  Smolensk  should  not 
similarly  cause  Alexander  to  sue  for  peace. 

Napoleon  left  Wilna  on  the  night  of  July  i6-i7th 
by  the  Si.  Petersburg  road  as  if  he  meant  to  march 
upon  that  city.  Rut  it  was  only  a  feint,  his  real  object 
being  to  make  for  VVitepsk  in  the  hope  of  catching 
Barclay  in  that  neiL;hbourhood.  Having,  therefore, 
marched  about  fifty-six  miles  towards  the  Russian 
camp  at  Drissa  he  turned  off  sharp  to  the  right  on 
the  evening  of  the  17th  and  reached  Globokoe  the 
following  morning.  Having  halted  there  for  four 
days   to    little   purpose  he  reached  Witepsk  on  July 


TitE   CAMPAJGU  of  i$,i2.  it 


28th    after  some    unimportant    fighting.      Barclay  de 
Tolly  fell  back  skilfully  before  him  day  by  day. 

Napoleon's  movements  had  been  eminently  suc- 
cessful so  far,  but  yet  things  were  not  going  as 
smoothly  as  he  had  hoped.  Portentous  storms  of  rain 
had  for  some  time  overwhelmed  his  columns  on  the 
march  and  made  their  progress  extremely  slow. 
Encumbered  with  enormous  trains  his  attempts  at 
forced  marches,  or  even  those  very  rapid  movements 
upon  which  his  strategy  was  usually  largely  based, 
only  drove  his  men  by  thousands  into  hospital  or  left 
them  by  tens  of  thousands  as  starving  stragglers  to 
indicate  the  route  he  had  followed.  The  country  was 
exhausted  of  supplies  by  the  retreating  Russians  so 
that  it  became  daily  more  and  more  difficult  to  supply 
men  and  horses  with  food.  Truss  a,  and  every  pro- 
vince his  armies  had  ]xissed  through  before  crossing 
the  Niemen  had  been  swept  of  horses.  But  the  deep 
mud  of  the  tracks  which  served  for  roads  in  Russia 
began  to  destroy  them  already  with  alarming  rapidity. 
The  unuill.ng  dr. vers  deserted  u])on  every  ]:»ossible 
opportunity.  Even  before  he  reached  Wihia  he  had 
been  compelled  by  want  of  horses  to  leave  behind  one 
hundred  guns  and  five  hundred  waggons. 

His  advance  through  the  centre  of  the  Russian  zone 
of  operations  had  separated  their  armies,  which, 
together  with  their  own  faulty  movements,  laid  them 
seriously  open  to  be  attacked  and  destroyed-  in  detail. 
But  his  commanders  had  already  fegun  to  quarrel 
amongst  themselves  ;  they  would  not  work  cordial'y 
together  and  failed  to  carry  out  his  best  laid  plans  or 
give  effect  to  his  ablest  schemes  for  the  annihilation 


12       THE  deClixe  axd  Fall  op  xaPoleox. 

of  the  enemy's  columns.  The  first  stage  of  the 
campaign  had  been  most  skilfully  thought  out  and 
prepared  for  by  the  master-mind  who  directed  it,  but 
vet  the  result  was  failure.  For  after  some  insignificant 
rear-guard  actions  the  armies  of  Bagration  and  of 
Barclay  succeeded  in  effecting  their  junction  at 
Smolensk  on  August  3rd. 

It  was  during  the  long  halt  of  sixteen  days  at 
Witepsk  that  Napoleon  learnt  of  England's  success  in 
negotiating  a  peace  in  the  north  between  Russia  and 
Sweden  and  in  the  soutli  between  Russia  and  Turkey. 
Two  considerable  bodies  of  Russian  troops  were  thus 
set  free  to  reinforce  the  armies  then  operating  on  the 
right  and  left  of  the  French  line  of  advance.  There 
were,  however,  vast  distances  to  be  traversed  by  them 
before  they  could  reach  the  zone  of  Napoleon's  opera- 
tions, and  he  hoped  to  finish  the  war  before  they  could 
bring  any  direct  influence  to  bear  upon  his  move- 
ments. At  the  same  time  he  naturally  felt  that  they 
were  certain  within  a  calculable  period  to  make  them- 
selves felt  upon  his  long  line  of  communications. 
This  should  have  been  to  him  an  additional 
warning  against  any  advance  that  year  beyond  the 
Dnieper.  Hitherto  his  operations  had  been  in  a 
region  where  the  inhabitants  were  largely  of  Polish 
origin  and  by  no  means  enthusiastic  well-wishers  of 
the  House  of  Romanof.  But  if  he  ventured  beyond 
Smolensk  he  would  find  himself  amongst  a  purely 
Russian  people  deeply  imbued  with  ver\-  strong 
religious  and  national  sentiments,  and  much  excited 
by  the  appeals  made  to  their  patriotism  by  Alexander, 
their  Pope  as  well  as  King. 


THE   CaMPAIG.V  of  iSli. 


n 


Napoleon  left  Witepsk  on  x-lugust  13th.  hoping 
to  fall  upon  the  Russian  army  before  it  reached 
Smolensk  and  possibly  to  cut  it  off  from  that  place. 


S; 


KING   OF   ROME. 


The  torrents  of  ra'n  which  had  fallen  throughout  July 
were  now  succeeded  by  stifling  heat,  and  during  l^e 
march  the  dust  on  the  clay  roads  was  intolerable. 
The  rest  at   Witepsk  was  grateful  to  the  soldier  in 


U         THE  DECLIK'E  AS't)   PALL   OF  XaPoLEOiV. 


such  weather,  but  the  losses  from  sickness  and  deser- 
tions were  already  appalling.  One  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  of  his  Grand  Army  were  missing,  either 
dead  or  in  hospital  or  wandering  about  the  line  of 
communication  as  stragglers.  He  knew  too  well  that 
the  farther  he  penetrated  into  Russia  the  greater 
would  become  this  evil. 

On  August  i6th.  17th,  and  i8th,  there  was  a  good 
deal  of  fighting  near  Smolensk,  with  great  loss  on 
both  sides  ending  in  the  retreat  of  the  Russians.  But 
Napoleon  failed  to  force  his  wary  adversary  into  a 
decisive  battle.  He  found  himself  in  what  had  been 
a  large  city  but  was  now  merely  a  mass  of  burning 
ruins — for  his  shells  had  set  it  on  fire — where  only  a 
small  amount  of  food  was  forthcoming.  The  harvest 
of  the  previous  year  had  been  bad — a  fact  known  to 
Napoleon  before  he  j)lanned  the  invasion  of  Russia — 
and  th;;t  of  18 1 2,  then  being  reaped,  was  either  carried 
off  or  larL;ely  destroyed  by  the  peasants  in  their  flight. 
They  had  also  driven  away  most  of  the  cattle  and 
horses,  making  it  difficult  for  the  Intendance  to  collect 
what  grain  there  was  left  in  the  fields. 

What  Napoleon  wanted  and  sought  for  was  a  great 
and  decisive  battle  that  would  enable  him  to  end  the 
war  without  any  farther  advance  into  Russia.  But 
although  Barclay  was  no  great  general  he  was  too 
clever  to  thus  play  into  his  adversary's  hands.  His 
policy,  and  it  was  a  sound  one  in  his  position,  was  to 
engage  in  rear-guard  actions  upon  every  favourable 
opportunity,  as  he  did  at  Smolensk,  and  then,  before 
his  army  was  seriously  compromised,  to  draw  oft' 
farther  into  the  interior  whilst  his  Cossacks  harassed 


THJL    CAMPA/CX   of   iSi:2.  2$ 


the  Frtnch  columns  on  the  marcli  swept  the  country 
of  provisions,  and  slew  the  stragglers.  In  a  roadless 
country,  like  the  Russia  of  that  time,  this  was  certainly 
Barclay's  s.rue  policy  ;  but  it  did  not  find  favour  with 
his  army  ar;d  was  generally  denounced  in  every  part 
of  Russia. 

Up  to  this  time  Napoleon  had  felt  so  certain  of 
being  able  to  force  on  a  decisive  action  before  Barclay 
should  get  past  Smolensk,  that  he  had  always  held 
out  that  place  to  his  soldiers  as  the  farthest  limit  of 
the  year's  campaign.  He  had  striven  to  console  them 
by  describing  it  as  a  fine  city  where  they  would  find 
rest  in  the  midst  of  a  fertile  country  teeming  with  the 
com  and  fruits  of  an  abundant  harvest.  But  they 
found  themselves  instead  surroinded  by  burning 
streets  and  in  a  country  where  the  homesteads  far 
and  near  were  in  flames. 

Throughout,  Napoleon's  plans  had  been  admirable 
on  paper,  but  owing  to  the  dilatory  and  spiritless 
manner  in  which  those  plans  had  been  carried  out  by 
his  generals  he  had  as  \ct  accomplished  nothing  of 
importance.  On  the  other  hand,  his  cncm)-  had  suc- 
ceeded in  rectifying  the  great  fault  of  their  original 
disposition  by  the  conccnt.ation  of  their  two  principal 
armies  at  Smolensk.  His  liei:tenants  advised  him  to 
halt  and  not  go  farther  into  Russia  that  year.  Behind 
the  Uwina  and  the  Dnieper  he  could,  they  said,  re- 
organise his  army  and  establish  a  new  base  for  another 
campaign  the  following  summer,  should  no  peace  be 
arranged  in  the  meantiiPie.  The  serious  nature  of  the 
enterprise  upon  which  he  had  embarked  was  patent  to 
all  his  marshals  and  must  now,  if  it  bad  not  done  so 


26         Ttm  £>ECLI.V£  AS*D  fiALl   OP  NAPOLEOM. 

earlier,  have  come  home  to  him  also.  But  he  still 
believed  in  his  "star"  and  could  not  realise  the 
possibility  of  failure.  We  can  only  account  for  his 
neglect  of  all  plans  to  meet  the  accident  of  non- 
success  by  that  overweening  confidence  in  himself  and 
in  his  luck  to  which  in  the  end  he  mostly  owed  his 
destruction.  When,  therefore,  failure  overtook  him 
it  not  only  surprised  him  but  it  found  him  without 
any  formulated  scheme  to  negative  its  effects. 

He  still  trusted  in  the  generally  accepted  opinion 
tliat  Barclay  would  soon  be  forced  by  the  Russian 
army  and  people  to  stand  and  fight.  Besides,  the 
cautious  policy  his  councillors  urged  upon  him  did  not 
suit  his  humour  or  his  reputation.  He  could  not,  as 
yet,  brook  the  idea  of  taking  any  public  step  that 
might  be  construed  into  a  confession  of  failure  on  his 
part.  He  still  relied  much  upon  his  influence  over 
Ale.xander  to  obtain  a  satisfactory  peace  whilst  he 
used  all  his  skill  to  bring  about  a  pitched  battle.  He 
could  still  count  upon  two  months  of  good  weather  in 
which  to  manoeuvre  and  he  felt  that  such  a  battle 
would  enable  him  to  crush  his  enemy,  and  by  that 
one  stroke  end  the  war. 

It  was  not  until  August  25th  that  he  started  from 
.  Smolensk  with  his  Guard,  the  Cavalry  under  Murat 
being  already  for  several  days  close  on  the  enemy's 
trail.  But  the  horses  were  in  such  a  miserable  con- 
dition that  little  could  be  expected  from  them,  and 
Murat  did  little.  From  Smolensk  to  Moscow  is  about 
two  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  The  road  passes  through 
a  fertile  country  but  the  retreating  Russians  had 
converted  it  into  a  desert.     The  sagacious  policy  by 


The  Campaign  op  \%\±.  27 

which  WelHngton  had  out-generalled  Massena,  when 
he  retreated  upon  his  h'ncs  at  Torres  Vedras,  was 
just  then  generally  held  in  high  esteem  amongst 
strategists.  It  was  closely  followed  by  Barclay  as 
long  as  he  was  left  in  chief  command.  The  French 
found  every  village  deserted,  many  of  tiiem  burned, 
and  all  food  for  man  and  beast  that  could  not  be 
carried  off  carefully  destroyed. 

This  policy,  however,  though  fatal  to  Napoleon 
was  not  understood  by  the  better  classes  and  was 
abominable  to  the  peasantry  who  were  the  direct 
sufferers  from  it.  The  cry  against  the  commander 
became  at  last  too  strong  to  be  resisted,  and  Barclay 
was  replaced  by  Kutusof  who  had  acquired  a  great 
reputation  in  his  wars  against  the  Turks.  In  accord- 
ance with  the  desire  of  all  classes,  civil  and  military, 
he  resolved  to  fight  a  great  battle  in  defence  of 
Moscow,  Russia's  ancient  capital.  The  position  he 
selected  at  Borodino  was  about  seventy-five  miles 
west  of  that  city,  and  he  entrenched  it  strongly  ; 
there  Napoleon  attacked  him  on  September  7th. 

The  distance  from  Wilna  on  the  Niemen  to  Boro- 
dino was  only  about  five  hundred  and  twenty  miles 
by  the  route  Napoleon  followed.  Yet,  out  of  the  half- 
million  of  men  he  had  with  him  when  on  that  river,, 
he  was  only  able  to  place  in  line  at  Borodino,  for 
what  he  believed  would  be  the  decisive  battle  of  the 
war,  about  130,000  men.  And  yet  his  losses  in  action 
up  to  that  time  had  been  insignificant.  By  drawing 
in  all  detachments  and  many  bodies  of  undisciplined 
Cossacks  and  ill-organised  miilitia,  the  Russian  com- 
mander  had    managed  to  collect  an   army  of  about 


28         THE  DECLINE  AXE)  EALL   OE  NAPOLEOX. 


equal  strength.  There  was  a  considerable  proportion 
of  recruits  and  very  young  soldiers  in  the  french  ranks 
but  the  great  bulk  of  Napoleon's  troops  at  Moscow 
were  the  finest  veterans  in  Europe  and  were  led  by  the 
most  experienced  officers  then  alive.  But  in  fighting 
value  the  French  army  suffered  seriously  from  the 
many  nationalities  and  languages  of  those  who  con- 
tributed to  swell  its  total.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the 
Russian  army  one  faith,  one  language,  and  one 
national  enthusiasm  pervaded  the  whole.  Standing  to 
defend  their  great  historic  capital  it  was  quite  certain 
that  every  man  would  sell  his  life  dearly  in  its  defence. 
Under  these  circumstances  a  murderous  contest  was 
to  be  expected  ;  the  result  fulfilled  popular  antici- 
pation for  the  battle  of  Borodino  was  perhaps  the 
bloodiest  in  modern  history. 

As  subsequently  at  Waterloo,  Napoleon  was  over- 
joyed at  finding  that  his  enemy  meant  to  stand  for 
a  great  pitched  battle,  especially  as  the  original 
distribution  of  the  Russian  army  at  Borodino  gave 
him  every  promise  of  inflicting  a  crushing  defeat  upon 
it.  He  made  his  arrangements  for  an  attack  upon  the 
Russian  left  which  if  successful  would  enable  him  to 
cut  off  the  enemy  from  Moscow  and  drive  their  centre 
into  the  river  upon  which  Borodino  stands. 

According  to  all  the  best  conceptions  of  the  general's 
science  nothing  could  be  more  perfectly  conceived  or 
in  design  better  elaborated  than  Napoleon's  plan  of 
attack  ;  but  from  a  variety  of  causes  the  execution 
was  poor  and  unsuccessful.  One  of  those  causes  was 
an  overwhelming  attack  of  his  mysterious  malady  at 
the    most  critical  period  of  the  battle.     It  occurred 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1812.  29 

when  Ney,  having  gained  a  great  success,  only 
required  prompt  and  sufficient  support  to  have  made 
Borodino  a  great  and  most  probably  a  decisive 
victory.  But  instead  of  being  so  it  merely  ended  in 
N  the  utter  exhaustion  of  both  sides,  whilst  some  80,000 
dead  and  wounded  covered  the  field.  The  Russians 
retreated  ;  but  they  left  neither  gun  nor  standard 
behind  as  a  trophy  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  This 
battle  gave  Moscow  to  the  French  ;  but  when  we 
fully  consider  Napoleon's  position  at  the  moment  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  Russians  really  gained  more  by 
it  than  the  French. 

Napoleon  entered  Moscow  on  September  14th. 
The  pillage  and  burning  of  that  picturesque  city  is  a 
well-known  story.  It  has  been  graphically  told  by  the 
historians  of  many  nations  ;  its  dramatic  incidents 
have  furnished  the  romance-writer  with  many  a  plot 
and  still  supply  the  artist  w  ith  endless  subjects  for  his 
pen  and  brush.  Want  of  space  prevents  me  from 
dwelling  upon  it  ;  but  Napoleon's  fatal  delay  in  that 
city  cannot  be  passed  over  without  remark.  It  was 
that  delay,  coming  upon  the  time  lost  at  Wilna, 
Globokoe,  and  Witepsk,  which  determined  the  fate  of 
his  army  and,  as  some  argue  with  much  force,  his 
own  downfall  also. 

He  made  some  serious  mistakes  in  his  calculations 
about  this  Russian  war — the  date  when  the  rigorous 
winter  might  be  exi)ected,  for  example  ;  but  the 
great  blunder  which  runs  throi-gh  all  his  actions 
in  this  campaign  was  his  misconception  of  the  Czar 
Alexander's  character.  This  is  a  curious  fact  ;  for 
Napoleon  knew  him  well  and  had  numerous  oppor- 


30         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


tunities  for  gauging  his  ability,  temperament,  aims, 
and  what  were  the  strongest  forces  that  worked  within 
him  to  influence  his  actions.  But  although  I  believe 
Napoleon  to  have  been  by  far  the  greatest  of  all  great 
men,  he  has  always  struck  me  as  having  been  a  bad 
judge  of  character.  Like  many  other  rulers  and 
generals  he  did  not  care  to  surround  himself  with 
very  clever  or  brilliant  assistants  and  he  often  made 
serious  mistakes  in  the  selection  of  men  to  do  his 
bidding.  In  this  respect  he  was,  I  think,  inferior  to 
Marlborough  who  seems  to  have  understood  not  only 
the  thoughts  of  those  he  personally  dealt  with  but  to 
have  known  by  intuition  even  the  manner  in  which 
they  would  give  effect  to  his  or  to  their  own  projects. 

Be  this  as  it  may  ^  Napoleon  certainly  misread 
Alexander's  character,  and  lingered  on  in  Moscow 
under  the  delusion  that  his  prolonged  stay  there  would 
bring  the  Czar  to  terms  ;  in  this  belief  he  was  encour- 
aged by  the  wily  Kutusof  His  army  was  rapidly 
falling  off  in  numbers,  whilst  the  Russian  armies 
were  being  constantly  reinforced.  His  delay  gave 
time  for  the  main  Russian  army  to  recover  from 
the  effects  of  Borodino  and  to  take  up  a  position 
about  forty  miles  south-west  of  Moscow  which 
threatened  Napoleon"s  line  of  retreat.  It  gave  the 
army  of  Fmland  time  to  approach  the  zone  of 
o'perations  and  the  army  of  Tchichagof,  from  the 
south,  to  do  so  likewise.  Above  all  it  brought  on 
still  nearer  the  dreaded  winter,  the  greatest  enemy  of 
all.  The  one  thing  it  did  not  bring  was  any  answer 
from  the  Czar  beyond  the  statement  that  he  refused  to 
negotiate  as  long  as  his  enemy  was  on  Russian  soil. 


THE    CAMP  A  icy  OF  1S12.  31 

It  was,  I  think,  a  fatal  error  of  Napoleon  to  have 
alvanccd  beyond  Smolensk  in  1S12.  But  he  might 
have  retrieved  it  in  a  great  measure  if,  after  an  interval 
sufficient  to  prove  his  assured  possession  of  Moscow 
an  J  to  rest  his  army  there,  he  had  forthwith  begun 
his  return  march  upon  Smolensk.  He  could  have 
effect<»d  his  retreat  without  difficulty  up  to  Sep- 
tember 2 1st,  or  even  a  ^cw  days  later;  for  he  might 
then  have  selected  a  line  through  districts  that  haii 
not  been  devastated.  He  might  have  chosen  his 
winter  quarters  so  as  to  be  within  reach  of  his 
magazines,  whilst  he  continued  to  threaten  Russia 
with  a  fresh  invasion  the  following  year.  He  would 
have  left  her  for  the  present  with  her  ancient  capital 
destroyed,  many  of  her  best  towns  ruined,  and  the 
impotence  of  her  generals  and  armies  to  resist  his 
advance  clearly  demonstrated  to  the  world. 

Napoleon  did  not  leave  Moscow  until  October  19th. 
The  winter  was  already  upon  him  and  there  had  even 
been  a  premature  fall  of  snow  a  week  before  the  city 
was  evacuated.  His  army  was  still  somewhat  over 
93,000  strong  but  it  was  encumbered  with  trains  of 
waggons  laden  with  loot.  Had  JVapoleon  burned 
every  article  pilhged  from  the  capitcd  and  filled  the 
carts  so  emptied  with  food,  the  march  would  have 
hccn  greatly  accelerated.  Thousands  would  have 
been  saved  of  those  v\ho  died  of  want. 

I  cannot  dwell  upon  the  details  of  this  disastrous 
retreat  though  it  teems  with  incidents  deserving  of 
notice.  It  is  one  of  the  most  dreadful  events  in 
military  history  and  its  story  can  never  fail  to 
interest  all  mankind.      Suffice  it  to  say,  that    indi§- 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  l8l2.  33 

cipline  in  its  most  hideous  form  soon  set  in  with 
all  its  fatal  results.  Some  time  before  Napoleon 
reached  Smolensk — November  9th — the  Grand  Army 
had  been  diminished  by  half  the  numbers  which  had 
quitted  Moscow  three  weeks  before.  The  horses 
perished  so  rapidly  that  guns  were  almost  daily  left 
behind  for  want  of  means  to  draw  them.  A  strange 
want  of  foresight  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  was  his 
neglect  to  make  provision  for  rough-shoeing  the 
horses,  to  enable  them  to  keep  their  feet  over  the 
frozen  roads.  This  neglect  had  no  small  influence 
upon  the  horrors  of  the  disaster  which  overtook  his 
army. 

By  the  time  the  Beresina  was  reached  the  retreating 
mass  had  degenerated  into  mobs  made  up  of  thousands 
of  men,  mostly  unarmed,  who  had  once  been  soldiers 
but  who  would  not  then  even  face  the  enemy  or  obey 
any  orders.  Their  rear  and  flanks  were  covered  b)- 
small  fighting  divisions  in  which  the  proportion  of 
officers  was  many  times  greater  than  usual.  These 
small  bodies  of  determined  men  alone  retained  any 
fiehtine  formation  or  even  the  semblance  of  soldiers. 

At  Smorgoni.  on  December  5th,  Napoleon  made 
up  his  mind  that  his  only  hope  of  saving  the  empire 
lay  in  his  rapid  return  to  France.  There  he  would 
raise  a  new  army,  and  by  lying  bulletins  try  and 
make  the  world  forget  his  disasters  in  glowing 
descriptions  of  fabulous  victories  achieved  between 
the  Niemen  and  the  Moskwa.  He  transferred  the 
supreme  command  to  Murat,  who.  three  days  after- 
wards, brought  the  remains  of  the  Grand  Army  into 
Wilna.       When    Kovno    was    reached     its     fighting 

D 


34 


THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


strength  was  scarcely  six  thousand  armed  men.  The 
passage  of  the  river  was  signalised  by  a  feat  of  arms, 
which  is  remarkable  even  among  the  many  in  Ney's 
career.  Covering  the  retreat  across  the  Niemen  with 
a  mere  handful  of  gallant  soldiers  sustained  by  his 
splendid  example,  he  found  himself  at  last  in  Kovno 


MURAT. 


with  a  party  of  only  thirty  or  forty  men  and  the  bridge 
over  the  river  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  Seizing 
a  musket  he  led  this  little  band  of  heroes  to  the 
attack,  cleared  the  bridge  and  once  more  rejoined 
the  army  to  be  again  its  protector  against  the 
Cossacks  who  still  swarmed  round  its  rear  guard. 
Later  on  the   arrival   of  some   fresh   troops  from 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1812. 


35 


Italy  enabled  Eugene  de  Beauharnais  to  lead  back- 
behind  the  Elbe  the  wretched  remains  of  what  could 
then  only  be  called  in  irony  "  The  Grand  Army." 
Ney,  "  the  bravest  of  the  brave," — a  proud  name  even 
amongst  the  many  which  adorn  the  history  of  France 
— covered  himself  with   honour   and   glory  when    in 


NEY. 


command  of  the  rear-guard  during  the  appalling 
disasters  of  this  retreat  from  Moscow.  His  daring 
courage  will  be  for  ever  the  admiration  of  all  Peoples 
who  still  preserve  any  national  sentiment  for  the  self- 
sacrificing  soldier  who  counts  his  life  as  dross  in  com- 
parison with  the  upholding  of  his  country's  honour. 
As  we  read  of  Ney's  chivalrous  conduct  throughout 

D   2 


;,6         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


this  campaign  we  cannot  help  feeling  what  poor 
creatures  many  of  Homer's  fabulous  heroes  were 
when  compared  with  him. 

The  invasion  of  Russia  ended  in  disastrous  failure. 
Those  who  like  may  attribute  this  fact  to  mere  ill-luck 
on  Napoleon's  part  ;  but  to  me  it  seems  truer  to  say. 
that  he  was  no  longer  the  leader  he  had  been  in  his 
early  campaigns  and  that  his  great  work  was  done. 
He  had  destroyed  the  rotten  remains  of  systems 
which  had  lingered  on  in  Europe  from  the  middle 
ages.  Though  as  Emperor  he  may  have  sought  to 
revive  some  of  them,  what  he  had  done  in  the 
plenitude  of  his  power  rendered  hopeless  any  attempt 
to  restore  them  except  artificially  and  even  then 
with  the  certainty  that  they  must  soon  disappear 
altogether.  But  it  was  time  that  his  own  despotism 
should  pass  away.  It  pressed  too  heavily  upon  the 
civilised  world  and  it  was  essential  for  human  in- 
terests that  Europe  should  once  more  breathe  freely. 
The  decree  from  above  had  gone  forth  against  him, 
and  as  ill-luck  it  was  recognised  by  himself  when  he 
said  that  his  star  was  no  longer  in  the  ascendant. 


(    37    ) 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   CAMPAIGN   OF    18(3. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  it  was  on  December  5th, 
1812,  that  Napoleon  left  his  army  at  Smorgoni,  bent 
upon  making  for  Paris  with  all  possible  speed.  It  is 
not  my  intention,  in  these  pages,  to  follow  the  fortunes 
of  the  "  Grand  Army  "  after  he  had  quitted  it.  All 
ranks  felt  his  departure  to  be  a  fresh  calamity  that  had 
overtaken  them.  As  long  as  he  was  with  the  army, 
so  great  was  their  faith  in  him  as  a  leader,  they  be- 
lieved he  would  eventually  save  them.  The  feeling  of 
personal  devotion  with  which  he  had  inspired  them 
exercised  a  strong  influence  over  their  discipline  and 
fighting  power.  But  as  soon  as  it  became  widely 
known  that  he  was  no  longer  present  to  command 
them  in  action  and  to  chide  them  when  they  failed  in 
any  duty,  despair  seemed  to  take  possession  of  their 
minds  and  to  enfeeble  their  bodily  strength.  Thence- 
forward all  orders  were  disregarded,  and  Murat,  their 
nominal  commander-in-chief,  could  no  longer  control 
their  actions  or  enforce  his  authority.  Even  his  subor- 
dinate generals  refused  to  obey  him.  The  men  did 
as  they  pleased,  and  absolute  ruin  was  the  result. 
"  A     general     recklessness     confounded    all     ranks, 


3?         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

command  ceased,  and  it  became  a  saicve-qni-peut  at  a 
funeral  pace."  * 

When  bidding  good-bye  to  his  generals  at 
Smorgoni,  Napoleon  promised  to  rejoin  them  in  the 
early  summer  with  a  new  army  of  300,000  men.  The 
Austrian  and  Prussian  contingents  to  the  right  and 
left  of  the  Grand  Army  had  not  been  seriously 
engaged  in  Russia,  and  he  calculated  that  the  remains 
of  the  Grand  Army,  when  joined  by  the  reserves 
collected  between  the  Oder  and  the  Elbe,  would 
amount  to  about  200,000  men.  He  therefore  hoped 
to  appear  again  on  the  Vistula  with  an  imposing 
force  of  nearly  half  a  million  of  soldiers.  But  as  far 
as  his  Allies  were  concerned  he  was  soon  undeceived. 
The  Prussians,  under  General  York,  entered  into  a 
convention  with  the  Russians  at  the  end  of 
December,  and  the  Austrians,  under  Schwarzenberg, 
fell  back  towards  Galicia  without  any  attempt  to 
resist  the  Czar's  advance. 

Napoleon  had  hoped  that  the  remains  of  the  Grand 
Army  would  be  able  to  hold  its  own  on  the  Vistula 
until  he  should  be  in  a  position  to  rejoin  it  with  a 
large  reinforcement  in  the  summer.  But  this  defec- 
tion of  his  Allies  rendered  that  impossible.  Prince 
Eugene  Beauharnais,  who  had  succeeded  Murat  as 
commander-in-chief,  soon  found  himself  compelled  to 
withdraw  to  the  Elbe,  having  first  thrown  strong  garri- 
sons into  the  fortresses  on  the  Oder  and  the  Vistula. 

It  took  some  little  time  for  the  world  outside 
Russia  to  realise  the  completeness  of  the  Moscow 
disaster  ;  but  when  it  became  generally  understood  a 

*  Sir  Robert  Wilson. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OP  1813.  39 

revival,  at  least  an  outward  expression  of  national 
enthusiasm,  showed  itself  daily  more  and  more 
throughout  Germany  and  the  states  of  Central 
Europe. 

The  conviction  arose  all  along  the  line  that  the 
moment  had  come  when  the  cruel  yoke  under  which 
they  had  so  long  groaned  might  be  effectually  thrown 
off ;  and  this  feeling  was  deeper  and  more  general  in 
the  houses  of  the  middle  classes  than  in  the  cabinets 
of  kings  and  statesmen.  The  many  principalities 
which  Napoleon  had  formed  into  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine,  as  well  as  other  allied  powers,  already 
began  to  secretly  negotiate  with  England  and  Russia 
to  accomplish  his  overthrow  ;  the  terror  of  his  name 
as  yet  prevented  them  from  openly  declaring  against 
him.  So  much  was  this  the  case,  that  for  some  time 
even  the  defection  of  York's  contingent  was  disavowed 
by  the  King  of  Prussia  as  the  unauthorised  act  of 
that  general.  Austria  still  professed  to  be  his  ally 
and  protesting  against  the  defection  of  others 
assured  him  that  her  negotiations  with  his  enemies 
were  undertaken  in  his  interests.  But  the  states  of 
Central  Europe  were  already  honeycombed  with 
secret  societies  whose  moving  influence  was  personal 
hatred  to  Napoleon  and  detestation  of  the  system  he 
had  imposed  upon  Europe.  Day  by  day  their  kings 
and  princes  were  urged  to  declare  themselves  against 
the  common  enemy,  and  the  angry  passions  of  the 
people,  thus  aroused,  hastened  the  inevitable  result.  ^ 

Wellington  said  that  Napoleon  at  the  beginning  of 
18 12  governed  one  half  of  Europe  directly  and  almost 
all  the  other  half  indirectly.     To  shake  off  completely 


40         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

the  dread  in  which  his  name  was  held  could  not 
therefore  be  accomplished  in  a  moment,  and  it  took 
some  little  time  before  even  the  knowledge  of  his 
Russian  catastrophe  drove  the  conviction  into  the 
hearts  of  his  nominal  allies  that  he  was  vulnerable, 
like  all  other  mortals.  However,  before  Napoleon 
was  again  able  to  take  the  field  in  Germany,  Prussia, 
urged  on  by  the  Czar,  plucked  up  courage  to  openly 
declare  against  him,  and  his  father-in-law,  the 
Emperor^  Francis,  announced  that  Austria  would 
assume  a  position  of  armed  neutrality. 

But  meanwhile  Napoleon  in  Paris  was  not  idle. 
Day  and  night  he  worked  hard  at  the  creation  and 
organisation  of  a  new  army  that  should  restore  his 
renown  which  had  been  so  seriously  shaken  by  the 
recent  disasters.  At  no  previous  period  of  his  career 
did  his  commanding  genius,  his  colossal  power  of 
work,  his  capacity  for  organisation — both  civil  and 
military — his  wisdom,  in  fact,  shine  out  more  con- 
spicuously. No  other  man  could  have  accomplished 
what  he  did  in  that  dreary  winter.  The  result  of  all 
these  labours  was,  that  by  April  25th,  18 13,  he  was  able 
to  take  the  field  with  a  new  army  of  140,000  men 
well  equipped  with  guns  and  every  fighting  requisite. 
This  army  rendezvoused  at  Erfurth,  Weimar,  Gotha, 
Saalfeld,  and  Coburg.  His  one  weak  point  was  his 
cavalry  for  which  he  could  not  obtain  a  sufficient 
number  of  suitable  horses. 

In  the  meantime  the  remains  of  the  Grand  Army 
under  Eugene  had  been  largely  reinforced,  and,  now 
numbering  some  40,000,  was  collected  at  and  round 
Magdeburg.     The   corps   of    D^voust,  not  yet  very 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813 


Strong,  was  between  Tougau  and  Dessau,  and  that  of 
Victor  was  between  Magdeburg  and  the  Saale. 
Behind  these  forces  his  new  army  was  being  organised 
in  France  with  all  possible  speed  and  was  able  to  join 
hands  with  them  before  the  end  of  April. 

From  the  date  of  his  return  to  Paris  until  he  was 


EUGENE   BEAUHARNAIS. 


again  in  the  field  with  his  newly  raised  but  yet 
formidable  army  was  only  four  months  :  almost  an 
incredible  achievement.  Europe  had  assumed  that 
the  old  and  dreaded  war-lion  was  no  more  or  at  least 
wounded  to  the  death  ;  and  great,  therefore,  was  the 
astonishment  of  all  nations  when  this  new  army 
sprang  from  the  ground,  as  it  were,  at  his  command. 


42         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

But  to  make  it  up  he  was  compelled  to  draw  largely 
upon  his  armies  in  Spain  for  old  soldiers  to  leaven 
the  newly  raised  mass,  and  whole  regiments  of  well- 
seasoned  Marines  were  incorporated  in  it  with  the 
same  object.  Although  the  great  bulk  were  immature 
men  imperfectly  trained  as  soldiers,  he  had  the  great 
advantage  of  possessing,  left  from  the  wreck  of  the 
"  Grand  Army  "  of  Russia,  a  large  number  of  experi- 
enced officers  who  were  of  incalculable  value  in  the 
organization  of  this  new  army.  But  still  it  could  not 
be  compared  for  marching  or  for  fighting  power  with 
his  armies  of  Austerlitz  or  of  Jena.  Of  the  generals 
in  command  of  divisions,  few  were  capable  of  handling 
large  numbers  of  men  in  action  ;  indeed,  his  letters  of 
this  period  teem  with  complaints  of  their  inefficiency. 

To  raise  and  equip  an  army  in  1813  was,  however, 
a  much  simpler  operation  than  it  would  be  at  the 
present  time.  All  the  implements  and  weapons  of 
destruction  then  were  of  the  simplest  kind.  No 
complex  machinery  was  required  for  their  construc- 
tion, and  the  repair  of  those  injured  in  the  field  was  an 
easy  matter.  In  those  days  you  could  almost  cut 
down  a  tree  to-day,  and  by  to-morrow  have  it  converted 
into  a  gun  carriage,  and  the  guns  themselves  could  be 
cast  by  the  hundred  with  the  greatest  rapidity.  Be- 
sides, the  soldier  then  had  comparatively  little  to 
learn.  No  months  spent  on  ranges  were  required  to 
teach  him  to  shoot.  He  loaded  his  primitive  firelock 
as  our  musketeers  had  done  theirs  at  Sedgemoor,  and, 
like  them,  fired  it  straight  to  his  front  at  any  enemy 
within  a  hundred  and  fifty  yards  distance.  No  long 
and  careful  training  in  attack  formations  was  necessary 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  43 

to  teach  him  to  face  clouds  of  shrapnel  bullets  and  the 
hail  of  close  rifle  fire  which  the  assailant  has  now  to 
advance  through.  A  battle  was  not  then  the  appalling 
convulsion,  the  terror  striking  trial  to  the  nerves  and  to 
a  man's  instinct  of  self-preservation,  that  it  is  in  these 
days  of  great  explosives  and  of  arms  of  precision.  The 
regimental  officer  then  had  himself  little  to  learn 
beyond  what  came  naturally  to  the  English  country 
gentleman.  The  tactics  were  of  the  simplest  sort. 
Fire  discipline  was  then  as  unknown  as  the  art  of 
photography,  and  the  officer's  chief  duty  was  to  lead 
his  men  straight  upon  the  enemy.  The  military  system 
of  every  great  European  power  at  this  moment  rises 
in  evidence  to  protest  against  the  theory  of  the  British 
optimist  on  this  subject.  In  the  Confederate  war  of 
1861-65  great  quickly  raised  armies  fought  well  against 
armies  similarly  constituted  and  equally  undisciplined 
and  untrained.  It  is  often  therefore  urged,  by  men 
who  know  nothing  of  war,  that  in  case  of  invasion  we 
too  could  in  like  manner  put  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  men  in  the  field  who  would  save  us.  The  civilian 
is  prone  to  forget  that  our  hastily  improvised  army 
would  have  to  meet  a  thoroughly  organized  army  of 
regular  troops.  You  might  just  as  well  hope  to  win 
the  Derby  with  an  imperfectly  trained  horse  as  to  win 
a  battle  with  partially  trained,  ill-disciplined  levies 
against  an  army  of  regular  soldiers. 

The  reappearance  of  Napoleon  towards  the  end  of 
April  in  the  heart  of  Germany  with  a  new  army  took 
the  Allies  by  surprise,  and  they  had  yet  to  learn  how 
formidable  that  army  could  be  under  his  leadership 
They  had  made  up  their  minds  that,  after  the  annihi- 


44         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   Oh   NAPOLEON. 

lation  of  his  enormous  army  in  Russia,  Napoleon 
would  never  again  be  in  a  position  to  cross  their 
path.  But  here  he  was  once  more,  apparently  as 
vigorous  as  ever,  barring  their  advance,  and  ready  to 
spring  at  the  throat  of  the  first  army  he  met. 

Kutosof  had  fallen  a  victim  to  the  malignant  fever 
then  devastating  the  districts  traversed  by  the  ref- 
treating  French  army  as  it  starved  "  exhausted  regions 
in  its  way."     He  had  been  replaced  by  Wittgenstein. 

It  was  exceedingly  important  to  the  cause  of  the 
Allies  that  their  troops  should  be  pushed  forward 
as  soon  and  as  far  as  possible  in  order  to  give  con- 
fidence to  the  country  people,  then  only  too  anxious 
for  an  opportunity  of  joining  their  standards.  The 
armies  of  the  Allied  ])owcrs  had  all  suffered  more  or 
less  in  the  previous  year's  operations  and  their  num- 
bers was  consequently  not  what  they  had  I  een.  Their 
strength  was  still  further  reduced  by  the  strong  de- 
tachments it  was  necessary  to  leave  behind  to  watch 
the  French  garrisons  in  the  Prussian  fortresses.  The 
result  of  this  attempt  to  cover  as  much  ground  as 
possible,  in  order  to  inspire  general  confidence,  was 
that  the  Allied  Armies  advanced  in  far  too  scattered 
fractions.  Their  great  enemy  was  consequently 
amongst  them  in  strength  superior  to  theirs  at  all 
impel  tant  points  before  they  even  knew  for  certain 
that  he  had  any  new  army  at  all  with  which  he  could 
take  the  field. 

On  May  ist,  as  Napoleon  was  pushing  forward  to 
seize  Leipzig,  his  troops  had  a  trifling  skirmish  with 
the  Russian  advanced-guard.  Although  this  some- 
what opened  the  eyes  of  the  Allies  to  the  fact  that 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  45 

they  had  a  regular  army  as  an  enemy  on  their  path 
they  still  refused  to  believe  that  it  was  an  efficiently 
trained  force  or  that  Napoleon  could  possibly  be 
again  in  the  field  with  the  numbers  he  had  actually 
with  him.  Wittgenstein  persisted  in  believing  that 
he  had  to  deal  only  with  a  comparatively  insignificant 
army  almost  exclusively  composed  of  recently  en- 
rolled young  conscripts.  So  strong  was  this 
conviction  that  he  assumed  the  offensive  hoping  to 
surprise  the  French  on  the  march.  With  this  object 
in  view,  he  pushed  forward  to  Lutzen  at  the  head  of 
about  seventy  thousand  men  and  suddenly  found 
himself  in  the  midst  of  Napoleon's  army.  The  battle 
of  May  2nd.  known  by  the  name  of  that  city,  was  the 
outcome  of  these  movements,  and  the  eyes  of  the 
Russian  general  were  soon  opened  to  the  great  mis- 
take he  had  made.  Although  the  nature  of  his 
offensive  movement  gave  him  some  advantage  at  the 
earlier  stages  of  the  battle  he  was  soon  heavily  re- 
pulsed by  the  troops  whom  Napoleon  had  thoroughl}- 
in  hand.  The  battle  was  indecisive,  but  Wittgen- 
stein's position  the  day  after  was  so  obviously  faulty 
and  dangerous  that  he  was  glad  to  escape  from  it  by 
a  rapid  retreat.  The  Emperor's  weakness  in  cavalry 
prevented  any  effective  pursuit,  and  the  defeated 
Allies  fell  back  in  safety  behind  the  Elbe. 

This  battle,  the  first  of  the  year,  though  without 
any  decisive  result— indeed,  a  rather  doubtful  French 
victory — was  yet  sufficient  to  inspire  Napoleon's 
young  soldiers  with  a  spirit  of  confidence  when  they 
found  themselves  pursuing  an  enemy  who  had  so 
lately  driven  the  Grand  Army  out  of  Russia. 


46 


THE  DECLINE    AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


By  May  8th  the  Allies  had  fallen  back  to  the  strong 
position  of  Bautzen  and  Napoleon  had  made  a  trium- 
phant entry  into  Dresden,  the  home  of  his  faithful  ally 


k.  Position  of  Frinch  Army  ^^^^    qP    ^j^j.    baTTLES    OF -LEIPZIQ 

oil  October  lf> 

B   PosilioH  of  FitncK  Anitf  On  THE  i6tii  and  j3th  OCTOBER,  1813. 

on  October  18. 


C.  Russian  Army, 

D.  Austrian  Army. 
e.  Prussian  Army. 
F.  Swedijh  Army. 


the  King  of  Saxony.  That  monarch,  who  had  been 
hard  pressed  by  the  Austrians  to  abandon  his  friend, 
now  returned  to  his  capital.    Although  the  heart  of  his 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  47 

people  was  in  the  great  German  movement  against 
the  French  Emperor,  he  was  able,  by  his  persona] 
influence,  to  place  the  whole  resources  of  his  kingdom 
at  Napoleon's  disposal.  For  the  time,  at  least,  this 
checked  the  contagion  of  desertion  from  the  French 
alliance. 

This  occupation  of  Dresden,  together  with  Ney's 
capture  of  Torgau  and  that  of  Hamburg  by  Davoust 
placed  the  line  of  the  Elbe  once  more  in  Napoleon's 
hands. 

It  is  a  remarkable  feature  in  the  decline  of 
Napoleon's  fortune  that  he  won  many  battles  where 
he  only  just  missed  gaining  the  decisive  success  that 
would  in  all  probability  have  restored  his  position  in 
Europe.  The  last  day's  battle  near  Smolensk,  in  the 
previous  year,  is  a  case  in  point.  It  might,  it  ought 
to  have  ended  in  the  complete  destruction  of  Barclay's 
army  ;  and  had  it  done  so,  it  would  most  probably 
have  insured  peace  on  terms  in  every  way  acceptable 
to  the  French  Emperor.  The  battle  of  Bautzen,  which 
now  followed,  is  another  instance. 

The  Allies,  about  150,000  strong,  had  taken  up  a 
very  strong  position,  with  their  left  resting  on  the 
Bohemian  mountains,  and  had  strongly  fortified  it. 
It  had,  however,  one  most  serious  defect  :  there  was 
only  one  line  of  retreat  from  it.  This,  Napoleon's 
quick  eye  took  in  at  once,  and  he  laid  his  plans 
accordingly.  His  intention  was  to  assail  it  in  front 
himself  with  about  80,000  men  whilst  Ney  with  about 
70,000  more  should  fall  upon  the  right  flank  and  rear 
of  the  Allies  to  cut  them  off  from  their  only  line  of 
retreat.     But  the  handwriting  on  the  wall  had  already 


48         THE  DECLINE  AND   FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

condemned  Napoleon  to  eventual  destruction  ;  and 
here,  as  throughout  the  remaining  events  of  his  career, 
the  cup  of  success  was  dashed  from  his  lips  just  as  he 
essayed  to  drink  from  it.  Ney  failed  to  carry  out 
the  mission  entrusted  to  him  and  which  in  the 
morning  he  had  started  to  execute.  The  Prussians 
held  the  right  of  the  Allied  position.  Blucher,  who 
commanded  them,  had  detached  a  small  force  of 
infantry  and  artillery  to  protect  his  rear,  and  with  it 
Ney  became  engaged.  Instead  of  pressing  his  march 
along  the  rear  of  the  Allied  Army  to  cut  off  its 
retreat  and  attack  it  in  rear  whilst  Napoleon  assailed 
it  in  front,  Ney  allowed  his  movement  to  be  checked 
and  his  direction  diverted  by  this  insignificant 
Prussian  detachment.  This  fighting  soon  roused 
Blucher  to  a  sense  of  his  extreme  danger  and  he  at 
once  fell  back  and  made  good  his  retreat.  Barclay 
with  his  Russians  took  up  the  duties  of  a  rearguard, 
and,  having  shown  a  good  front  to  his  enemy  as 
long  as  daylight  lasted,  he  also  got  safely  away  during 
the  night.  It  was  entirely  Ney's  fault  that  the 
Prussian  and  the  Russian  armies  were  thus  able  to 
escape  from  the  snare  so  well  devised  by  Napoleon 
to  catch  them  in.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the 
French  army  was  quite  half  again  as  strong  as  theirs 
was.  Such  are  the  uncertainties  of  war  even  when 
waged  under  the  personal  direction  of  so  great  a 
captain  as  Napoleon.  Ney,  in  fact,  had  only  succeeded 
in  manoeuvring  the  Allies  out  of  a  position  in  which 
Napoleon  inten  led  to  destroy  them  and  where  they 
must  have  been  destroyed  had  his  orders  been  skilfully 
obeyed.     Had  the  Emperor  left  Ney  to  attack  in  front 


The  campaign  of  1813.  49 


whilst  he  himself  directed  the  turning  movement. 
Bautzen  would  doubtless  have  been  one  of  the  most 
complete  victories  he  ever  gained.  Indeed,  it  is  hardly 
possible  to  doubt  that  he  would  have  almost  regained 
at  a  blow  his  former  position  in  Europe.  The  whole 
available  force  of  the  Russians  and  Prussians  within 
the  region  of  operations  would  have  been  hopelessly 
broken  up.  Austria,  which  was  waiting  to  see  which 
way  victory  inclined,  would  have  held  back  from  the 
Alliance  against  him  ;  he  could  then  have  easily 
crushed  the  troops  being  collected  at  Berlin,  and  the 
provinces  that  subsequently  became  the  recruiting 
ground  for  armies  to  be  employed  against  him  would 
have  remained  subject,  being  held  in  subjection  by 
his  triumphant  legions. 

Both  Lutzen  and  Bautzen  were  bloody  contests  for 
the  two  contending  sides  yet  neither  led  to  any 
decisive  result.  Well  indeed  may  the  baffled  Emperor 
have  cried  in  anger,  "  What  a  ma.ssacre  for  nothing  !  " 
Although  the  Allies  again  made  good  their  retreat 
after  the  battle  of  Bautzen,  both  it  and  Lutzen  were 
held  to  be  substantial  PVench  victories  in  the  general 
estimation  of  Europe.  They  reasserted  Napoleon's 
military  ascendency  and  weakened  the  mfluence  of  the 
secret  societies  which  were  then  in  full  blast  through- 
out Central  Europe.  These  societies  worked  hard  to 
dissolve  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  and  to  accom- 
plish the  Emperor's  downfall.  Every  allied  army  is 
weak  through  the  national  jealousy  of  the  troops  em- 
ployed—  a  feeling  which  is  often  seriously  heightened 
by  the  envious  rivalry  of  their  respective  leaders.  In 
this  instance  an  angry  spirit  had  already  grown  up 

E 


ro  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

between  the  two  allies  then  in  the  field.  The 
Prussians  attributed  their  defeat  to  Wittgenstein's 
want  of  ability,  and  the  Russians  began  to  murmur 
at  having  to  fight  battles  in  defence  of  Prussian 
territory. 

The  natural  and  safe  line  of  retreat  for  the  allied 


BttRNADOTTE. 


Prussian  and  Russian  army  would  have  been  north- 
wards, towards  Prussia  and  Poland.  To  retreat  in  an 
easterly  direction  to  Silesia,  along  the  Austrian  frontier, 
was  certain  destruction  if  Austria  were  really  and 
honestly  neutral  as  she  still  professed  to  be.  Such  a 
line  of  retreat  would  have  enabled  Napoleon  to  drive 
them  into  Austrian  territory.     Viewing  the  tortuous 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  51 

policy  which  then  characterised  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna, 
it  is  difficult  to  guess  what  would  have  happened  had 
Napoleon  by  a  rapid  pursuit  driven  the  Russo-Prussian 
army  into  Bohemia.  This  would  have  forced  Austria's 
hand,  a  result  which  she  was  most  anxious  to  avoid  as 
she  still  desired  above  all  things  to  gain  time.  As  long 
as  she  professed  to  be  a  neutral  power  she  would  have 
been  bound  to  disarm  troops  which  had  taken  refuge 
in  her  territory.  Though  she  still  pretended  to  be  an 
ally,  the  line  of  retreat  adopted  by  the  Russians  and 
the  Prussians  after  Bautzen  caused  Napoleon  to  sus- 
pect the  existence  of  a  secret  understanding  between 
his  father-in-law  and  his  openly  avowed  enemies.  The 
possibilities  which  Austria's  adherence  to  the  Alliance 
would  open  up  seem  to  have  so  startled  Napoleon  that 
he  was  led  into  what  is  generally  acknowledged  to 
have  been  one  of  the  most  fatal  mistakes  he  ever  made. 
He  halted  his  armies,  arrested  the  further  progress  of 
the  campaign,  agreed  to  a  truce — to  which  the  Allies 
were  only  too  glad  to  consent — and  at  Prague  opened 
negotiations  for  peace.  This  secured  the  Allies  time, 
and  time  was  what  the  Allies,  and  Austria  in  particular, 
most  desired.  Russia  wanted  it  to  enable  her  to  bring 
up  the  great  levies  she  had  raised  during  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  previous  year.  They  had  now  been  converted 
into  soldiers,  but  enormous  distances  and  bad  roads 
separated  St.  Petersburg,  Moscow  and  the  still  more 
distant  Russian  provinces  from  Bohemia  whose 
borders  had  now  become  the  theatre  of  operations. 
The  time  thus  gained  enabled  Prussia  to  fill  the 
depleted  ranks  of  her  army  with  the  efficient,  well- 
drilled    soldiers   furnished    under   the    Short   Service 

£  2 


52  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

System,  which  the  genius  of  Scharnhorst,  Gneisenau 
and  Stein  had  created.  It  enabled  the  secret  societies, 
now  supported  by  powerful  governments,  to  sap  the 
very  foundations  of  Napoleon's  strength,  even  in  the 
German  States  where  his  word  was  still  law  ;  and  last, 
but  not  least,  it  gave  the  sovereigns  who  sought  his 
downfall  time  to  obtain  from  England  the  subsidies 
which  were  so  much  needed  by  states  impoverished 
through  his  wars,  his  "  Continental  system,"  and  the 
exactions  of  his  armies. 

Napoleon  wished  for  peace,  but  the  terms  he  de- 
manded were  preposterous,  while  those  offered  by 
Austria  were  fair  and  reasonable.  He  had  now 
retrieved  the  honour  of  the  French  army  after  its 
grievous  misfortunes  of  the  previous  year.  His  country 
was  weighed  down  with  taxation  and  drained  of  its 
manhood  to  find  soldiers  for  his  wars.  He  knew  she 
longed  for  peace,  and  all  his  best  Marshals  impressed 
upon  him  the  fruitlc'^sness  of  further  hostilities.  But 
his  pride  would  not  allow  him  to  make  peace  upon  any 
but  the  most  exacting  terms,  which  the  events,  so  far, 
of  this  campaign  did  not  warrant  his  demanding.  In 
this,  which  I  deem  to  have  Veen  the  turning  point  in 
his  career,  he  certainly  did  not  show  the  great  wisdom 
he  displayed  upon  nearly  every  other  serious  occasion 
in  his  life.  He  undoubtedly  misunderstood  the 
strength  of  the  forces,  of  the  moral  forces  especially, 
with  which  he  had  now  to  contend.  His  unbounded 
energy  and  the  great  machinery  he  had  inherited 
from  the  Revolution  as  its  executor — and  in  many  a 
sense  he  was  its  embodiment  also — had  hitherto  en- 
abled him  to  make  time  tell  in  his  favour.     It  usually 


T^lE    CAMPAIGN  OP  1813.  5^ 


does  tell  in  favour  of  the  despot  who  has  to  fight 
against  a  confederacy  of  many  long-established  nations 
bound  by  the  traditions  of  their  old-fashioned  and 
perhaps  cumbersome  mode  of  military  procedure.  But 
he  was  no  longer  contending  against  governments 
which,  out  of  tune  With  the  epoch,  were  fighting  ex- 
clusively for  the  [^reservation  of  an  archaic  state  policy 
as  best  they  could  w.th  armies  made  up  of  unwilling 
recruits.  He  had  now  to  face  the  rulers  of  an  almost 
united  Europe,  each  leading  a  nation  even  more 
anxious  to  destroy  him  than  those  rulers  were  them- 
.^elves. 

If  the  Allies  were  sincere  in  wishing  for  peace, 
Napoleon  ought  to  have  made  it  after  Bautzen  ;  if 
they  were  not  so  and  only  wished  to  deceive  him  in 
order  to  g^ain  time,  he  ought  to  have  seen  through 
their  deceit,  and  pressing  them  hard  before  their  rein- 
turcenients  could  arrive,  he  should  have  forced  them 
to  make  peace  upon  the  lines  which  Austria  declared 
she  was  willing  to  negotiate  upon. 

Hitherto  I  have  said  little  or  nothing  of  the  war 
which  England  was  then  waging  against  Napoleon  in 
the  Peninsula.  And  yet.  when  all  is  said  and  done 
and  every  allowance  is  made  for  the  stern  determina- 
tion of  the  Czar  and  his  allies  to  prosecute  the  war  to 
the  bitter  end,  it  must  be  generally  adm.tted  that  it 
was  the  war  maintained  by  England  agamst  France 
in  Spain  by  land  and  all  over  the  world  at  sea, 
together  with  the  pressure  which  she  brought  to  bear 
upon  Napoleon  by  means  of  her  lavish  subsidies,  that 
eventually  destroyed  him.  The  "  Spanish  ulcer." 
which  since  1808  had  been  tapping  the  strength  of  the 


54       The  deCUne  and  fall  of  naPoleoN. 

French  army,  now  told  seriously  against  Napoleon's 
power  in  Germany.  The  successive  defeats  sustained 
by  his  Marshals  beyond  the  Pyrenees  had  seriously 
reduced  the  number  of  French  troops  available  for 
service  elsewhere.  But  hitherto,  Wellington's  victories 
were  only  of  local  effect  ;  for  the  French  army  in 
Spain  had  all  along  been  vastly  superior  in  numbers 
to  his,  the  only  organised  force  Napoleon  had  to 
contend  with  there.  So  much  was  this  the  case,  that 
it  was  only  the  impossibility  of  any  effective  union 
between  the  French  Marshals  which  enabled  Welling- 
ton to  hold  his  own — a  circumstance  to  which  he  was 
also  indebted  for  being  able  to  defeat  them  separately 
one  after  the  other.  But  in  1 8 1 3  the  case  was  altogether 
different.  The  battle  of  Vittoria— fought  June  21st — 
was  no  mere  local  victory.  It  was  not  only  a  crushing, 
a  final  blow  to  Napoleon's  power  in  Spain,  but  it  laid 
the  south  of  France  open  to  invasion  by  Wellington's 
thoroughly  efficient  Anglo-Portuguese  army  at  a 
moment  when  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia  were 
preparing  to  invade  her  from  the  east.  Beyond  all 
doubt  this  great  victory  of  Wellington's  had  an 
important  influence  in  determining  the  action  of 
Austria  during  the  truce  and  the  negotiations  at 
Prague. 

When  hostilities  recommenced  on  August  iith,  the 
Allied  forces  in  Germany — about  500,000  strong  with 
1800  guns — were  divided  into  the  three  following 
armies  :  the  main  army  in  Bohemia,  under  Schwarz- 
enberg,  of  about  320,000  ;  that  of  Blucher  in  Silesia 
of  about  95,000  ;  and  of  Bernadotte,  at  Berlin,  of 
about  90,000  men.     There  were  also  some  divisions, 


THE   CAMPAIG.^  OF  I813.  55 


about  40.000  in  all,  employed  in  watching  the  French 
garrisons  of  Danzig  and  Hamburg  ;  and  behind  all. 
there  were  reserves  of  about  250,000  men.  Thi.s 
calculation  of  the  Allies  strength  does  not  include  the 
troops  in  Spain  under  Wellington  or  the  Austrian 
forces  in  Bavaria  and  Italy. 

After  all  Napoleon's  great  exertions,  he  had, 
available  for  field  operations  on  and  beyond  the  Elbe, 
only  about  400.000  men  with  1200  guns. 

The  Allies  determined  upon  the  following  scheme  of 
operations,  Bernadotte  was  to  cover  Berlin  and  drive 
Davoust  from  Hamburg,  and  Blucher  was  to  engage 
the  enemy  in  front  whilst  Schwarzenberg,  with  the 
main  army,  was  to  operate  against  his  communica- 
tions. This  last-named  move  would,  it  was  felt,  be 
greatly  facilitated  by  the  configuration  of  the  mountains 
which  form  the  northern  frontier  of  Bohemia. 

Schwarzenberg's  army,  with  which  were  the  Czar, 
the  Emperor  of  Austria,  and  the  King  of  Prussia,  was 
to  march  behind  the  screen  of  these  mountains  and 
fall  upon  the  defences  of  the  Elbe,  attacking  Dresden 
from  the  south,  and,  if  possible  from  the  west. 

Bernadotte's  army  at  Berlin  was  continually  growing 
in  size  and  increasing  in  efficiency.  Its  nucleus  con- 
sisted of  the  Swedes  he  had  brought  with  him  from  the 
north,  a  handful  of  English,  some  Russians,  and  the 
skeleton  of  a  Prussian  army  to  be  completed  by  re- 
servists and  recruits.  These  Prussians  joined  in  large 
numbers  all  eager  for  what  they  now  felt  to  be  a 
national  war  and  full  both  of  patriotic  enthusiasm  and 
bitter  hatred  of  the  French.  Bernadotte's  army  was  a 
source  of  considerable  anxiety  to  Napoleon  for  he  felt 


56  JH^  DECLIS'E   AS'b    FALL    Of^  S'aPoLEOM. 


that  if  he  did  not  crush  it  at  once,  whilst  it  was  still 
weak  from  want  of  orLjanisation  it  was  bound  to  be- 
come a  formida'ile  thorn  in  his  left  flank  when  ne 
advanced  bex'ond  the  I^lbe.  Blucher,  by  his  fiery 
patriotism,  imparted  to  his  army  in  Silesia  a  weight 
and  consequence  far  be\'ond  its  numbers  ;  and  General 
York's  corps,  which  formed  part  of  it,  also  added  to  its 


SCHWARZKNBERG. 


importance  from  the  fact  that  it  had  been  in   Russia 
with  Napoleon  and  had  been  the  first  to  desert  him. 

But  notwithstanding  the  numerical  superiority  of 
the  AHies  they  still  dreaded  to  engage  the  ^reat  king 
of  war  himself  Impressed  doubtless  by  their  failure 
in  the  first  phase  of  the  campaign  and  also  by  the  fact 
that  their  rapid  retreat  both  at  Lutzen  and  Bautzen 
had  rendered  those  French  victories  almost  fruitless 
in  result  for   Napoleon,  they  resolved    upon  a  novel 


Ttm  Campaign  of  1813.  57 


method  of  procedure  which  they  endeavoured  to  follow 
for  the  rest  of  the  war.  It  was.  to  attack,  whenever 
they  could,  any  army  that  was  commanded  by  any  of 
Napoleon's  Marshals,  but  if  Napoleon  were  prtsent,  to 
retreat  and  avoid  a  battle.  This  poiicy  proved  fatal 
to  most  of  Napoleon's  projects,  for  although  during 
the  following  campaign  he  made  many  rapid  advances 
and  forced  marches  in  the  hope  of  compelling  his 
enemy  to  fight,  he  always  failed  to  do  so.  Wherever 
he  appeared  the  threatened  Allied  commander  retired, 
like  an  ignis  fatinis,  before  him. 

It  is  quite  possible  that  as  yet  none  of  the  Allied 
sovereigns  may  have  seriously  contemplated  Napoleon's 
forcible  deposition,  much  less  have  formulated  any 
plan  for  bringing  it  about.  But  it  must  have  been 
very  evident  to  himself  that  if  his  army  were  defeated, 
or  if  he  even  failed  to  obtain  the  great  victory  between 
the  Elbe  and  the  Oder  upon  which  his  hopes  werj 
fixed,  he  would  soon  find  himself  standing  on  French 
soil  in  defence  of  the  Rhine  frontiei'.  Already  Wel- 
lington threatened  invasion  from  the  south,  and 
Napoleon  felt  that  he  could  best  defend  the  Pyrenees 
by  a  masterstroke,  as  of  yore,  in  Germany.  For  this 
his  best  chance  lay  in  a  vigorous  offensive  beyond  the 
Elbe  over  which,  after  Lutzen,  he  held  all  the  pas- 
sages. Its  strong  places  being  in  his  possession 
made  it  into  a  good  fortified  base  pushed  forward 
into  Germany  from  behind  which  he  might  deliver 
his  blows  in  safety.  His  plan  was  to  operate  with 
three  armies  :  one  under  Oudinot  against  Berlin, 
another  under  Macdonald  against  Blucher,  whilst, 
with  a  large  central  force  under  his  own  immediate 


S§         TtiE  bECUMM  AMb  FALL   OP  NAPOLEO^. 

command  he  would  be  able  to  rapidly  reinforce 
either  of  those  armies.  He  would  thus  temporarily 
make  the  reinforced  army  far  superior  in  numbers  to 
its  immediate  antasj^onist.  Besides  these  armies  there 
were  the  Corps  of  Vandamme.  St.  Cyr,  Victor,  and 
Poniatowski,  who  were  intended  to  hold  the  Elbe  and 
watch  Bohemia. 

This  scheme  of  campaign  may  be  fairly  described 
as  over-ambitious  and  on  too  grand  a  scale  when  we 
remember  how  numerically  inferior  his  army  was  to 
the  Allied  forces  arrayed  against  him.  It  was  a  bold 
game,  an  enormous  venture  for  the  great  prize  of 
Universal  Empire  at  which  he  had  aimed  so  long. 
In  framing  it  he  seems  to  have  ignored  the  disasters 
of  the  previous  year,  and  to  have  refused  to  admit 
that  his  renown  and  the  fear  in  which  all  nations  held 
him  were  not  what  they  had  been  before  he  had  led 
his  armies  across  the  Niemen.  But  in  his  opinion  it 
was  the  only  safe  course  to  take  if  he  meant  to  regain 
his  former  authority  in  Europe  and  to  bring  back  its 
sovereigns  to  their  previous  state  of  vassalage  to 
himself.  A  great  a  startling  military  success  was 
the  first  the  all-important  essential  for  his  plan,  and 
he  was  as  fully  sensible  of  the  difificulties  to  be 
encountered  before  he  could  secure  it  as  he  was  of 
the  dangers  to  his  throne  which  the  struggle  would 
involve.  This  policy,  which  he  deliberately  adopted, 
was  on  a  par  with  the  "  nothing  risk  nothing  win  "  the 
"  all  or  nothing  "  play  of  the  gambler,  who  having  had 
a  long  run  of  ill  luck,  and  finding  himself  nearly  ruined 
unwisely  and  recklessly  stakes  his  all  upon  one  venture. 

Finding  that  Blucher  was  the  first  of  his  antagonists 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  61 

to  move,  Napoleon  opened  the  campaign  by  a  rapid 
march  to  support  Macdonald.  But  before  Napoleon 
could  do  anything  against  the  veteran  Prussian  he  had 
fallen  back,  having  ascertained  that  the  Emperor  was 
present  with  the  army  in  his  front. 

Just  at  this  same  time  news  reached  Napoleon  that 
the  main  army  of  the  Allies  was  crossing  the  Bohe- 
mian frontier  with  the  evident  intention  of  attacking 
Dresden.  He  at  once  marched  back  upon  that  place, 
gathering  together  as  he  went  all  his  forces  from  the 
Bohemian  frontier. 

St.  Cyr  had  been  left  to  hold  Dresden,  but  its  dis- 
mantled defences,  which  Napoleon  had  ordered  to  be 
restored,  were  still  in  a  very  imperfect  condition. 
Napoleon's  intention  was  to  cross  the  Elbe  near  the 
Bohemian  frontier  and  whilst  St.  Cyr  held  the  Allied 
Army  in  front  to  fall  upon  its  rear,  and,  cutting  it  ofif 
from  every  line  of  retreat,  to  utterly  destroy  it.  A 
grand  combination  worthy  of  the  great  genius  who 
framed  it.  But  St.  Cyr  sent  him  an  urgent  despatch 
to  say  he  could  not  undertake  to  defend  Dresden  as 
it  was  then.  A:iother  plan  was  therefore  necessary 
and  it  was  formed  on  the  instant.  He  ordered 
Vandamme  with  30,000  men  to  occupy  a  position  in 
the  gorges  of  the  Erzgebirge  on  the  Allied  line  01 
retreat,  and  moved  himself  upon  Dresden  with  the 
remainder  of  the  troops  at  his  disposal.  He  reached 
that  city  at  10  A.M.  on  August  26th,  his  headquarters 
having  marched  about  120  miles  in  four  days.  His 
troops,  though  fatigued — for  the  roads  were  very  bad 
from  heavy  rain — pressed  eagerly  forward,  as  in  their 
best  davs,  to  meet  the  enemy. 


62         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

The  operations  which  led  to  the  battles  round 
Dresden  are  most  instructive  for  the  miUtary  student. 
On  one  side — until  Vandamme's  defeat  at  Kulm— - 
the  ablest  strategy,  the  most  fearless  decision,  the 
clearest  grasp  of  the  position,  and  the  most  rapid 
movements  ;  on  the  other,  divided  counsels,  feeble 
indecision,  and  a  dread  of  facing  their  redoubtable 
adversary.  The  presence  with  the  Allied  Army  of 
Emperors,  Kings,  and  their  attendant  ministers  and 
advisers  so  delayed  its  movements  that  it  was  not 
until  late  in  the  afternoon  of  August  26th  that  the 
Allies  began  their  attack  upon  Dresden,  being  then 
under  the  belief  that  Napoleon  was  absent.  For  so 
much  did  his  presence  count  on  any  field  of  battle 
that  as  soon  as  they  discovered  their  mistake  orders 
were  at  once  issued  to  suspend  the  attack.  It  was 
nevertheless  made — in  sheer  helplessness  it  would 
seem — and  was  bloodily  repulsed. 

By  the  following  day,  August  27th,  all  the  available 
French  troops  had  arrived  in  front  of  the  Allied  Army. 
Napoleon  made  a  careful  reconnaissance  of  the  posi- 
tion it  occupied  covering  the  heights  round  Dresden 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe.  The  centre  was  crowded 
with  masses  of  men  but  the  left  was  isolated  beyond 
the  deep  ravine  through  which  the  Weisseritz  flows 
into  that  river  below  the  city.  Upon  this  left  Napo- 
leon resolved  to  deliver  his  chief  attack  whilst  he 
held  in  check  the  densely-occupied  centre  by  the  fire 
of  a  great  array  of  field-guns.  His  attack  upon  the 
Allied  left  was  most  successful  ;  and,  as  soon  as  their 
infantry  had  been  driven  from  the  villages  the\'  occu- 
pied into  the  open  Murat,  who  directed  the  operation, 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  63 

poured  down  his  horsemen  upon  it.  This  isolated 
left  wing  was  utterly  destroyed  and  the  Allied  Army 
was  cut  off  from  all  hope  of  retreat  by  the  roads  in 
rear  of  that  flank.  In  the  meantime  Ney,  who  had 
operated  against  the  Allied  right,  succeeded  in  cutting 
off  their  retreat  by  that  flank,  and  their  crowded 
centre  had  suffered  heavily  from  the  batteries  which 
Napoleon  had  massed  against  it. 

Like  Turenne's  battle  at  Entzheim,  these  operations 
round  Dresden  were  executed  under  a  heavy  down- 
pour of  rain,  which  destroyed  the  roads  and  so 
rendered  all  retreat  most  difficult. 

This  was  the  only  occasion  upon  which  Napoleon 
ever  attacked  both  wings  of  a  superior  enemy  in 
position  contenting  himself  simply  with  a  heavy 
artillery  fire  upon  the  hostile  centre.  The  object  he 
here  aimed  at  was  to  cut  off  the  Allies  from  their 
easiest  line  of  retreat  and  compel  them  to  retire  by 
their  centre  upon  the  passes  through  the  Erzgebirge  in 
which  Vandamme  was  posted  to  bar  the  way. 

Obliged  to  fall  back,  principally  from  want  of  pro- 
visions and  ammunition  the  arrival  of  which  had  been 
prevented  by  the  badness  of  the  roads,  the  Allies  thus 
found  themselves  restricted  to  one  road  as  their  line  of 
retreat.  At  first  Napoleon  pressed  their  retiring 
columns  with  his  wonted  energy  and  as  long  as  he 
remained  to  direct  the  operations  everything  went 
well.  Knowing  the  position  which  Vandamme 
occupied  in  the  mountains  he  was  justified  in  believing 
that  the  destruction  of  the  whole  Allied  Army  was 
certain.  The  capture  of  the  two  Emperors  and  the 
King  of  Prussia  would  most  probably  re-establish  his 


6 1  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


renown  and  authority  which  had  been  so  seriously 
shaken  by  the  disastrous  retreat  from  Moscow,  How 
all  these  speculations,  these  hopes  must  have  filled 
Napoleon's  mind  at  this  critical  moment!  How  he 
must  have  congratulated  himself  upon  having  adopted 
the  audacious  policy  he  had  followed  instead  of 
standing  upon  the  defensive  near  the  Rhine,  as  most 
leaders  would  have  done  under  similar  circumstances  ! 
What  stupendous  anxieties  must  then  have  crowded 
that  mighty  brain  !  What  consequences,  not  only  for 
himself  but  for  all  Europe,  depende  1  upon  the  turn 
which  the  events  of  the  next  few  hours  might  take  ! 
Oh,  war  is  a  terrible  thing  from  every  aspect  ;  but  in 
none  is  it  more  so  than  in  its  awe-inspiring  uncertainty, 
and  the  chances  which  affect  its  results.  Well  indeed 
may  Turenne  have  said,  that  after  the  ablest  com- 
binations have  been  planned  by  the  first  generals 
three-fourths  of  the  result  still  depend  upon  accident. 
Here  is  an  illustration  in  point,  for  here  once  more  the 
evil  genius  of  what  I  may  call  Napoleon's  declining 
years  snatched  from  him  the  results  which  he  had 
every  right  to  expect  from  his  recent  victory. 

He  suddenly  relinquished  his  personal  direction  of 
the  pursuit  and  went  back  to  Dresden.  That  it  was 
illness  or  physical  prostration  which  caused  him  to  do 
so  there  can  be,  I  think,  no  doubt.  The  man  who 
hitherto  throughout  this  campaign  had  been  on  horse- 
back at  daybreak  each  morning  when  there  was 
fighting  to  be  expected  was  not  likely  to  have 
abandoned  this  pursuit — upon  which  his  very  existence 
as  Emperor  depended — had  h-:;  been  strong  enough, 
bodily  and  mentally,  to  have  continued  it.     Bat  at  this 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  65 


critical  moment  he  seems  to  have  suddenly  become  an 
altered  man  We  know  that  he  was  exposed  during 
the  battle  to  the  drenching  rain  which  fell  that  day 
and  this  may  have  brought  on  an  attack  of  that 
mysterious  malady  to  which  I  referred  in  the  previous 
chapter.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  there  is  a 
sudden  and  unmistakable  change  in  the  tone  and 
spirit  of  the  letters  he  wrote  after  his  return  to  Dresden 
from  those  he  had  previously  written.  At  first  his 
orders  for  the  pursuit  are  clear,  vigorous,  and  charac- 
teristic. Suddenly  the  Marshals  are  left  without  in- 
structions and  the  pursuit  is  relaxed  in  consequence. 

The  Allies,  no  longer  harassed  or  pressed  in  rear, 
had  time  thus  allowed  them  to  realise  that  with  their 
overwhelming  numbers  they  could  easily  brush 
Vandamme  from  their  path.  This  they  did  at  Kulm 
on  August  30th,  his  cavalry  and  about  ten  thousand 
foot  alone  escaping  to  rejoin  Napoleon.  Vandamme, 
who  boasted  that  he  feared  neither  God  nor  devil,  was 
taken  prisoner  and  all  his  guns  and  the  rest  of  his 
force  were  either  captured  or  destroyed.  "  Vandamme," 
said  Napoleon,  "  is  very  precious  to  me  for  if  ever  I 
have  occasion  to  make  war  against  the  infernal 
regions  he  is  the  only  general  I  have  who  would  be 
capable  of  tackling  the  devil." 

In  the  meantime  Oudinot  with  6o,o0O  men  had 
been  heavily  defeated  on  August  26th  at  Gross  Beeren 
by  Bernadotte  with  an  army  over  1 50,000  strong  and 
composed  of  better  elements  than  Napoleon  had  given 
it  credit  for.  Gerard's  Division,  which  had  hastened 
to  Oudinot's  assistance,  was  almost  entirely  destroyed. 
This   was    Napoleon's  first  experience  of  the    power 

F 


66         THE  DECLINE  Ar^D  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

which  a  Short  Service  System,  well  applied,  gives  the 
ruler  who  is  shrewd  enough  to  make  use  of  it.  Though 
Swedes,  English,  and  Russians  were  important 
elements  in  Bernadotte's  army  at  Berlin  it  was  on 
Bulow's  Prussian  Corps,  formed  almost  entirely  of 
Reservists,  that  most  of  the  fighting  at  Gross  Beeren 
had  fallen. 

On  August  26th  Macdonald's  army,  about  8o,oco 
strong,  having  been  caught  by  Blucher  in  the  act  of 
passing  the  Katzbach  was  driven  back  upon  its  swollen 
torrent  and  escaped  with  barely  20,000  men. 

These  defeats  at  Kulm,  Gross  Beeren,  and  the 
Katzbach  were  heavy  blows  to  the  fighting  efficiency 
of  Napoleon's  army  in  Germany,  and  were  deadly 
wounds  to  his  reputation  for  invincibility.  They  were 
all  the  more  serious  because  they  served,  in  a  remark- 
able degree,  to  give  new  life  to  the  Allied  forces 
whose  spirit  had  been  damped  by  their  defeats  at 
Dresden  and  by  the  perils  of  their  retreat  from  that 
city — perils  which  were  appalling  as  long  as  Napoleon 
was  able  to  direct  the  pursuit  in  person.  They 
inspired  all  Germans  with  increased  determination  to 
fight  the  war  out  to  the  bitter  end,  and  increased  both 
the  number  of  recruits  who  joined  the  regular  army 
and  of  the  Corps  of  Free  Lances  who  now  harassed 
Napoleon's  communications  everywhere.  Time  was 
working  against  him  and  every  hour  that  did  not 
represent  progress  for  his  arms  was  a  fatal  loss  to  him  ; 
for  England  was  now  straining  every  nerve  to  re-arm 
the  populations  whom,  after  his  early  career  of  victory, 
he  had  disarmed  lest  they  should  fight  against  him. ' 
Napoleon  now  despatched    Ney  with  fresh  troops 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  67 

towards  Berlin.  He  had  intended  to  reinforce  him 
with  his  own  central  army  but  the  necessity  of 
supporting  Macdonald's  broken  army  obliged  him 
instead  to  hurry  forward  against  Blucher.  That 
fighting  Field  Marshal,  however,  as  soon  as  he  heard 
that  Napoleon  was  with  the  army  marching  to  attack 
him,  fell  back  promptly  to  avoid  a  battle.  Meantime 
the  Grand  Army  of  the  Allies,  relieved  of  Napoleon's 
presence,  again  passed  the  Bohemian  mountains  to 
threaten  Dresden  for  the  second  time.  This  move 
brought  back  Napoleon  in  a  hurry  to  that  city  in  the 
hope  of  once  more  catching  that  Army,  and  in  this 
instance  of  destroying  it  after  he  had  beaten  it  in 
battle.  Here  again  he  was  doomed  to  disappoint- 
ment for  as  soon  as  his  return  became  known  the 
Allies  again  retired  behind  the  Erzgebirge,  and 
Blucher  resumed  the  offensive  against  Macdonald. 
Meanwhile,  Ney,  unsupported  and  left  without  the 
personal  direction  of  Napoleon,  had  advanced  against 
Bernadotte  and  was  severely  defeated  at  Dennewitz 
on  September  6th. 

All  Napoleon's  movements  were  closely  watched 
by  irregular  troops  who  obtained  the  best  information 
everywhere  from  the  inhabitants  who  in  all  districts 
were  well-wishing  informers  and  self-constituted  spies. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  had  the  utmost  difficulty  in 
obtaining  reliable  information  about  his  enemies' 
doings  or  whereabouts.  Nothing  was  more  remark- 
able about  Napoleon's  personal  conduct  of  a  war  than 
the  skill  and  energy  he  always  displayed  in  his 
arrangements  for  securing,  at  every  phase  of  a  cam- 
paign, the  earliest  and  best  intelligence  of  all  that  was 

F  2 


68         THE   DECLINE  AND   FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

taking  place  in  the  theatre  of  war  whilst  he  carefully 
concealed  his  own  movements  and  intentions  from 
♦  he  enemy.  He  lays  it  down  as  a  maxim  that  the 
general  who  has  to  remain  in  ignorance  of  his 
enemies'  proceedings  is  ignorant  of  his  trade.  Yet  in 
this  campaign,  especially  after  the  truce,  he  could 
learn  very  little  about  the  distribution  and  strength 
of  the  Allied  Armies  opposed  to  him  ;  whilst  on  the 
other  hand,  although  the  efforts  made  and  the  methods 
pursued  by  Schwarzenberg  and  the  Allied  headquarters 
for  this  purpose  were  feeble  in  the  extreme,  they 
had  good  information  about  the  French  armies.  The 
passionate  hatred  of  millions  which  his  "  Continental 
system  "  and  his  soldiers'  treatment  of  the  inhabitants 
had  roused  against  him  made  it  difficult  for  his  spies 
to  act,  and  this  in  a  great  measure  made  up  for  the 
deficiencies  of  the  Allied  leaders  in  this  respect.  His 
complete  ignorance  of  the  strength  and  real  com- 
position of  Bernadotte's  army  in  Berlin,  which  was 
the  main  cause  of  Ney's  and  Oudinot's  disastrous 
defeats,  is  a  good  illustration  of  what  I  mean.  But 
the  general  failure  of  his  Marshals  in  1813  was 
largely  owing  to  the  military  system  which  he  had 
created,  I  mean  the  centralization  of  all  initiative  in 
himself. 

Napoleon's  armies  were  thus  rapidly  crumbling 
away  under  the  hands  of  his  Marshals  whilst  the 
Allies  successfully  evaded  his  own  blows.  He  made 
repeated  efforts  to  overwhelm  Blucher  but  to  no 
purpose,  for  as  I  have  stated  that  wily  soldier  either 
retreated  or  by  calling  in  his  detached  forces  became 
too    .strong   to    be    attacked   with   any   certainty    of 


THE    CAMPAIGN  OF  i%\i.  69 

success.  Upon  each  occasion  Napoleon  was  com- 
pelled to  relinquish  the  hope  of  crushing  Blucher  and 
to  fall  back  nearer  France. 

These  retirements  of  their  great  adversary  in  person 
increased  the  confidence  of  the  Allies.  Bennigsen, 
with  a  fresh  Russian  army,  was  near  at  hand,  and 
this,  amongst  other  reasons,  now  caused  the  Allied 
leaders  to  resolve  upon  taking  the  offensive.  Their 
plan  was,  that  Blucher  and  Bernadottc  on  one  flank 
and  the  main  army,  strengthened  by  Bennigsen,  on 
the  other  were  to  cross  the  Elbe  and  join  hands  in 
rear  of  Napoleon's  army,  and  so  cut  it  off  from  its 
base  on  the  Rhine.  But  before  this  could  be  accom- 
plished the  defection  of  Bavaria  rendered  Napoleon's 
forward  position  so  dangerous  that  he  felt  obliged  to 
fall  back  upon  Leipzig  with  all  his  forces,  a  point  so 
central  for  all  lines  of  communication  between  France 
and  Germany  that  he  could  not  afford  to  allow  the 
Allies  to  seize  it. 

In  this  historic  neiehbourhoo  1  both  the  contendin<j: 
sides  now  gathered  for  a  great  battle.  It  began  on 
October  i6th  and  lasted  three  uays.  Upon  each  of 
these  days  the  Allies  received  such  large  reinforce- 
ments that  they  were  able  to  hem  in  Napoleon  closer 
and  closer  within  a  circle  so  narrow  that  at  last  he 
could  manoeuvre  no  longer.  At  every  point  around 
him  he  was  met  with  greatly  superior  numbers.  On 
the  1 8th,  in  the  middle  of  the  battle,  the  Saxon  and 
Wurtemberg  contingents  went  over  to  the  Allies  and 
actually  turned  their  weapons  against  their  friends  of 
the  morning. 

Napoleon's  chief  of  the  staff,  accustomed   always  to 


70         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON. 


victory  when  carrying  out  the  schemes  of  his  great 
master,  had  made  no  proper  provision  for  the  retreat 
which  now  became  inevitable.  No  extra  bridges  had 
been  laid  across  the  Elster  and  none  of  the  impedi- 
menta had  been  sent  to  the  rear.  When,  therefore, 
the  retreat  began  in  the  early  morning  of  October  19th, 
there  was  great  confusion  from  the  intermingling  of 
troops  and  baggage.  The  rearguard  fought  splendidly 
but  was  eventually  cut  off  and  either  captured 
or  destroyed  through  the  premature  destruction 
of  the  bridge  it  was  to  have  retreated  by.  This 
battle  cost  Napoleon  about  50,000  men,  300  guns, 
and  a  great  mass  of  military  material  ;  but  yet  when 
his  old  aUies,  the  Bavarians,  strove  to  bar  his  passage 
he  brushed  them  aside  with  ease  and  succeeded  in 
recrossing  the  Rhine  at  Mayence  on  November  2nd. 
Not  more,  however,  than  about  75,000  or  80,000  good 
troops,  the  remains  of  the  large  army  with  which  he 
opened  the  campaign  six  months  before,  crossed  that 
river  with  him. 

The  Allies,  instead  of  pursuing  vigorously,  spent 
the  next  two  months — almost  uselessly — in  reducing 
the  many  fortresses  still  held  by  the  French  on  the 
Elbe  the  Oder  and  the  Vistula.  Had  they  pressed 
Napoleon  hard  they  might  have  destroyed  his  army 
before  it  could  recross  the  Rhine.  Had  this  been  the 
result  of  the  campaign  the  Allied  sovereigns  might 
have  eaten  their  Christmas  dinner  in  the  Tuileries, 
and  we  should  not  have  had  the  history  of  the  inter- 
esting but  useless  campaign  of  18 14  to  record.  But 
the  weakness  and  folly  of  the  Allies  in  failing  to  pur- 
sue with  all  their  might  not  only  gave  some  respite  to 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  xZ\->>-  71 

Napoleon's  jaded  troops,  but  also  gave  him  time  to 
prepare  for  that  most  remarkable  campaign  which 
began  about  the  end  of  the  following  January. 

Both  in  1812  and  18 13  the  collapse  of  the  Imperial 
power  was  mainly  due  to  causes  which  for  some  years 
had  been  sapping  the  foundations  on  which  it  rested, 
whilst  they  left  the  edifice  itself,  apparently,  as  stately 
and  imposing  as  ever.  The  failure  of  Schwarzen- 
bersr's  Austrians  in  18 12  and  the  defection  of  York 
were  only  more  overt  signs  of  what  was  happening 
in  detail  wherever  Napoleon's  armies  moved  or 
wherever  the  authority  of  his  edicts  was  recognised. 
The  sentiment  of  all  European  nations  was  bitterly 
hostile  to  him,  and  this  accounts  largely  for  the  slow 
movement  and  frequent  destruction  of  the  supply- 
trains  upon  which  his  army  depended.  The  drivers 
and  conductors — mostly  German — forced  to  serve 
with  these  trains,  loathed  helping  their  conqueror. 

The  composition  of  his  army,  more  than  any  other 
one  cause,  had  forced  him  onwards  when  he  hesitated 
at  Smolensk  as  to  whether  he  should  winter  there  or 
push  on  for  Moscow.  The  great  forces  with  which  he 
appeared  in  Russia  and  with  which  he  reappeared  in 
the  18 1 3  campaign  were  largely  swollen  by  allies  held 
to  him  only  by  a  belief  in  his  power — in  what  the 
world  conceived  to  be  his  omnipotence.  But  when 
that  belief  was  rudely  shaken  by  the  destruction  of 
his  army  in  Russia  they  were  only  too  ready  to  de- 
sert him  :  in  fact,  they  began  to  fear  his  enemies  more 
than  they  feared  him  ;  and  in  the  campaign  of  18 13 
all  these  hostile  elements  made  themselves  more  felt 
than  in  the  previous  year. 


72         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

Independently  of  Napoleon's  failure  to  destroy  his 
enemy  after  the  battle  of  Dresden  he  made  several 
mistakes  this  year.  But  they  were  more  mistakes 
in  diplomacy  than  in  the  practice  of  war.  His  re- 
jection of  the  terms  proposed  by  Austria  during  the 
truce  will  always  seem  the  height  of  folly  to  most 
men  ;  and,  amongst  the  errors  in  his  military  plans 
we  are  most  struck  with  his  having  locked  up,  to  no 
useful  purpose,  an  army  of  about  a  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  soldiers  in  the  fortresses  on  the  Oder  and 
the  Vistula.  It  is  easy  to  pick  holes  in  ihe  character 
even  of  a  saint,  to  point  out  errors  made  by  even  the 
real  kings  of  men  in  their  management  of  public 
affairs.  But  the  more  closely  we  study  the  pro- 
ceedings of  Napoleon  in  1813,  notwithstanding  the 
mistakes  he  made,  the  greater  appears  his  remarkable 
individuality,  and  the  more  inclined  we  are  to  say 
with  the  Duke  of  Wellington  about  him,  "  How  much 
the  fate  of  the  world  depends  upon  the  temper  and 
passions  of  one  man  !  " 

As  I  have  said  of  his  campaign  in  Russia  I  say  of 
this  in  Germany,  Napoleon  in  18 13  was  not  the  man 
he  was  in  1796  or  in  1805.  His  conceptions  were  as 
great,  the  grandeur  of  his  undertakings  was  as 
striking,  but  his  execution  was  not  as  of  yore.  His 
career  of  brilliant  success  had  made  him  believe  that 
he  was  not  only  different  from  other  men  in  brain- 
power but  that  a  special  goddess  of  victory  was  his 
guardian  angel,  and  that  he  was  the  favoured  son 
of  Fortune.  The  plans  he  devised  entitled  him  to 
expect  success  and  he  seems  to  have  believed  that 
a  special  providence — his  "  star  " — would  preside  over 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1813.  73 

their  execution.  Although  this  was  apparently  never 
absent  from  his  mind  yet  no  man  ever  left  the 
execution  of  his  plans  less  to  chance  than  he  did  as 
long  as  his  health  and  strength  were  normal.  In  this 
campaign  we  read  of  him  being  on  horseback  at  all 
hours  watching  the  enemy  and  reconnoitring  the 
position  for  himself,  personally  superintending  the 
passage  of  his  troops  and  trains  over  rivers,  and  doing 
all  that  any  commander  in  his  best  days  could  have 
done  to  avoid  failure.  But  over  and  over  again  we 
find  luck  run  against  him. 

In  the  war-game  we  now  play  so  generally  in  our 
garrison  towns  the  dice  have  to  be  thrown  in  certain 
cases  when  squadrons  of  equal  strength  charge  one 
another.  Men  sometimes  say  that,  as  war  is  a  science, 
the  introduction  of  this  element  of  chance  into  the 
game  robs  it  of  much  of  its  instructional  value.  But 
those  who  know  what  real  war  is  smile  at  this 
criticism.  They  know  that  an  accidental  pain  in  the 
stomach  or  a  clod  in  the  eye  of  either  leader  at  the 
critical  moment  just  before  a  charge  may  always 
decide  the  result.  The  accidents  which  influence 
that  result  in  real  war  render  it  often  quite  as  much 
a  matter  of  chance  as  in  the  throw  of  the  dice  in  the 
Kriegspiel  of  peace. 

As  far  as  any  one  now  can  judge  of  what  might 
what  ought  to  have  happened  after  the  battle  of 
Dresden,  it  seems  very  evident  to  me  that  had  not 
Napoleon  withdrawn,  as  he  did,  from  the  personal 
direction  of  the  pursuit  nothing  could  have  saved  the 
Allied  Army  from  destruction  or  capitulation.  I  can 
only  find  one  explanation  of  that  withdrawal,  and  it 


74         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON. 

is  the  sudden  collapse  through  illness  at  the  moment 
of  Napoleon's  mental  and  physical  powers.  The  ball 
was  at  his  foot ;  but  he  turned  back  instead  of 
making  a  goal  and  his  subordinates  could  not  make 
it  for  him. 


(    75     ) 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   CAMPAIGN   OF    1814. 

During  the  month  of  November  18 13,  the  French 
armies,  after  their  defeat  at  Leipzig,  were  driven 
helter-skelter  towards  the  Rhine,  and  the  AlHes  in 
their  wake  approached  that  river  on  their  way  to 
Paris.  When  the  AlHed  sovereigns  reached  Frank- 
fort, the  difficulties  of  their  great  task  seem  to  have 
impressed  them,  for  they  began  to  realise  how 
unequal  their  generals  were  to  cope  with  Napoleon. 
It  is  therefore  scarcely  to  be  wondered  at  that,  not- 
withstanding their  recent  successes,  they  were  still 
prepared  to  treat  with  him  on  terms  that  would  have 
left  him  as  sovereign  over  a  greater  France  than  any 
of  its  legitimate  kings  had  ever  ruled  over.  Besides, 
his  father-in-law,  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  had  not  yet 
resolved  to  dethrone  his  own  daughter.  They  offered 
him  as  frontiers  the  Pyrenees,  Switzerland  and  the 
Rhine  to  the  sea,  besides  giving  him  Nice  and  Savoy. 
These  were  the  boundaries  which  had  been  the  day- 
dream of  Lewis  XIV.  and  which  Marlborough's 
victories  had  alone  prevented  him  from  securing. 

When  1814  opened.  Napoleon's  position  was  critical. 
With   the  exception    of  the  fortresses  which  he  still 


76  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

unwisely  held  on  the  Oder  the  Vistula  and  else- 
where he  had  lost  the  whole  of  Germany.  All  the 
great  military  powers  had  become — one  after  the 
other  —  his  enemies,  and  their  armies  were  in  full 
march  for  Paris.  Italy  and  Switzerland  had  just- 
turned  against  him  ;  the  English  fleets  had  driven  his 
flag  off  the  ocean,  and  Wellington,  at  the  head  of  a 
thoroughly  organised  army  well  experienced  in  war 
and  flushed  with  recent  victories,  was  already  on 
French  soil  threatening  his  capital  from  the  south. 

How  seriously  the  defeats  experienced  at  Moscow 
and  Leipzig  had  wounded  France  no  man  knew 
better  than  Napoleon.  But  in  the  game  of  war, 
especially  when  a  despot  like  Lewis  XIV.  is  pitted 
against  a  Confederation  of  many  nations,  time  often 
brings  many  chances  to  the  weaker 'side.  He  trusted 
so  much  to  this  and  to  his  own  skill  that,  although 
he  knew  that  every  arithmetical  calculation  was 
against  him  he  deliberately  preferred  to  trust  his 
luck  and  expose  his  country  to  the  likelihood  of  a 
mortal  blow  rather  than  accept  any  terms  which 
should  injure  his  own  future  renown  as  a  ruler  and 
a  conqueror.  To  satisfy  his  craving  for  immortal 
fame  the  fair  fields  of  France  must  be  given  over 
to  the  ravages  of  infuriated  Cossacks  and  her  capital 
occupied  by  revengeful  Prussians. 

The  France  he  had  to  work  upon  was.  however,  no 
longer  the  France  of  1805.  The  fields  were  largely 
fallow  from  the  lack  of  men  and  horses  to  till  them, 
and  nearly  all  agricultural  work  had  devolved  upon 
the  women  and  children.  After  a  quarter  of  a 
certury  of  revolutionary  horrors  and  imperial  victories 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  77 

exhausted  France  cried  aloud  for  peace  at  any  price  ; 
but  her  despot  would  not  hearken.  He  would  not 
have  it  at  the  cost  of  his  own  glor\'  and  future 
fame,  and  for  this  cruel  decision  future  ages  will 
condemn  him.  Come  what  might  he  was  determined 
to  immortalise  his  name  by  the  display  of  what  his 
great  military  genius  could  do  under  the  most  adverse 
circumstances.  He  would  have  it  remembered  by  all 
generations  of  Frenchmen  that  he  had  not  despaired 
of  the  destinies  and  fortune  of  France  even  in  her 
darkest  hour.  Under  a  pretended  all-absorbing  love 
for  her  he  hoped  to  hide  the  burning  craze  for  fame 
and  immortal  renown  which  now  filled  his  thoughts 
and  which  filled  them  from  boyhood  to  his  death. 
He  kept  for  his  brothers  ear  alone  that  according  to 
his  views  of  this  world,  "  it  is  better  to  die  a  king 
than  to  live  as  a  prince." 

In  ancient  history  we  read  of  men  who  lived  almost 
exclusively  for  fame,  for  the  admiration  of  future 
generations.  They  cared  little  for  the  hardships  and 
the  pains  of  war  or  how  others  suffered  from  them  as 
long  as  they  might  hope  thereby  to  render  their 
names  immortal.  But  in  this  thirst  for  the  applause 
and  worship  of  peoples  yet  unborn  few  have  equalled 
none  have  exceeded  Napoleon.  He  had  entered 
public  life  at  a  time  when  those  around  him  daily 
ransacked  the  histories  of  Greece  and  Rome  for 
tales  of  national  heroism,  when  even  the  unlettered 
crowd  had  learnt  to  babble  of  Csesar  and  of  Brutus. 
In  his  early  days  the  names  of  Leonidas,  Epami- 
nondas,  Fabricius,  Hannibal.  Scipio  and  other 
Grecian   and   Roman  heroes  were  constantly  on   the 


78         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   Of'  NAPOLEON. 


lips  of  the  real  as  well  as  the  sham  actors  in  what 
were  then  tlie  appalling  tragedies  of  every-day  life. 
Immortal  renown  was  the  great  aim  of  Napoleon 
and  no  man  at  any  period  ever  achieved  it  to  a 
greater  degree.  No  man  ever  lived  more  for  the 
future  than  he  did.  Very  early  in  his  career  he 
felt  that  historians  would  class  him  with  Cyrus, 
Alexander,  Mahomet,  and  the  greatest  conquerors 
who  had  overrun  the  earth.  He  knew  that  his  reign 
would  be  compared  with  that  of  Charlemagne, 
Henri  IV.  and  Lewis  XIV.  and  his  ambition  was  to 
leave  behind  him  a  name  greater  than  theirs.  Were 
he  now  to  make  peace  on  the  Allies'  conditions  how 
could  he  meet  on  equal  terms  the  spirits  of  other 
great  conquerors  in  those  Elysian  fields  of  which  he 
loved  to  talk  } 

His  mind  was  of  that  peculiarly  superstitious  nature 
that,  whilst  we  may  assume  he  had  never  bent  a  knee 
in  true  reverence  to  his  Maker,  he  did  firmly  believe  in 
some  good  spirit  who  watched  over  him  and  ensured 
him  success.  This  guardian  angel  had  pulled  him 
through  many  great  difficulties,  more  than  once  even 
converting  defeat  into  victory.  Why  should  Fortune 
now  turn  her  back  upon  the  ablest  soldier  of  the  age, 
the  wisest  and  greatest  man  alive !  His  thoughts 
were  more  occupied  with  future  history  and  as  to  how 
posterity  would  regard  him,  than  with  the  present  and 
the  events  taking  place  around  him.  Peering  afar  off 
into  future  ages  it  would  seem  as  if  the  glare  dazzled 
his  eyes,  so  that  he  had  no  power  to  take  in  any 
exact  estimate  of  the  things  near  and.  immediately 
surrounding    him.      As    a    soldier    he    had    equalled 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  79 


the  fame  of  Turenne,  even  of  Marlborough  ;  as  a 
king  he  had  brought  France  greater  renown  than 
Lewis  XIV.  ;  but  he  would  not,  like  that  monarch, 
self-styled  "  the  Great,"  sign  away  all  his  glory  in  any 
second  treaty  of  Utrecht. 

Throughout  this  campaign  Napoleon  did  all  he 
could  to  give  to  his  operations  the  colour  of  a  national 
war  waged,  as  in  1792,  in  defence  of  France  against 
invaders  bent  upon  her  destruction.  He  did  his  best 
to  pose  as  a  national  hero, — he  was  an  inimitable 
actor, — and  when  we  read  in  the  French  histories  of 
the  Allied  hosts  drawn  from  all  points  of  the  compass 
who  were  then  converging  upon  Paris,  we  are  apt  to 
think  of  him  as  the  soldier-patriot,  disputing  every 
inch  of  French  territory ;  as  the  giant  driven  to  bay, 
with  his  back  to  the  wall,  dealing  out  knock-me-down 
blows  first  to  one  then  to  the  other  of  his  antagonists 
as  each  in  turn  dared  to  assail  him.  The  mind  natur- 
ally recurs  to  young  William  of  Nassau's  heroic  defence 
of  Holland  when  it  was  invaded  by  Lewis  XIV. 
We  remember  William's  splendid  patriotism  during 
that  prolonged  struggle  :  how  he  fought  almost 
against  hope  ;  how  at  last,  sooner  than  surrender  his 
country  to  the  invader,  he  gave  back  to  the  sea  whole 
provinces  which  his  industrious  countrymen  had  re- 
claimed from  the  Northern  Ocean  ;  and  how,  when 
tempted  by  the  French  king  with  offers  of  personal 
sovereignty,  he  said  he  would  die  in  the  last  ditch 
sooner  than  forsake  the  people  who  had  trusted  him. 
But  our  William  III.  loved  Holland,  the  land  of  his 
birth,  with  all  his  heart  with  all  his  soul,  he  was  a 
real  patriot  and  hero.     But  superhuman  as  I  believe 


8o         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

Napoleon's  genius  to  have  been  I  cannot  feel  that 
in  the  three  last  years  of  his  wars  he  either  proved 
himself  a  hero  or  a  true  French  patriot.  Had  he 
loved  his  own  personal  renown  less  and  France 
more  how  different  would  have  been  his  end  !  how 
much  useless  loss  of  life  how  much  misery  and 
defeat  he  would  have  spared  France  !  When  we 
think  of  all  this,  I  can  well  understand  the  Frenchmen 
who,  loathing  his  memory,  remind  us  that  when,  as  a 
youth,  he  was  talking  of  his  future  to  his  most 
intimate  school  friend,  he  said  :  "  I  will  do  these 
Frenchmen  all  the  harm  I  can." 

Upon  his  return  to  Paris  after  Leipzig  he  called,  as 
usual,  for  large  levies,  but  few  except  mere  boys 
answered  the  call.  He  could  not  find  horses  for  his 
cavalry  and  many  of  the  newly-enrolled  foot  had 
neither  muskets  nor  belts.  Most  of  the  National 
Guard  were  in  sabots  and  blouses.  He  wanted 
money  but  time  was  still  more  required,  and  to  gain 
it  he  strove  to  obtain  an  armistice  early  in  the  cam- 
paign. The  Allies  would  not  listen  to  the  proposal. 
They  would  make  peace  at  once  on  their  own  terms, 
but  would  not  halt,  even  to  make  it,  until  they  had 
reached  Paris.  Napoleon  never  trusted  to  his  luck 
more  than  in  1814,  feeling  that  in  the  very  vast- 
ness  of  the  combination  against  him  there  were  many 
elements  that  might  at  any  moment  declare  in  his 
favour.  He  thoroughly  understood  the  inherent 
weakness  of  all  Coalitions  :  on  this  point,  as  on  many 
others,  he  had  not  studied  Marlborough's  campaigns 
in  vain.  He  very  naturally  looked  for  the  chances 
which  would    be  afforded  him    by  an   Allied   Army 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1 814.  81 

commanded  by  three  sovereigns,  all  more  or  less 
jealous  of  one  another  and  each  with  special  interests 
to  serve. 

The  nine  weeks'  campaign  of  18 14  was  the  only 
defensive  one  Napoleon  ever  waged.  In  his  previous 
wars  he  had  always  taken  the  initiative  and  assuming 


1.ANNES. 

a  vigorous  and  rapid  offensive  had  overwhelmed 
his  enemy,  not  only  by  superior  strategy  but  by 
the  force  and  rapidity  of  his  blows,  until  his 
adversary  lay  prostrate  before  him  bleeding  from 
every  pore. 

By  November  ist,  having  placed  the  Rhine  between 

G 


82         THE  DECLINE  AND   FALL    OF  NAPOLEON. 

his  disorganised  troops  and  the  enemy,  his  first  idea 
was  to  hold  that  river  if  possible  in  order  to  retain 
the  provinces  on  its  left  bank  as  a  recruiting  ground 
and  to  obtain  a  revenue  from  them.  He  had  not 
expected  that  the  Allies  would  have  embarked  in  a 
winter  campaign  and  had  fondly  hoped  that,  protected 
by  that  river,  he  would  have  had  time  allowed  him  to 
reorganise  his  army  and,  by  the  augmentation  of 
another  conscription,  to  prepare  it  for  a  new  campaign 
in  the  following  spring.  But  here  his  calculations 
were  at  fault.  His  energy  was  as  fierce  as  ever  and 
his  plans  and  arrangements  were  stamped  with  all  his 
usual  ability  ;  the  Allies  moved  slowly  and  timidly 
and  ignorantly  after  they  had  crossed  the  Rhine ; 
he  won  what  he  announced  in  Paris  as  victories  ;  but 
notwithstanding  all  this  he  never  was  given  the  time 
he  required  to  drill  or  arm  and  equip  the  conscripts 
who  obeyed  the  Senate's  call  for  300,000  fresh 
soldiers.  Most  people  now  agree  in  thinking  that  as 
soon  as  he  found  the  Allies  were  actually  crossing 
into  France,  he  should  have  made  peace  upon  the 
best  terms  he  could  obtain. 

Many  ambitious  self-seekers  mistake  their  own 
personal  aims  and  their  mad  quest  after  personal  fame 
for  the  good  and  the  renown  of  their  country, — this  is 
not  uncommon  in  political  life.  But  Napoleon  was 
far  too  shrewd  and  able  a  man  to  entertain  any  such 
illusion,  although  he  had  at  all  times  striven  to 
impress  France  with  the  conviction  that  whatever  he 
did  was  done  purely  in  her  interests,  and  in  18 14 
that  he  was  only  fighting  in  her  cause.  When  a 
prisoner  at   St.    Helena  he   mendaciously  strove  to 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  83 

make  the  world  accept  this  explanation  of  his  strange 
and  reckless  conduct  in  that  year. 

Determined  to  carry  on  the  war,  as  soon  as  the 
Allies  began  to  cross  the  Rhine  he  felt  that  with  his 
weakened  forces  it  was  hopeless  to  think  of  main- 
taining himself  on  that  river.  He  accordingly  ordered 
the  corps  under  Ney,  Victor,  and  Marmont,  to  fall  back 
upon  Verdun,  Chalons,  and  Bar-sur-Aube,  before  the 
advancing  enemy.  Besides  these  there  were  also 
available  Mac  Donald's  corps  and  the  guard  under 
Mortier  and  Oudinot.  In  this  year's  war  the  number 
of  troops  engaged  is  more  than  usually  uncertain  ; 
besides.  Napoleon's  very  rapid  movements  and  the 
great  exposure  to  which  his  men  were  subjected 
thinned  his  ranks  day  by  day.  In  all  wars  forced 
marches  and  constant  movement  soon  cause  the 
strength  of  battalions  to  dwindle  away  even  in  fine 
weather  ;  but  the  cold  and  rain  of  winter  and  the 
irregularity  of  supplies  which  repeated  forced  marches 
entail  increase  the  rate  of  diminution  enormously. 
The  whole  of  his  drilled  and  equipped  army  at  the 
date  when  the  Allies  passed  the  Rhine  was  only  some- 
thing between  seventy  and  eighty  thousand,  of  which 
about  one-fourth  were  cavalry :  the  proportion  of  his 
guns  to  men  was  much  larger  than  was  usual  at  that 
period.  During  the  progress  of  the  campaign  he 
frequently  received  reinforcements  which  materially 
increased  his  strength  ;  those  which  joined  the  Allies 
were  more  numerous,  but  they  brought  with  them 
much  sickness  contracted  during  their  long  line  ol 
march. 

Though  Napoleon    recovered    fairly  well  from  the 

G  2 


84         THE  DECLINE  AND   FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

disasters  of  Moscow  he  never  did  so  from  the  defeat 
at  Leipzig.  For  the  campaign  of  1813  he  had  still 
untouched  in  the  vaults  of  the  Tuileries  an  immense 
reserve  fund  upon  which  to  draw  when  money  grew 
scarce,  and  the  manhood  of  the  country  had  not  been 
as  yet  exhausted.  This  was  all  changed  now  and 
the  taxes  had  become  enormous :  that  on  income 
alone  was  25  per  cent,  for  all  non-military  people. 
This  caused  the  rich  and  the  middle  classes  to  long 
for  a  Bourbon  restoration  and  reduced  the  poor  to 
abject  want.  But  these  taxes  came  in  slowly,  and 
Napoleon  soon  spent  all  the  ready  money  which 
remained  to  him  in  refitting  his  retreating  army  and 
in  the  equipment  of  the  new  levies  he  was  collecting. 
France  had  no  longer  her  former  faith  in  him  and 
began  at  last  to  regard  his  wars  as  both  endless  and 
aimless.  The  strictly  enforced  conscriptions  of  the 
last  two  years  had  denuded  the  Ian  J  o{  young  men  : 
the  only  males  to  be  seen  in  the  villages  were  the 
boys  and  old  fathers  of  families.  In  fact,  he  had 
forestalled  the  annual  contingents  of  recruits  by  some 
)'ears.  In  every  department  of  the  Empire  there  was 
now  a  decided  inclination  to  resist  the  conscription  as 
far  as  men  could  safely  venture  to  do  so.  In  many 
districts  those  drawn  to  be  soldiers  had  taken  to  the 
woods.  The  worst  features  of  the  press-gang  in  its 
most  oppressive  days  were  distanced  by  the  cruelties 
of  Napoleon's  latest  conscriptions.  Of  the  300,000 
men  voted  to  reinforce  his  army  after  the  disasters  of 
Leipzig,  only  63,000  had  answered  the  caU  by 
January  31st,  18 14.  The  unwisdom  and  inexpedi- 
ency of  his  "  Continental   system "  was  now    openly 


THE    CAMPAlGiV  OF  1S14.  85 

acknowledged  and  freely  spoken  of,  and,  amongst 
what  we  may  at  least  by  courtesy  style  the  ruling 
classes  under  such  a  ruler,  there  had  grown  up  a 
craving  for  that  tranquil  prosperity  which  as  was 
now  generally  believed  his  wars  made  impossible. 
The  shocks  caused  by  his  recent  disasters  seemed 
at  last  to  have  aroused  France  from  the  state  of  in- 
toxication into  which  the  dazzling  glory  of  his  former 
victories  had  sunk  her.  The  Royalists  the  Republicans 
the  Priest-party  as  well  as  the  scheming  politicians  of 
the  Talleyrand  type,  all  were  now  encouraged  by  the 
aspect  of  affairs  within  the  very  borders  of  France 
to  intrigue  against  Napoleon  and  his  oppressive  rule. 
The  Legislative  Body,  his  faithful  slaves  as  long  as  he 
was  victorious,  now  plucked  up  courage  to  ask  for 
guarantees  for  popular  liberty  and  even  ventured  to 
restrict  his  demands  for  money.  He  dismissed  them 
in  anger  ;  the  Senate,  still  in  awe  of  him,  gave  him  all 
he  wanted.  But  this  summary  dismissal  of  the  Legisla- 
ture tended  to  reduce  his  influence  and  his  power  to 
obtain  from  a  discouraged,  as  well  as  an  impoverished 
people,  the  men  and  supplies  he  then  so  urgently 
needed.  Indeed,  such  became  the  state  of  public 
feeling  that  he  did  not  dare  to  renJer  that  popular 
force,  the  National  Guard,  as  really  effective  as  he 
might  have  done. 

Napoleon's  aims  were  still  directed  to  great  objects, 
as  if  he  had  met  with  no  crushing  disasters  during  the 
two  previous  years  ;  his  schemes  were  still  .so  vast, 
so  far-reaching,  that  he  would  not  bring  down  his 
thoughts  to  so  restricted  a  compass^  as  the  mere 
defence  of  France.     Bent  on  great  plans  for  future 


86         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OE  XAPOLEOM. 

action,  he  had  in  1812-13  left  a  considerable  army 
behind  him  in  the  fortresses  of  Germany  which 
employed  on  the  Elbe  in  18 13  might  have  insured 
him  victory.  In  the  same  way  he  could  not  now 
make  up  his  mind  to  concentrate  all  his  resources  for 
the  defensive  campaign  which  he  clearly  saw  was  then 
before  him.  The  thirty  or  forty  thousand  seasoned 
troops  with  which  Suchet  held  Catalonia  would  have 
been  an  invaluable  addition  to  his  small  army  in  the 
plains  of  Champagne  ;  Eugene  was  operating  in  Italy 
with  an  army  of  about  the  same  strength  ;  Augereau 
at  Lyons  was  organising  a  new  force ;  and  Soult 
might  have  spared  some  valuable  troops,  had 
Napoleon  ordered  him  to  restrict  his  army  to  purely 
defensive  operations  against  Wellington.  As  in  the 
previous  year's  campaign,  Napoleon's  general  plan  of 
operations  was  too  ambitious  and  was  not  in  scale 
with  the  actual  position  in  which  he  then  found 
himself. 

In  judging  of  Napoleon's  decision  to  hold  on  as 
long  as  he  could  to  the  largest  possible  extent  of 
territory,  both  in  18 13  and  the  following  year,  we 
must  not,  however,  forget  that  he  was  fighting  for 
recruiting  areas.  Wherever  there  were  enough  French 
troops  to  maintain  his  authority  he  was  able  to  raise 
soldiers,  for  he  still  had  zealous  friends  in  every  pro- 
vince ;  but  as  soon  as  his  authority  was  no  longer 
recognised  the  countries  so  lost  to  him  too  often 
became  a  valuable  recruiting  ground  for  his  enemies. 
For  example,  when  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
had  been  broken  up  as  the  result  of  his  recent  mis- 
fortunes, nearly   150,000  troops  that   had  previously 


THE   CAMPAIGN-  OF  1814. 


87 


fought  under  his  banner  were  transferred  to  swell  the 
armies  opposed  to  him.  The  countries  which  had 
formed  that  Confederation,  being  nearest  to  France, 


'"-iS 

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HK'.A-  'jV''.-ta 

FREDERICK  WILLIAM   III.   OF   PRUSSIA. 


were  of  all  others  then  the  most  important  on  that 
account. 

Some  of  Napoleon's  best  troops  had  come  from 
Piedmont  and  Tuscany — in  fact  Eugene's  army  was 
almost  entirely  recruited  in   Italy — but  at  the  same 


8^         TH&  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NaPoLEOX. 

time  to  have  brought  them  into  France  might  have 
entailed  their  loss  through  desertion  to  the  enemy, 
as  had  happened  in  the  cases  of  Saxony,  Wurtemberg 
and  Bavaria  when  Napoleon  evacuated  those  king- 
doms. Besides  he  counted  on  Eugene's  army,  aided 
by  Augereau,  to  secure  the  alliance  and  assistance  of 
the  Swiss  amongst  whom  Napoleon  had  many  ardent 
friends.  It  was  his  intention  that  Eugene,  thus 
supported,  should  fall  upon  the  Allies'  lines  of  com- 
munication after  their  armies  had  entered  France,  and 
he  hoped  that  the  warlike  inhabitants  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  would  be  thus  encouraged  to  act  with 
greater  vigour  in  the  enemy's  rear.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  those  two  provinces  did  strenuously  oppose 
the  advance  of  the  Allies.  With  the  exception  of 
Augereau's  comparatively  snjall  army,  Napoleon 
could  hardly  count  upon  assistance  from  any  of  these 
sources  if  he  restricted  his  plan  of  operation  to  the 
fields  watered  by  the  Marne  and  the  Seine,  where  it 
was  evident  he  must  fight  to  protect  Paris.  But  on 
the  other  hand  if  Eugene's  army  joined  him,  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  would  be  able  to  move  his  troops 
under  Bellegarde  from  Italy  into  France. 

The  case  of  his  armies  in  Spain  was  different.  It 
is  difficult  not  to  think  that  Napoleon  was  indulging 
in  expectations  there  which  the  battle  of  Vittoria 
had  made  unworthy  of  serious  consideration.  Time 
pressed,  and  as  soon  as  he  found  that  the  Allies 
meant  to  cross  the  Rhine  he  should  have  sent  back 
Ferdinand  to  Madrid  ;  but  instead  of  doing  this,  we 
find  him  at  the  eleventh  hour  negotiating  terms  for 
that  king's  restoration.     His  reason  for  this  was,  that 


The  Campaign  op  1814. 


by  keeping  up  the  army  under  Soult  to  a  respectable 
figure  and  by  retaining  possession  of  Catalonia 
with  the  army  of  Suchet,  he  hoped  to  so  arrange 
matters  with  Spain  that,  under  the  returned  monarch 
Wellington's  position  would  be  rendered  politicall\- 
impossible.  Were  he  relieved  of  all  pressure  from 
that  quarter  by  this  withdrawal  of  the  English  from 
Spain,  he  might  be  able  to  rally  to  him  the  armies 
of  both  Soult  and  Suchet. 

But  Wellington's  complete  victory  at  Vittoria  had 
stamped  these  schemes  with  the  ominous  words,  "  too 
late."  Suchet's  hold  upon  Catalonia  had  become 
little  more  than  an  isolated  and  irrelevant  detail 
which,  if  persisted  in,  could  only  involve  the  ultimate 
loss  of  the  French  garrisons  stationed  in  that  pro- 
vince ;  and  Soult's  army,  though  admirably  led,  was 
unable  to  withstand  Wellington's  triumphant  invasion 
of  France.  It  is  dangerous,  indeed  presumptuous,  for 
any  soldier  to  criticise  Napoleon's  military  con- 
ceptions and  plans  ;  but  it  strikes  military  students 
of  this  campaign  that  he  would  have  done  better  had 
he  restricted  Soult's  army  to  gaining  time  by  an 
active  defensive  on  the  Pyrenean  frontier  and  ordered 
every  French  soldier  that  could  be  spared  from  it  and 
from  Spain  generally  to  join  his  army  in  the  valleys 
oi  the  Marne  and  the  Seine. 

As  long  as  the  French  arms  were  victorious  in 
Central  Europe  the  elements  of  opposition  to  his 
authority  were  apparently  feeble  and  were  easily 
suppressed  wherever  they  showed  themselves  ;  but  as 
soon  as  the  ebbing  tide  of  failure  set  in  and  that 
Napoleon's  star  was  seen  to  be  undoubtedly  on  the 


90      THE  declime  and  fall  of  napoleon. 

wane  the  decline  of  his  power  proceeded  with  an 
increasing  rapidity  until  the  final  crash  came.  The 
vast  French  Empire  of  1811  provided  him  with 
immense  resources  in  men.  He  commanded  the 
services  of  Poles,  Italians,  Swiss,  Saxons,  Danes? 
Wurtembergers,  and  Bavarians,  and  he  was  able  to 
extract  money  and  material  from  others  who  were  not 
friendly  to  him.  As  his  dominion,  however,  became 
reduced  in  extent  by  every  step  he  took  backwards 
not  only  were  these  supplies  cut  off  but  the  larger 
became  the  armies  opposed  to  him.  The  zealous 
self-sacrifice  of  whole  nations,  supported  by  the  in- 
exhaustible wealth  of  England,  brought  successively 
into  the  field  masses  of  men  who  eventually  swept 
away  his  power  as  if  by  an  ever-increasing  avalanche 
pouring  down  upon  the  collapsing  structure  of  his 
Empire. 

There  is  yet  another  excuse  for  Napoleon's  deter- 
mination to  fight  rather  than  make  peace  in  1814. 
Before  the  Allies  crossed  the  Rhine  he  had  calculated 
that  they  would  make  large  detachments  for  the 
purpose  of  besieging  the  fortresses  in  which  he  had 
left  garrisons  behind.  He  also  thought  they  would 
require  armies  for  various  duties  in  the  provinces  now 
being  restored  to  their  legitimate  rulers.  He  did  not, 
consequently,  anticipate  so  large  a  disproportion 
between  his  own  army  and  that  of  the  Allies  when 
both  had  taken  the  field  in  France.  But  before 
crossing  the  Rhine  the  Allies  had  almost  exclusively 
employed  their  militia  to  invest  or  besiege  the  French 
garrisons  in  Germany  ;  and  in  their  advance  from 
that  river  towards  Paris  they  stopped  to  besiege  no 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  9t 

fortress,  contenting  themselves  with  observing  or  in- 
vesting them.  This  was  what  Malborough  intended 
to  do  when,  early  in  his  wars,  he  urged  the  Dutch  to 
allow  him  to  march  direct  upon  Paris  and  there 
dictate  terms  to  Lewis  XIV. 

I  have  thus  dwelt  upon  the  larger  features  of  the 
war  in  1814  because  I  think  it  is  misleading  to  the 
student  of  history  to  direct  his  attention  exclusively 
to  the  operations  in  the  valleys  of  the  Marne  and  the 
Seine.  I  am  glad  to  find  that  of  late  years  there  has 
been  a  natural  tendency,  amongst  those  who  carefully 
follow  all  the  events  in  Napoleon's  career,  to  revolt 
against  any  isolated  treatment  of  this  campaign  as 
a  kind  of  academic  study  upon  the  influence  on 
defensive  operations  of  two  lines  of  river  in  a  theatre 
of  war.  The  able  summary  of  this  campaign  by  Sir 
E.  Hamley  and  the  manner  in  which  he  has  treated 
its  remarkable  events  has  long  tended,  in  my  opinion 
to  unduly  concentrate  attention  upon  the  movements 
of  the  Allies  and  of  Napoleon  between  the  Marne 
and  the  Seine  to  the  exclusion  of  all  the  other 
influences  which  helped  to  bring  about  the  abdication 
of  the  great  soldier-Emperor,  In  almost  every  cam- 
paign the  questions  which  determine  a  general  in  his 
decisions  are  of  a  much  wider  scope  than  the  mere 
strategical  or  tactical  movements  which  can  be 
executed  along  certain  features  of  a  particular  line  of 
country.  But,  at  any  rate,  "  the  decline  and  fall  of 
Napoleon  "  cannot  be  well  understood  unless  we  fully 
realise  the  basis  upon  which  his  power  and  supremacy 
rested  and  how  seriously  that  foundation  had  been 
already  shaken  before  the  Allies  crossed  the  Rhine. 


g±         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OE  XaPOLEON. 

No  technical  criticism  of  his  magnificent  strategy,  no 
mere  professional  analysis  of  his  splendid  tactics  on 
the  field  of  battle  will  suffice. 

By  the  end  of  1813  there  were  about  a  million  of 
men  under  arms  for  the  avowed  object  of  pulling 
down  Napoleon  from  his  position  as  Dictator  in 
Europe  ;  but  we  must  study  the  moral  as  well  as  the 
physical  forces  that  worked  against  him  if  we  would 
fully  comprehend  his  fall.  Throughout  the  greater 
part  of  Europe  there  were  two  parties  then,  one 
favourable,  the  other  bitterly  hostile  to  him.  The 
first  was  still  under  the  influence  of  the  enormous 
advantages  they  had  gained  through  the  French 
Revolution  and  from  the  success  of  its  armies ; 
the  second  was  smarting  under  the  pressure  of 
Napoleon's  Continental  System  and  the  remem- 
brance of  the  many  injuries  and  insults  received  from 
his  soldiers.  Time  and  the  shortness  of  human 
memory  for  favours  received  had  acted  against  the 
party  friendly  to  him,  and  every  day  strengthened 
that  which  haled  him.  The  agencies  which  Captain 
Mahan  has  so  ably  traced  in  his  interesting  work  on 
the  influence  of  sea-power  were  also  at  work  against 
him  ;  but  there  were  others  also.  The  s  oliation  of 
Italy  and  Switzerland,  the  gradual  springing  up  in  all 
the  provinces  of  ancient  Germany  of  a  common 
German  feeling  bitterly  hostile  to  France,  and  the 
social  reforms  introduced  into  Prussia  by  the  able 
statesmanship  of  Stein,  were  amongst  the  chief  causes 
which  acted  powerfully  in  developing  a  determined 
opposition  to  Napoleon's  supremacy. 

The  Allies  built  a  golden  bridge  for  his  retreat  over 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  93 

the  Rhine  as  their  pursuit  after  Leipzig  was  feeble 
in  the  extreme.  They  did  not  begin  to  cross  that 
river  until  December  21st,  18 13,  having  reached  it  in 
three  columns  :  one  had  marched  upon  the  Lower 
Rhine  through  Holland  sweeping,  as  it  passed,  that 
nation  into  the  coalition  against  Napoleon  ;  another 
under  Blucher,  about  50,000  strong,  upon  the  Middle 
Rhine  at  Coblentz  ;  and  the  third  and  largest,  about 
120,000  men  under  Schwarzenberg,  upon  Bale  where 
it  crossed  by  the  stone  bridge.  Bale  belonged  to 
Switzerland,  which  threw  in  its  lot  with  the  Coalition. 
Before  the  end  of  the  year  the  two  last-named  armies 
were  assembled  in  the  valleys  of  the  Marne  and  the 
Seine.  They  were  no  longer  prepared  to  grant 
Napoleon  the  favourable  terms  they  had  proposed  at 
Frankfort,  for  they  had  begun  to  realise  that  there 
could  be  no  permanent  tranquillity  in  Europe  as  long 
as  he  was  left  to  rule  France  upon  any  conditions. 

Before  passing  the  Rhine  the  Allies  issued  a 
manifesto  to  the  French  people  declaring  that  it  was 
their  wish  to  see  France  strong  and  prosperous. 
They  endeavoured  to  impress  upon  all  classes  that  it 
was  Napoleon  alone  who  stood  between  them  and  the 
peace  which  was  so  ardently  longed  for.  Their  "  only 
conquest,"  they  said,  "  should  be  peace — a  peace  that 
should  give  permanent  repose  to  France  and  to  all 
Europe."  Following  the  example  of  the  old  Direc- 
tory, they  declared  they  did  not  make  war  upon  the 
people  but  upon  their  rulers.  The  Allied  armies 
were  generally  received  with  cordiality  as  friends 
come  to  give  them  back  peace.  To  the  shame,  how- 
ever, of  the  invaders,  they  sullied  their  operations  by 


94         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

great  excesses  ;  but  when  we  remember  how  all 
grades  in  the  French  army  had  pillaged  and  oppressed 
the  inhabitants  of  Central  Europe  it  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that,  having  in  their  turn  become  con- 
querors, they  should  take  vengeance  for  the  wrongs 
and  insults  they  had  previously  endured. 

Napoleon  now  found  himself  under  the  unlooked- 
for  necessity  of  having  to  defend  his  capital  against 
the  Allies  who  were  marching  upon  it.  Amongst  the 
unfavourable  conditions  under  which  he  was  com- 
pelled to  begin  this  struggle,  the  retired  position  of 
his  fortresses  behind  the  Rhine  frontier  was  a  serious 
misfortune.  Hitherto  his  war  policy  had  always  been 
to  dictate  terms  to  his  enemies  in  tJieir  capitals,  and 
the  result  of  his  far-reaching  conquests  was  that  he 
had  neglected  the  girdle  of  fortresses  with  which 
Lewis  XIV.  had  protected  the  eastern  frontier  of  his 
kingdom.  But  that  frontier  had  been  left  behind  :  it 
was  not  Napoleon's  frontier  and  he  had  consequently 
thought  it  useless  to  spend  money  upon  the  main- 
tenance of  works  designed  to  defend  the  bygone 
limits  of  a  restricted  France.  These  fortresses  were 
not,  therefore,  in  a  state  to  resist  any  siege.  Besides, 
typhus  fever,  too  often  the  scourge  of  a  defeated 
army,  was  decimating  his  troops  in  those  places, 
having  been  imported  from  Russia  and  by  the 
garrisons  lately  withdrawn  from  Germany. 

Napoleon  saw  the  net  that  was  being  drawn  around 
him  by  the  mighty  hosts  which  now  threatened  Paris 
from  all  points.  But  he  was  not  without  hope,  for  he 
could  foresee  in  the  coming  struggle  numerous  possi- 
bilities for  the  exercise  of  his  commanding  ability  ; 


7HE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  95 

and  one  of  the  most  striking  peculiarities  of  his 
dech'ning  fortunes  was,  that  Hke  the  ruined  speculator 
he  based  his  calcalutions  more  upon  the  possible  than 
the  probable.  He  believed  that  his  army  in  the 
Pyrenees,  under  the  skilful  leadership  of  Soult,  would 
suffice  to  keep  Wellington  at  a  distance  long  enough 
to  enable  him  to  dispose  of  his  own  immediate  an- 
tagonists. He  calculated  much  upon  the  national 
spirit  which  the  invasion  of  France  would  call  forth  ; 
and  although  it  was  not  as  strong  or  as  pronounced  as 
he  had  anticipated,  it  is  most  creditable  to  the  oppressed 
and  ruined  people  that  it  did  show  itself,  especially 
in  some  districts.  He  believed  this  feeling  would 
animate  his  soldiers,  and  inspire  them  with  a  dash 
and  valour  even  greater  than  ever.  His  was  an  army 
of  Frenchmen  fighting  to  defend  the  soil  of  France  : 
what  might  he  not  therefore  expect  from  them  under 
his  superlatively  able  leadership  .-'  Opposed  to  him 
were  the  armies  of  three  nations  and  many  princi- 
palities, each  with  its  special  aims  and  jealousies. 
One  was  the  army  of  his  father-in-law  who  was 
present  with  it  and  would  not  surely  allow  his 
daughter  to  be  deposed  or  her  husband  driven  into 
exile.  No  one  knew  better  than  he  did  the  weakness 
of  a  divided  command,  especially  when  the  com- 
manders were  like  those  now  pursuing  him,  Schwar- 
zenberg — the  nominal  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Allied  armies — was  a  poor  and  extremely  timid 
strategist  under  all  circumstances,  but  in  front  of 
Napoleon  he  was  apparently  so  awed  that  his  habitual 
want  of  dash  and  hesitating  slowness  led  him  into  an 
inordinate  dissemination  of  his  forces.     In  many  ways 


g6  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


he  resembled  some  of  the  Austrian  generals  whom 
Napoleon  had  destroyed  years  before.  He  was.  in 
fact  just  the  sort  of  commander  to  give  his  great 
antagonist  the  opportunities  he  wanted  and  would  be 
sure  to  make  good  use  of  Blucher  was  a  man  of 
entirely  difterent  mettle :  a  soldier  by  instinct,  a 
dashing  leader  by  disposition  and  temper.  Though 
old  he  was  overflowing  with  energy.  Not  learned  in 
the  science  of  war  he  was  apt  to  be  rash,  but  his 
reckless  daring  was  now  kept  within  bounds  by  the 
highl\'  educated  Gneisenau  and  Muffling,  who  never 
left  him. 

The  immediate  object  of  the  Allied  sovereigns 
upon  crossing  the  Rhine,  was  the  occupation  of  Paris, 
but  the  general  plan  they  adopted  to  secure  it  was 
extremely  faulty.  For  the  convenience  of  subsistence 
the}'  unwisely  distributed  their  armies  over  a  wide 
front,  as  if  there  had  been  no  great  master  of  war 
within  the  zone  of  operations  watching  for  an  oppor- 
tunity to  beat  them  in  detail.  Instead  of  moving 
upon  the  enemy's  capital  by  converging  lines,  so  that 
Napoleon  should  not  be  able  to  seriously  attack  one 
without  having  the  others  on  his  flank,  they  marched 
with  great  intervals  between  their  armies  which  were 
consequently  unable  to  support  one  another.  They 
entirely  ignored  the  fact  that  the  shortest  and  quickest 
and  safest  way  to  reach  Paris  was  through  the  de- 
struction of  Napoleon's  army.  As  they  manoeuvred 
they  threw  away  to  a  large  extent  the  only  one  great 
advantage  they  possessed — that  of  vastly  superior 
numbers.  Schwarzenberg's  timid  movements  may  or 
may  not  have  been  controlled  by  Metternich,  but  not- 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  97 


withstanding  the  many  checks  and  defeats  experienced 
by  the  AUies,  as  a  matter  of  fact  those  defeats  inflicted 
serious  losses  upon  the  French.  Though  often  driven 
back  the  Allies  alvvai's  returned  to  their  advance  upon 
Paris  with  unJiminished  numbers  and  with  the  renewed 
energy  which  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  always 
imparts,  whilst  their  opponent's  army  was  dwindHng 
away  having  no  reserves  to  maintain  it.  But,  as  in 
the  previous  year,  the  Allies  still  feared  to  tackle  any 
body  of  troops  with  which  Napoleon  was  known  to  be 
present.  They  courted  action  with  his  Marshals,  but 
the  ascendency  which  his  very  name  exercised  over 
them  was  still  enormous.  Schwarzenberg's  first  idea 
was  the  safety  of  the  Austrian  army  ;  and,  feeling 
that  he  was  no  match  for  his  great  adversary,  his 
mind  seemed  always  more  bent  upon  defensive  than 
offensive  combinations.  He  was  not  the  man  to 
conduct  the  invasion  of  France  especially  when 
Napoleon  was  in  the  field  against  him. 

Let  us  now  follow  the  general  movements  of  the 
opposing  forces. 

Only  two  of  the  three  armies  of  invasion,  to  which  I 
have  referred,  marched  for  Paris — that  of  Schwarzen- 
berg  from  Langres  down  the  valley  of  the  Seine  to 
Troyes,  and  that  of  Blucher  from  Nancy  to  Joinville 
and  down  the  Marne  to  St.  Dizier.  This  separate 
line  of  advance  was  just  what  Napoleon  most  desired. 
It  gave  him  the  chance  of  beating  first  one  then  the 
other.  Bluchers  being  the  smaller  body  he  turned 
first  upon  him.  His  plan  was  excellent  ;  but  it  failed 
through  one  of  those  accidents  which  in  war  have  so 
often  frustrated  the  most  ably  devised  schemes.     An 

H 


98         THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

intercepted  despatch  disclosed  the  movement  to  the 
AlUes.  An  indecisive  action  at  Brieniie,  on  January 
28th,  was  succeeded  by  Napoleon's  defeat  at  La 
Rothiere  on  February  ist,  where  he  lost  heavily  and 
had  54  guns  and  3000  men  taken  by  the  enemy. 

After  this  victory  the  Allies  again  separated  their 
armies  whilst  Napoleon  fell  back  upon  Nogent.  In 
the  meantime,  whilst  Schwarzenberg  was  slowly  and 
timidly  following  the  retreating  Emperor,  Blucher  was 
pushing  past  beyond  him  to  the  north  making  straight 
for  Paris.  In  the  haste  of  movement  Blucher  had,  for 
the  convenience  of  administration,  broken  up  his 
army  into  detachments.  Sacken  with  15.000  men 
was  at  Ferte-sous-Jouarre  ;  York's  corps  was  dis- 
seminated along  the  road  towards  Chateau  Thierry  ; 
5000  Russians  were  at  Champ-Aubert ;  and  Blucher 
himself  was  at  Fere-Champenoise  with  20,000  men. 
Here  was  a  great  chance  for  a  man  of  Napoleon's 
quick  perception  and  decision. .  He  first  attacked  and 
destroyed  the  Russians  at  Champ-Aubert,  then  turned 
upon  Sacken  whom  he  defeated  with  a  loss  of  26 
guns  and  4000  prisoners  besides  killed  and  wounded, 
the  remnants  of  his  force,  together  with  York's  corps, 
being  driven  by  Mortier  northwards  towards  Soissons. 
Marmont  who,  in  full  communication  with  Napoleon, 
had  been  slowly  falling  back  before  Blucher's  own 
corps  during  these  events  was  now  joined  by  the 
Emperor.  At  Vauchamp  Blucher  found  himself 
obliged  to  fall  back  and  was  vigorously  pursued  by 
Marmont  who  surprised  and  defeated  his  rearguard 
of  Russians  under  Ourousoff.  In  this  retreat  Blucher 
lost  15  guns  and  8000  men. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  99 

It  was  now  Schwarzenberg's  turn.  With  the  main 
army  he  had  advanced  towards  Paris  as  far  as  the 
River  Yeres  but  was  there  held  in  check  by  Oudinot, 
Victoi  dnd  Macdonald.  Putting  his  guards  into  carts 
and  carriages  and  marching  night  and  day,  Napoleon 
joined  those  Marshals  on  January  i6th  at  Guignes. 
The  following  day  he  surprised  the  advance-guard  of 
the  Allies  at  Mormant,  when  this  huge  army  fell 
back,  pursued  by  Napoleon's  handful  of  men,  and  did 
not  halt  till  beyond  Troyes. 

This  new  condition  of  things  weakened  the  Coali- 
tion, for  each  of  the  Allied  sovereigns  seemed  more 
than  ever  to  think  of  the  position  his  own  army  would 
occupy  at  the  end  of  the  war  rather  than  of  the 
measures  required  to  bring  it  to  a  conclusion.  Each 
was  intent  upon  what  was  to  be  his  share  in  the 
plunder  when  the  terms  of  peace  were  settled.  The 
fact  that  certain  provinces  were  actually  held  by  the 
troops  of  any  one  particular  Power  when  the  cessation 
of  hostilities  came  about  would  be  a  strong  argument 
in  favour  of  their  retention  by  that  Power.  All  were 
therefore  anxious  to  place  themselves  in  what  would 
be  the  most  advantageous  position  when  the  war 
should  come  to  an  end.  Austria  desired  to  secure 
large  territory  in  Italy ;  but  as,  thanks  to  Eugene's 
skilful  generalship,  Italy  had  not  yet  been  conquered 
Austrian  statesmen  had  no  desire  whatever  to  bring 

o 

about  a  premature  peace.  The  real  director  of  the 
Austrian  army's  movements  at  this  time  was  not 
Schwarzenberg  but  the  wily  Metternich.  That  subtle 
and  crafty  statesman  had  negotiated  the  secession  of 
Bavaria,  Wurtemberg  and  Saxony,  and   he   thought 

H  2 


loo        THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


that  Austria's  claims  to  supersede  France  in  the 
leadership  of  the  states  which  had  formed  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine  should  therefore  be  recog- 
nised. Having  secured  Murat's  co-operation  against 
his  former  master  and  benefactor  he  had  every  hope 
of  being  able  in  a  short  time  to  expel  Eugene  and 
occupy  the  Italian  provinces.  In  order,  however,  to 
be  in  a  position  to  enforce  Austria  s  claims  to  these 
advantages  it  was  necessary  that  the  Austrian  army 
should  be  kept  as  strong  as  possible.  He  was  quite 
willing  that  Blucher,  in  his  eagerness  to  seize  Paris, 
should  knock  the  Prussian  and  the  Russian  armies  to 
pieces  but  he  was  determined  that  Schwarzenberg 
should  do  nothing  of  the  kind  with  his  army.  The 
tardy  appearance  in  Switzerland  at  this  time  of 
Augereau's  corps  in  the  rear  of  the  Allies,  came,  there- 
fore, as  a  convenient  excuse  foi'  what  was  otherwise 
desirable — I  mean,  the  further  falling  back  of  the 
Grand  Army.  The  Allies  of  Austria  were  quite  alive 
to  the  true  nature  of  Metternich's  policy  and  to  the 
reasons  which  dictated  it  but  they  were  not  in  a 
position  to  quarrel  with  her  about  it.  They  were  con- 
sequently compelled  to  bend  to  the  inevitable  and 
devise  a  plan  of  campaign  to  accord  with  her  obvious 
intentions. 

Under  strong  pressure  from  England,  Bernadotte 
had  despatched  from  the  north  the  corps  of  VVoronzoff 
and  Bulow  to  support  Blucher  in  his  next  attempt  to 
reach  Paris  by  the  valley  of  the  Marne.  The  former 
joined  Blucher  when  Wintzingerode's  cor[)s  had  taken 
possession  of  Soissons  and  St.  Priest  was  bringing  up 
a  reinforcement    f^i  some    1 2,000    men    through    the 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814. 


Ardennes  and  Chalons.  Blucher's  army,  including  these, 
was  over  ico.ooo  strong.  It  was  now  decided  that 
Blucher  should  play  the  first  and  active  part  in  the  cam- 
paign whilst  Schwarzenberg  remained  on  the  defen- 
sive :  if  Napoleon  turned  upon  Blucher's  army,  the 
Grand  Army  under  Schwarzenberg  was  to  advance 
cautiously  ;  disgusted  as  the  other  members  of  the 
Coalition  were  at  such  a  plan  of  operations  they  were 
made  to  feel  it  was  all  they  could  expect  from  their 
Austrian  allies. 

Napoleon  had  arrived  before  Troyes  on  February 
22nd  ;  and  on  the  24th  Blucher,  without  waiting  to 
get  his  army  in  hand,  pushed  forward  to  attack 
Marmont  on  the  Marne.  Marmont  fell  back  before 
the  fiery  Prussian  towards  La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 
There  he  was  within  supporting  distance  by  Mortier, 
who  had  been  watching  Wmtzingerode,  who  had 
moved  from  Soissons  to  Rheims,  and  Bulow  who  had 
reached  Laon.  As  soon  as  Wintzingerode  had 
quitted  Soissons  Mortier  recaptured  it  and  placed  in 
it  a  fairly  strong  garrison  under  General  Moreau.* 
Mortier  and  Marmont  together  could  only  muster 
12,000  men  but  by  a  skilful  use  of  the  Marne  and  the 
Ourcq  they  checked  Blucher's  a  ivance  beyond  the 
latter  river  till  March  ist,  when  they  were  reinforced 
by  6,000  men  from  Paris. 

Meanwhile  Napoleon,  leaving  Troyes  on  P'ebruary 
27th,  hastened  with  25,000  men  to  the  support  of  his 
Marshals  and  was  at  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  in  Blucher's 

*  This  General  Moreau  must  not  be  confounded  with 
Napoleon's  old  rival  for  power,  who  had  been  killed  the 
previous  year  by  a  chance  round  shot. 


102        THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

rear,  by  March  ist.     Napoleon's  prospects  of  dealing 
Blucher  a  deadly  blow  now  seemed  most  brilliant,  and 
he    must    have  felt   as  if  he  had  him  already  in  the 
hollow   of  his  hand.     Blucher  had   no  choice  but  to 
retreat   in  all   haste  northwards  by   way  of  Soissons. 
But  Napoleon   knew  that  it  was  held   by  Moreau  and 
that  its  defences  had  recently  been  improved.     He  at 
once  pushed  Marmont  and  Mortier  in  pursuit  and  on 
March  3rd  crossed  the  Marne  with  his  own  force  in 
support  of  them.     Blucher  had  called  to  him  Wintzin- 
gerode  and  also   Bulow  who  had  arrived  via  Holland 
and  Belgium    and  who,  upon  reaching  Soissons,  had 
induced    Moreau   to   surrender  just   at   the    moment 
when  Napoleon  was  expecting  to  gain  the  full  advan- 
tage of  a  fortified  post  on  Blucher's  only  possible  line 
of  retreat.     It    is   difficult    to   say  what    might    have 
happened    had    Moreau  done  his  duty  ;  for,  with  an 
army  recently  defeated  to  be  forced  across  an  unford- 
able  river  by  an  antagonist  of  Napoleon's  calibre  is  an 
ugly  business  under  all  circumstances.     It  is  certain 
that  Moreau  was  not  a  traitor  but  he  was  a  weak- 
kneed  creature  unworthy  of  any  responsibility  in  war. 
Napoleon  was  furious,  and   most  justly  so,  when  he 
heard    the    news.       "  Have    that    miserable    creature 
arrested,"   he  wrote,   "  and  also  the   members   of  the 
council    of  defence  :    have  them    arraigned    before   a 
Military    Commission   consisting  of  general    officers, 
and,  in  God's  name,  see  that  they  are  shot  in  twenty- 
four  hours,"     Had  Moreau  held  out  for  a  day  and  a 
half  longer  than  he  did  I  cannot  see  how  Blucher  could 
have  escaped  an  overwhelming  disaster.     Thiers  refers 
to  this  surrender  in  his  usual  inflated  terms  as,  next  to 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  ,    103 

Waterloo,  the  most  fatal  event  in  French  history. 
This  may  be  a  great  exaggeration  ;  but,  as  far  as  the 
war  of  1 8 14  in  France  was  concerned,  it  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  Napoleon's  star  set  when  Soissons 
surrendered.  No  such  other  opportunity  again  pre- 
sented itself  in  this  campaign. 


lo+      THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


CHAPTER   IV. 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF   \^\A,— continued. 

On  the  night  of  March  3rd  Blucher  safely  crossed  the 
Aisne  and  took  up  a  position  between  Craonne  and 
Soissons  along  its  northern  bank.  Napoleon,  crossing 
that  same  river  at  Berry-au-Bac  in  advance  of  his 
Marshals,  who  were  engaged  in  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  on  Soissons,  turned  Blucher's  left,  defeated 
Woronsoff  at  Craonne  and  pushed  on  by  the  Soissons 
road  to  Laon,  whither  Blucher,  on  finding  his  left 
turned,  had  withdrawn  his  whole  army. 

The  battle  of  Laon  followed  on  March  9th. 
Marmont's  attack  from  the  south-cast  had  been  fairly 
successful  during  the  day,  as  Blucher,  under  the  im- 
pression that  there  must  be  some  central  body  between 
Marmont  and  Napoleon  who  was  advancing  from  the 
south-west,  hesitated  to  attack.  Having  at  last 
discovered  his  mistake  he  fell  upon  Marmont's 
bivouacs  by  night  and  nearly  destioyed  him,  taking 
45  guns  and  2,500  prisoners.  It  was  a  tremendous 
blow  to  Napoleon  at  this  stage  of  his  fortunes  ;  but 
far  from  succumbing  to  it  he  resolved  to  continue  his 
own  attack  upon  Laon  the  following  day.  He  had 
less  than  20,000  men,  but  he  calculated  that,  in  order 


THE    CAMPAIGN  OF  1814,  105 

to  make  sure  of  success  in  his  attack  upon  Marmont, 
Rlucher  must  have  seriously  reduced  the  force  now 
opposed  to  himself.  It  was  not  until  he  had  ascertained 
that  Blucher  was  concentrating  all  his  force  with  the 
intention   of  falHng  upon  him  that  he  at  last  yielded 


TALLEYRAND. 

to  the  entreaties  of  his  Marshals  and  fell  back  upon 
Soissons.  Before  as  well  as  after  the  battle  of  Laon  it 
was  of  importance  to  Napoleon  that  he  should  husband 
his  resources  in  every  possible  way.  As  a  matter  of 
abstract  prudence,  therefore,  it  could  not  have  been 


lo6       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

wise  of  him  to  attack  an  enemy  nearly  threefold  his 
strength  and  in  a  good  defensive  position.  Besides, 
he  would  have  been  the  first  to  have  condemned  any 
of  his  Marshals  who  had  allowed,  as  he  had  done,  one 
fraction  of  his  army  to  advance  by  the  road  from 
Soissons  to  Laon  while  the  other  marched  by  a  road 
beyond  all  supporting  distance  from  it — thatis,  by  the 
road  from  Berry-au-Bac  to  that  same  town.  The 
point  of  concentration  was  also  known  to  be  in  occupa- 
tion of  the  enemy — a  fact  which  rendered  the  opera- 
tion still  more  dangerous  and  still  further  opposed  to 
the  well-understood  maxims  of  war.  This  northern 
movement  upon  Soissons  and  Laon  cost  Napoleon 
and  the  Allies  about  12,000  men  each;  but  whilst 
the  former  could  not  replace  his  loss  the  latter 
were  at  once  able  to  do  so.  Blucher  lost  a  great 
chance  at  Laon  for  had  he  but  launched  the  whole 
of  his  troops  upon  Napoleon,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  the  little  French  army  in  his  front  could  have 
been  saved  from  utter  destruction.  But  it  has  been 
well  said  indeed  of  all  the  contests  in  this  campaign 
that  the  great  Corsican's  presence,  like  Medusa's 
head,  invariably  paralysed  as  well  as  terrorised  his 
enemies. 

In  the  several  rapid  movements  he  made  from  one 
flank  to  the  other  of  the  theatre  of  war.  Napoleon  had 
seldom  with  him  more  than  about  25,000  men.  Each 
time  that  he  marched  from  right  to  left  or  vice  versd, 
he  was  of  course  compelled  to  leave  behind  a  sufficient 
number  to  conceal  his  departure  from  whatever  Allied 
forces  had  been  in  front  of  him,  and  also  to  make  head 
against  them  should  they  assume  an  active  offensive 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  107 

in  his  absence.  Rumour,  however,  always  greatly 
exaggerated  his  numbers  and  he  took  every  care  to  do 
so  himself  by  all  possible  methods.  Indeed,  his  move- 
ments were  so  extremely  rapid  that  he  never  gave  the 
enemy  time  to  ascertain  his  real  strength  for  his 
practice  always  was  to  strike  at  once  when  he  reached 
the  hostile  forces.  An  exaggerated  notion  of  his 
numbers  was  therefore  easily  fostered.  His  audacity 
in  striking  with  his  little  army  at  part  of  Schwarz- 
enberg's  vast  host  of  120.000  men  was  of  itself  suffi- 
cient to  make  his  opponents  believe  that  he  was  strong, 
for  it  was  not  thought  he  would  venture  upon  such 
daring  operations  unless  he  had  a  powerful  army 
behind  him.  Throughout  this  phase  of  the  campaign 
he  relied  almost  entirely  upon  his  own  skill  in 
handling  troops  ;  he  looked  to  the  terror  of  his  name 
to  keep  him  out  of  serious  danger  whilst  he  trusted 
greatly  to  his  luck  and  to  Schwarzenberg's  bungling 
and  cautious  slowness  for  opportunities  to  pull  the 
chestnuts  from  between  the  bars  before  the  fire  could 
touch  them. 

On  March  nth  the  Russian  general  St.  Priest  took 
the  fortified  town  of  Rhcims  by  sudden  assault  during 
the  night — a  place  of  considerable  strategic  importance 
at  the  moment  as  its  possession  re-established  com- 
munications between  the  still  widely  separated  armies 
of  Blucher  and  Schwarzenberg.  St.  Priest,  foolishly 
believing  that  Napoleon's  army  had  been  destroyed  by 
Blucher  at  Laon,  billeted  his  15,000  men  in  the 
villages  round  Rheims  and  took  little  or  no  precau- 
tions to  protect  them  from  surprise.  Napoleon,  aware 
of  St.  Priest's  isolated  position,  moved  secretly  and  by 


io8        THE   DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


forced  marches  upon  Rheims,  and  on  March  13th 
retook  the  town  and  drove  him  in  great  disorder  and 
with  great  loss  from  the  neighbourhood. 

This  reappearance  of  Napoleon  on  the  field  of  battle 
at  a  moment  when  the  Allies  had  begun  to  think  his 
end  had  come  drew  from  one  of  his  distinguished 
opponents  the  following  remarks  :  "  We  expect  to  see 
this  terrible  man  everywhere.  He  has  beaten  us  all, 
one  after  the  other  :  we  dread  the  audacity  of  his 
enterprises  the  rapidity  of  his  movements  and  his 
able  combinations.  One  has  scarcely  conceived  any 
scheme  of  operations  before  he  destroys  it." 

Napoleon's  fierce  attack  upon  Laon,  his  practical 
destruction  of  St.  Priest  and  his  bold  stay  at  Rheims 
close  to  Blucher's  position  on  the  Aisne  were  not 
without  their  effect.  We  find  that,  notwithstanding 
the  great  Prussian  general's  feverish  anxiety  to  finish 
the  war,  he  did  not  again  venture  to  move  southwards 
beyond  that  river  until  March  2Cth— until,  in  fact,  he 
knew  that  Napoleon  had  quitted  Rheims.  Napoleon 
halted  at  that  place  from  March  14th  to  17th  ;  and 
on  the  latter  date,  gathering  in  some  fresh  reinforce- 
ments, marched  to  Epernay  in  order  to  threaten 
Schwarzenberg  who  had  only  ventured  to  advance 
beyond  Troyes  when  he  heard,  on  the  14th,  of 
Napoleon's  repulse  at  Laon.  But  the  Austrian 
commander-in-chief  moved  slowly  and  cautiously 
driving  before  him  Macdonald  and  Oudinot  who  had 
been  left  to  watch  him.  As  soon,  however,  as  he 
heard  that  Napoleon  had  reached  Epernay  he  again 
took  alarm  and  again  fell  back  pursued  in  hot  haste 
by  Napoleon,  who  made  for  Arces-sur-Aube  full  of 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  109 

confidence  notwithstanding  his  very  great  inferiority 
in  strength. 

A  sudden  change  now  came  over  the  plans  of  the 
AlHes.  The  Czar  had  long  inwardly  chafed  at  the 
repeated  retreats  and  uncertain  movements  of  the 
Allied  forces  whenever  and  wherever  Napoleon  made 
his  appearance,  even  with  the  most  insignificant 
numbers.  The  fear  that  Austria  might  withdraw 
from  the  Coalition  had  now  passed  away  ;  for  by  a 
new  treaty  each  nation  had  pledged  itself  not  to  make 
any  treaty  without  the  consent  of  the  other  Allied 
powers.  The  Emperor  Alexander  consequently  felt 
that  he  might  now  safely  insist  upon  a  sounder  and 
more  active  military  policy.  The  result  was  an  order 
issued  to  all  the  component  parts  of  the  Allied  army 
under  Schwarzenberg's  command  to  march  north- 
wards, and,  having  joined  hands  with  Blucher,  to  press 
on  direct  for  Paris  as  one  concentiated  army  no 
matter  what  Napoleon  might  do.  The  Allied  army 
was  engaged  in  striving  to  effect  this  intended  con- 
centration near  Arces  when  Napoleon  took  up  his 
position  there.  He  soon  found  himself  nearly  hemmed 
in  and  with  dif^culty  effected  his  retreat  across  the 
Aube.  In  order  to  secure  the  bridges  he  had  himself 
to  dismount  and,  sword  in  hand,  rally  the  fugitives. 

His  fortunes  now  appeared  to  be  almost  at  their 
last  ebb.  He  had  the  advantage  of  operating  upon 
interior  lines  and  of  interposing  between  the  two 
great  masses  into  which  the  invading  army  was 
divided,  but  yet  he  had  been  roughly  and  with  great 
loss  repulsed  by  both.  He  clearly  saw  that  they 
were  at  last  bent  upon  closing  in  upon  him  to  crush 


no       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

him  between  them.  In  the  south  Wellington  had 
beaten  Soult  at  Orthez  and  was  advancing  on 
Toulouse,  having  despatched  Beresford  to  Bordeaux 
where  he  had  been  received  with  enthusiasm  ;  and 
La  Vendee  was  moving  in  behalf  of  the  Bourbons. 
He  was  begirt  with  enemies  and  his  friends  were 
only  half-hearted,  yet  he  did  not  despair.  The 
calmness  with  which  he  faced  disaster,  the  resource 
and  ingenuity  with  which  he  contrived  to  find  hope 
and  almost  substantial  grounds  for  hope,  is  most 
remarkable.  Think  what  we  may  of  him  per- 
sonally, we  cannot  refuse  to  admire  the  magnificent 
courage  and  indomitable  spirit  of  this  self-contained 
giant  of  strength  and  superhuman  genius. 

He  could  no  longer  oppose  the  direct  advance  of 
the  Allies  upon  Paris  ;  but  there  was  still  one  course 
open  to  him  :  he  might  fall  upon  their  lines  of 
communication  with  all  the  troops  he  could  collect 
whilst  Joseph  did  his  best  to  defend  the  capital.  He 
calculated  that  there  had  been  already  time  for  the 
recovery  and  convalescence  of  the  invalids  thrown 
into  the  groat  frontier  fortresses  of  Luxembourg, 
Verdun,  Metz,  Thionville,  etc.,  etc.,  and  also  for  the 
tolerable  training  of  many  conscripts  within  those 
places.  These  fresh  troops  would  swell  his  ranks 
and  the  possession  of  those  fortresses  for  purposes  of 
supply  vvould  enable  him  to  move  with  great  freedom. 
By  this  daring  operation  he  hoped  to  relieve  Paris  of 
all  or  at  least  of  any  serious  pressure  upon  it.  This 
calculation  was  based  upon  the  supposition  that,  in 
accordance  with  all  tradition  all  theory  and  all 
precedent  in   formally  conducted    armies,   the  Allies 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814. 


would  conceive  it  to  be  an  unquestioned  necessity 
to  fall  back  in  order  to  restore  and  protect  their 
communications  with  the  Rhine  which  Napoleon  had 
fallen  upon  and  cut  off.  He  also  attached  great 
importance  to  the  moral  effect  which  this  startling 
and  very  bold  combination  would  have  upon  his  o\\  n 
soldiers  as  well  as  upon  the  enemy.  But  its  success 
depended  upon  the  defence  of  Paris  by  Joseph  until 
Napoleon  had  had  time  to  reach  the  valley  of  the 
Meuse  with  all  his  available  forces.  This  was  the 
weak  point  in  his  scheme  ;  for  his  poor  feeble  brother 
was  a  broken  reed  to  rest  upon,  and  he  had  not  even 
taken  any  effective  steps  to  place  Paris  beyond  the 
danger  of  a  coup  de  main. 

When  Napoleon  started  from  Arces-sur-Aube  in 
the  direction  of  Vitri  and  St.  Dizier,  to  carry  out  his 
new  and  daring  project,  his  numbers  were  too  small 
to  enable  him  to  act  successfully  upon  the  enemy's 
rear.  He  had  consequently  to  draw  to  himself 
Pacthod's  division,  then  at  Berg^res,  and  the  corps 
of  Marmont  and  Mortier  which  he  had  left  to 
watch  Blucher  when  he  turned  south  to  fall  upon 
Schwarzenberg.  But  in  taking  these  troops  with  him 
he  withdrew  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Paris  the 
only  really  good  corps  allotted  for  its  defence  and 
upon  which  its  safety  most  depended.  As  Blucher 
had  advanced  they  had  fallen  back  in  a  south-westerly 
direction  towards  the  capital  and  had  reached 
Fere-en-Tardenois  when  they  received  Napoleon's 
order  to  join  him  at  St.  Dizier  by  way  of  Chalons 
Had  these  orders  reached  them  before  Blucher,  in 
his  southward  movement  to  join  Schwarzenberg,  had 


112       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

reached  a  position  to  the  eastward  of  them  they  could 
easily  have  complied  ;  but,  as  it  was,  their  only  chance 
of  doing-  so  then  was  by  a  cross-country  road  to  Vitri. 

For  the  second  time  in  this  campaign  an  intercepted 
despatch  disclosed  the  Emperor's  project  to  the 
enemy.  Anxious  to  keep  up  the  failing  spirits  of  the 
dejected  court  in  Paris,  he  had  written  his  wife  a  full 
account  of  the  project  which  he  still  hoped  would 
restore  his  fortunes.  And  this  it  was  that  fell  into 
the  enemy's  hands  on  March  24th. 

As  long  as  Blucher  and  Schwarzenberg  had  operated 
independently  against  Paris  with  a  great  interval 
between  their  armies,  the  central  line,  that  between 
Paris  and  Chalons,  was  generally  available  for 
Napoleon's  movements.  This  was,  he  deemed,  all  the 
safer  now  since  he  had  driven  those  two  hostile  armies 
so  wide  apart.  Not  only  had  he  consequently 
ordered  Marmont  and  Mortier  to  use  it  in  coming  to 
him  but  other  troops  were  then  marching  westward 
by  it.  General  Compans  with  about  three  thousand 
men  had  reached  La  Ferte  en  nnite  to  join  him  by 
Sezanne.  Two  divisions  of  the  National  Guard  were 
nearing  Chalons  with  a  large  convoy  of  artillery.  All 
these  detachments,  in  ignorance  of  their  danger,  were 
moving  independently  between  the  two  Allied  armies, 
whose  presence  they  were  not  aware  of,  whilst 
Napoleon  at  the  same  moment  was  farther  from  Paris 
than  either  Blucher  or  Schwarzenberg.  This  was  a 
very  dangerous  condition  of  things  for  the  French. 

When  the  full  nature  of  Napoleon's  scheme  became 
known  to  the  Allies,  Blucher  at  once  resolved  that 
instead     of    pressing     south-westwards     by    himself 


G.Fhilifi.Scn.XiietzSv.  London.. 

[  To  face  paj^e  112. 


•^ 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  1 13 

towards  Paris  he  would  march  direct  upon  Chalons 
to  ensure  his  junction  with  Schwarzenberg  in  the 
great  open  country  between  it  and  Vitri.  Having 
begun  this  movement,  he  despatched  at  the  same 
time  a  large  force  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  under 
Wintzingerode  towards  St.  Dizier.  This  he  did  in 
order  to  conceal  the  intended  movement  of  the  two 
concentrated  armies  upon  Paris  which  was  now  laid 
open  to  them  by  Napoleon's  movement  towards  Chau- 
mont  and  the  Upper  Meuse.  Schwarzenberg  at  first 
was  somewhat  alarmed  by  the  news  contained  in  the 
intercepted  despatch  ;  but  as  one  consequence  of 
Napoleon's  movement  on  St.  Dizier  and  thence  south- 
wards upon  Doulevent,  the  French  cavalry  had  chased 
from  Chaumont  and  Bar-sur-Aube  the  Allied  diplo- 
matic headquarters  with  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and 
Metternich.  They  had  fled  to  Dijon.  Schwarzenberg 
was  by  this  relieved  of  the  clog  upon  all  his  plans  and 
movements  which  their  vicinity  had  proved  ;  and  as 
he  could  no  longer,  for  the  time  at  least,  appeal  to  the 
authority  of  his  court  he  consented  to  the  now 
strongly  expressed  desire  of  the  Czar  that  the  Grand 
Army  should  at  once  join  Blucher  and  that  the  two 
armies  so  united  should  march  direct  upon  Paris, 
regardless  of  what  Napoleon  might  do.  The  Allied 
forces  having  effected  their  junction  as  intended 
moved  forward  at  last  for  Paris  on  March  24th,  as 
one  vast  force,  to  the  delight  of  all  the  soldiers  in 
those  armies.  Its  advance  was  in  two  columns 
covered  by  great  masses  of  horsemen,  who  on 
the  25th  upon  reaching  Soude-Sainte-Croix — about 
half-way    between    Vitri    and    F^re    Champenoise — 

I 


114       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

Struck  upon  Marmont's  camp  just  as  Mortier's 
columns  had  reached  it.  Those  two  Marshals  were 
very  roughly  handled  and  driven  back  in  the  utmost 
disorder  upon  Fere  Champenoise.  and  finally  upon 
Allemant  near  Sezanne.  The  French  troops  as  a 
body  had  not  behaved  well  this  day  and  their  losses 
were  very  heavy.  Whilst  the  Marshals  were  so 
engaged,  a  great  artillery-train  together  with  a  large 
ammunition  and  provision  convoy,  also  bound  for 
Napoleon's  camp,  came  upon  the  scene  to  the  north- 
ward. Abandoned  to  its  fate  by  the  flying  troops 
under  Marmont  and  Mortier,  and  overwhelmed  on  all 
sides  by  cavalry  and  horse  artillery,  it  was  totally 
destroyed.  Altogether,  the  French  loss  this  day 
amounted  to  60  guns  and  about  10,000  men. 

Cut  off  from  all  possibility  of  joining  Napoleon 
and  almost  surrounded  by  enemies,  the  defeated 
Marshals  had  to  make  a  wide  detour  by  Melun  in 
order  to  get  back  between  Paris  and  the  now  steadily 
advancing  and  concentrated  Allied  armies.  They 
reached  Charenton — to  the  south-east  of  the  city — at 
midday  on  March  29th. 

By  that  date  the  Allies  also  had  reached  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  capital  upon  its  northern  and  eastern 
sides.  The  Empress  and  the  Council  of  Regency 
escaped  to  Blois  in  accordance  with  Napoleon's 
instructions,  leaving  Joseph  to  provide  for  the  defence 
of  the  city.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  feeble 
than  his  conduct  in  this  emergency.  The  force  at  his 
disposal  consisted  of  some  cadres  of  the  Guard  into 
which  at  the  last  moment  he  had  poured  some 
thousands  of  conscripts.     Marmont  and  Mortier  had 


THE    CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  115 

brought  back  about  12,000  men  and  Compans,  lately 
reinforced  by  a  few  battalions,  was  in  command  of 
some  6000  more.  General  Money  had  taken  command 
of  about  5000  of  the  National  Guard  who  had  been 
lately  organised.  There  was  a  large  quantity  of 
heavy  guns  available,  but  no  adequate  steps  had  been 
taken  to  place  them  in  position  or  to  establish  an}' 
defensive  works  on  the  commanding  heights  round 
Paris.  We  often  hear  much  ignorant  ridicule  of 
permanent  fortifications  and  this  is  a  good  illustration 
of  how  foolish  it  sometimes  is  ;  for  if  in  1814  that  city 
had  been  protected  by  external  forts,  as  in  1870,  the 
result  of  this  campaign  might  have  been  verj- 
different.  But  far-seeing  as  Napoleon  generally 
was  he  had  not  contemplated  the  possibility — until 
too  late — of  Paris,  the  centre  and  focus  of  his  power, 
being  assailed  by  an  enemy.  Had  he  even  in  the 
month  of  January  constructed  great  field  works  on 
the  east  and  north  and  south  of  Paris  and  thickly 
armed  them  with  heavy  guns,  the  city  might  have 
held  out  whilst  he,  in  the  valley  of  the  Meuse,  made 
havoc  of  his  enemies'  lines  of  communication. 

The  Allies  pressed  forward  upon  the  north  of  Paris 
on  a  front  extending  from  the  St.  Denis  (Bois  de 
Boulogne)  road  eastward  to  Belleville  and  Romainville, 
and  upon  March  30th  drove  the  French  from  all  their 
forward  positions  into  the  city.  Joseph  then  authorised 
Marmont  to  negotiate  for  the  evacuation  of  the  place, 
and  by  the  evening  of  that  same  day  a  convention 
having  been  agreed  to,  all  hostilities  ceased. 

Meanwhile  Napoleon's  cavalry  had  actually  seized 
Chaumont     directly     on     Schwarzenberg's     line     of 

I    2 


ii6        THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

communication.  He  was  himself  at  Doulevent  on 
March  25th,  anxiously  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Marmont 
and  Mortier  on  the  very  day  of  their  great  disaster 
when  it  was  reported  to  him  that  large  masses  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  were  in  sight.  For  the  moment  no 
news  could  have  pleased  him  better,  for  it  seemed  to 
imply  that,  as  he  had  calculated  upon,  Schwarzenberg 
was  falling  back  to  restore  his  communications.  He 
at  once  moved  to  the  attack  with  all  the  forces  he  had 
at  hand,  hoping  to  cut  his  way  through  the  hostile 
horse  and  join  hands  with  the  Marshals  whom  he 
hourly  expected.  This  cavalry  q{  the  enemy  was 
under  Wintzingerode,  and  over  it  he  gained  a  brilliant 
success  driving  it  at  last  with  great  loss  to  the  north- 
east far  off  the  immediate  zone  of  operations  and 
beyond  Bar  le  Due.  It  was  from  his  prisoners  he  then 
first  gathered  some  indication  of  what  had  happened. 
In  the  first  place  he  was  startled  to  find  that  it  was 
with  Blucher's  and  not  with  Schwarzenberg's  army 
he  had  been  fighting.  Secondly,  they  all  reported 
vague  rumours  of  the  Allies'  march  upon  Paris.  It 
became  therefore  vitally  important  he  should  ascertain 
the  facts. 

Halting  himself  at  St.  Dizier,  he  pushed  a  strong 
reconnaissance  forward  to  Vitri  on  the  26th.  From  it 
for  the  first  time  he  heard  of  the  Marshal's  defeat  at 
F^re-Champenoise  on  the  25th.  and  also  that  Talley- 
rand and  his  party  had  summoned  the  Allies  to  Paris, 
whither  they  had  marched. 

Even  after  the  reception  of  this  news  his  own 
inclination  was  to  adhere  to  his  plan  for  moving  on  the 
enemy's   communications  with  every   man    he   could 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  II7 

collect,  leaving  the  Allies  to  do  their  worst  upon  Paris. 
But  the  series  of  disasters  his  arms  had  sustained 
during  the  last  three  campaigns  had  robbed  him  of 
much  of  his  old  undisputed  sway.  Most  of  his 
generals  were  despondent — Berthier,  his  chief  of  the 
staff,  most  so.  All  agreed  that  he  must  either  save 
Paris  or  succumb.  The  pressure  brought  to  bear  by 
those  about  him  was  now  too  strong  to  be  resisted. 
Two  years  before  he  would  have  summarily  dismissed 
the  man  who  ventured  unasked  to  give  him  any  advice 
at  all.  Besides,  he  began  to  realise  that  Paris  could 
not  hold  out  long  enough  against  the  Allies'  overwhelm- 
ing numbers  to  enable  him  to  attack  and  spread  disorder 
in  the  enemy's  rear.  He  consequently  hurried  back 
towards  Paris  with  all  the  troops  he  could  take  with 
him  in  one  of  his  rapid,  relayed  marches.  Travelling 
post,  and  moving  by  Troyes,  he  reached  Fontainebleau 
on  March  31st.  There  he  learnt  that  Paris  had 
surrendered,  but  even  yet  he  was  by  no  means 
disposed  to  give  up  the  game.  On  the  very  day  of 
his  arrival  he  addressed  a  despatch  to  the  Empress 
telling  her  of  the  rising  en  masse  of  the  eastern 
provinces,  of  the  capture  of  all  sorts  of  distinguished 
people  when  his  cavalry  broke  in  upon  the  diplomatic 
headquarters,  etc.,  etc.  He  went  upon  the  plan  of 
telling  untruths  without  hesitation  when  he  thought  it 
advisable  to  spread  abroad  the  most  flattering  stories 
of  his  victories  and  of  the  losses  inflicted  upon  the 
enemy. 

Paris  being  now  lost  to  him,  he  makes  arrange- 
ments for  prosecuting  the  war  with  Orleans  as  his 
new  base  and  new  seat  of  government.     Orders  were 


Ii8       THE  DECLmE  AMD  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

issued  for  the  concentration  of  all  his  forces,  both 
those  which  fell  back  from  Paris  upon  its  surrender 
and  those  which  had  been  following  his  rapid  move- 
ments ;  they  were  to  take  up  a  position  south  of  Paris 
between  it  and  Essonne.  He  provides  for  the  reor- 
ganisation of  the  civil  government,  appointing  special 
prefects  and  other  administrative  officers  to  assist  him 
in  carrying  on  the  war  upon  which  he  is  still  bent. 

But  able  as  his  conceptions  are,  clever  and  business- 
like as  are  all  his  arrangements,  he  is  no  longer  the 
absolute  monarch  who  can  feel  certain  of  his  orders 
being  obeyed.  His  Guards  and  the  privates  and 
under-officers  generally  are  still  faithful  and  will 
follow  him  anywhere  ;  but  the  Marshals  whom  he 
has  raised  from  the  ranks,  and  the  Senate  whose 
members  owe  their  places  and  fortunes  to  him,  all 
have  determined,  and  wisely  determined  for  the  sake 
of  France,  that  the  war  shall  end — that  there  shall  be 
peace  no  matter  how  destructive  its  terms  may  be 
to  the  master  who  had  made  them.  Amongst  the 
many  ways  in  which  the  personal  loyalty  of  the  rank 
and  file  to  Napoleon  at  this  juncture  shows  in  strong 
contrast  with  the  calculated  treason  of  his  generals,  the 
following  story  is  a  good  illustration  :  Marmont,  acting 
within  his  right — within  his  duty  in  fact — entered 
into  negotiations  for  himself  and  on  behalf  of  his 
corps  that  they  would  abide  by  the  decree  of  the 
Senate.  When  on  April  2nd  that  body  declared  the 
Emperor  deposed  and  nominated  a  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, Marmont  issued  orders  on  the  assumption  that 
his  men  felt  as  he  did.  But  when  they  and  their 
regimental  officers  learned  that  the  intention  was  to 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  ng 

abandon  Napoleon  they  refused  to  obey.  Marmont 
was  riding  towards  his  corps  when  the  generals  met 
him  and  told  him  this  news,  warning  him  at  the  same 
time  that  he  would  certainly  be  shot  if  he  appeared 
on  parade.  He  was  too  brave  a  man  to  fear  his 
own  soldiers  so  he  rode  in  amongst  them.  After  a 
very  French  scene  where  everybody  seems  to  have 
cried  together  he  succeeded  in  carrying  his  corps 
with  him  and  led  them  into  the  camp  of  the  Allies. 

For  some  time  there  was  much  talk  of  a  Regency 
under  the  Empress  until  Napoleon's  son  was  old 
enough  to  reign,  but  all  felt  that  this  would  only 
mean  Napoleon  under  a  new  guise.  Even  he  himself 
scoffed  at  the  notion  of  a  Regenc)-  under  a  child,  as 
he  called  his  wife.  The  only  other  alternative  was 
the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons,  and  for  this  the  Allies 
declared.  As  Talleyrand  well  said,  "  the  Regency 
was  an  intrigue,  the  Bourbons  alone  were  a  prin- 
ciple." 

It  was  his  Marshals  who  forced  Napoleon  to  abdi- 
cate. They  were  sick  of  war,  had  drunk  deep  of  its 
glory  and  had  exhausted  all  the  rewards  it  was  in 
the  power  of  their  great  leader  to  bestow.  For  the 
ten  previous  years  many  of  them  had  not  spent  as 
many  months  at  home.  The  story  of  Marmont's 
desertion  of  the  master  who  had  raised  him  to  a  great 
position  would  require  an  article  to  itself.  Whatever 
posterity  may  think  of  its  morality,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  it  was  the  final  blow  which  destroyed 
Napoleon  in  18 14.  We  are  asked  by  some  historians 
to  condemn  these  men  because  the  sovereign  they 
destroyed  had  covered  them  with  wealth  and  honours  ; 


12D       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  they  had  then  to 
decide  between  fidelity  to  him  and  loyalty  to  their 
country.  Who  can  therefore  justly  blame  them  ? 
Not  surely  tho>e  whose  ancestors  deserted  James  II. 
and  joined  the  great  William  of  Nassau  because  the 
welfare  of  England  depended  upon  the  success  of  the 
Revolution ! 

On  April  5th  and  6th  Napoleon  urged  his  Marshals 
to  follow  him  behind  the  Loire  and  continue  the 
struggle.  He  appealed  to  their  loyalty  and  to  those 
feelings  which  attach  soldiers  to  great  leaders  ;  but 
all  in  vain.  As  scheme  upon  scheme  was  projected 
in  that  colossal,  that  labyrinthine  mind  of  his,  how 
the  iron  must  have  entered  into  his  soul  as  he,  the 
"  man  of  thousand  thrones,"  was  forced  to  listen  to 
his  Marshals,  his  former  humble  servants,  when  they 
declared  in  tones  of  dictation  and  of  menace  that  he 
must  abdicate  unconditionally  for  they  would  take  no 
part  in  the  civil  war  which  his  proposed  action  would 
entail  upon  France  !  Convinced  as  many  are  that 
the  campaign  of  18 14  was  not  only  a  folly  but  a 
crime,  still  one  cannot  contemplate  Napoleon's  last 
week  at  Fontainebleau  without  the  deepest  feeling  of 
pity  for  his  lot.  And  who  can  withhold  his  admira- 
tion of  the  sterling  courage,  the  honest  fidelity  and 
simple  loyalty  of  the  rank  and  file  to  the  master  who 
had  so  often  led  them  to  victory  ?  Although  we  may 
feel  that  he  was  little  worthy  of  their  noble  devotion, 
who  will  deny  his  meed  of  praise  to  the  humble, 
warm-hearted  and  gallant  French  soldier  for  bestow- 
ing it  upon  the  idol  of  his  life  ? 

As  soon  as  it  became  generally  known  at  Fontaine- 


TBE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1SI4. 


bieau  that  Napoleon  had  abdicated  he  was  deserted 
by  his  generals  and  by  nearly  all  his  staff,  and  very 
few  officers  remained  even  to  do  duty  at  his  head- 
quarters. 

On  April  nth  Napoleon  issued  an  address  to  the 
army  that  had  remained  faithful  to  him,  spoke  his 
famous  farevv^ell  to  his  Generals  and  signed  his  Act  of 
Abdication.  The  Allies  gave  him  the  pleasant  little 
island  of  Elba  as  his  future  residence  and  allowed 
him  to  play  there  at  royalty  under  the  title  of 
Emperor,  with  a  small  party  of  his  Guards  and  such 
of  his  courtiers  as  wished  to  accompany  him  into  exile. 
These  easy  terms  entailed  upon  the  world  a  risk  of 
war  which  the  Allies  were  not  justified  in  permitting. 
He  was  the  Peace-Destroyer  of  Europe  and  his  re- 
appearance in  France  at  any  time  would  mean  more 
war,  more  misery  to  nations,  his  own  adopted  nation 
included.  Having  at  last,  after  great  suffering  and 
exertions,  caught  this  unrivalled  bird  of  prey  they 
should  not  have  contented  themselves  with  any  mere 
clipping  of  his  wings  :  they  should  have  pinioned  him 
and  have  closely  caged  him,  as  they  subsequently  did 
at  St.  Helena,  and  taken  every  precaution,  no  matter 
how  inconvenient  to  him,  to  render  his  escape  im- 
possible. Had  he  been  in  their  place  no  sentimental 
feeling  for  fallen  greatness,  for  defeated  royalty  would 
have  influenced  his  decision  ;  his  knowledge  of  human 
nature,  his  practical  common  sense  would  have  told 
him  that  Napoleon  Bonaparte  was  not  the  man  to 
remain  long  a  prisoner  in  a  little  island  from  which 
escape  was  comparatively  easy.  Had  proper  pre- 
cautions been  taken  in  1814  to  prevent  his  ever  again 


122       THE  DECLINE  AND  PALL   Of   NAPOLEON. 

troubling  the  world,  what  an  amount  of  bloodshed 
and  of  consequent  misery  the  Allies  would  have 
saved  Europe,  what  defeat  and  further  abasement 
they  would  have  spared  France  ! 

Wellington's  final  stroke  which  shattered  Soult's 
army  at  Toulouse  was  not  delivered  until  six  days 
after  the  date  of  Napoleon's  abdication,  so  slowly  in 
those  days  did  news  travel.  Soult  had  heard  vague 
rumours  of  what  had  taken  place  at  Paris  and  Fon- 
tainebleau  but  had  received  no  official  authority  for 
a  suspension  of  arms. 

And  so  ended  the  much-talked-of  and  very  remark- 
able campaign  of  1814.  Until  the  Napoleonic  idea, 
so  fostered  by  the  writings  of  M.  Thiers,  had  led 
France  into  the  war  of  1870  it  was  the  common  study 
of  all  military  students  as  a  brilliant  example  of 
the  offensive-defensive.  It  is  full  of  instruction  for 
soldiers,  and  also  abounds  in  incidents  that  are  fitting 
subjects  for  the  high-flown  exaggeration  of  the 
grandiloquent  French  historian  in  his  description 
of  the  wounded  tiger's  death-struggle  ;  woe  be- 
tide the  man  who  dared  to  approach  within  reach 
of  even  his  crippled  strength !  But  looking  at  it 
from  the  standpoint  of  French  patriotism — if  an 
Englishman  can  do  so — one  feels  obliged  to  condemn 
it  as  a  campaign  that  should  never  have  taken  place. 
The  odds  against  Napoleon  when  he  determined 
upon  it,  were  so  overwhelming  that  nothing  short  of 
a  miracle  in  his  favour  could  have  secured  him 
eventual  success.  "We  admire,  we  praise  the  man 
who  when  fighting  solely  for  his  country  fights  to 
the  last  trusting  to  some  chance  miracle  to  give  her 


L 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  125 

the  victory.  But  no  one  can  be  justified  jn  fighting 
out  a  war  to  the  bitter  end,  as  Napoleon  did  in  18 14, 
when  that  war  is  waged  for  his  own  reasons  and  his 
own  personal  objects. 

In  the  actual  theatre  of  war  Napoleon's  strategy 
for  the  first  three  months  of  this  year  is  beyond  all 
praise.  But  as  a  campaign,  as  a  great  episode  in  this 
three  years'  war,  it  was  based  upon  a  thoroughly  un- 
sound military  policy.  When  he  made  up  his  mind 
to  refuse  the  terms  offered  by  the  Allies  before  they 
had  crossed  the  Rhine  he  should  have  secured  to 
himself  all  the  possible  chances  in  his  favour.  I  have 
already  referred  to  the  garrisons  in  Germany  and  to 
his  armies  in  Spain  which  he  might  have  withdrawn. 
Why  not  at  once  have  sent  back  to  Madrid  his 
prisoner,  the  real  king  of  Spain,  having  made  an 
advantageous  peace  with  him  .''  This  and  his  de- 
position of  Joseph,  the  poor  unmilitary  creature  to 
whom  he  had  given  that  historic  crown,  would  have 
gone  far  towards  conciliating  what  I  may  term  the 
spirit  the  sentiment  of  Divine  Right  to  which  the 
Allied  sovereigns  attached  considerable  weight.  It 
would  certainly  have  tended  to  make  some  of  them 
half-hearted  in  the  contest  and  to  weaken  still  more 
the  ties  which  kept  the  Alliance  together.  Had  he 
wished  he  might — immediately  after  Dresden — have 
easily  detached  his  father-in-law,  the  Emperor  of 
Austria,  from  the  Coalition.  Indeed,  whilst  freely 
admitting  that  the  whole  strategic  conception  of  the 
campaigns  of  1813  and  1814  was  of  the  highest  order 
the  general  military  policy,  largely  based  upon  the 
unexpected  chances  of  the  game,  which  he  then  pur- 


126        THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

sued  was  faulty  in  the  extreme  ;  and  if  an  ordinary 
individual  may  venture  to  question  the  wisdom  of  the 
man  whom  he  beheves  to  have  been  the  greatest  of 
God's  human  creations,  it  was  opposed  to  the  interests 
of  exhausted  France  and  most  hurtful  to  what  was 
still  dearer  to  him — I  mean  his  own  interests.  Many 
of  the  battles  in  this  campaign  are  splendid  examples 
of  Napoleon's  best  style  of  fighting  and  of  his  master- 
genius  in  war,  but  they  must  not  be  confounded  with 
victories.  They  are  so  styled  by  M.  Thiers  and  his 
school ;  but  beyond  the  glory  which  some  of  them 
shed  upon  him  and  the  French  army  at  the  time,  each 
battle  was  little  more  than  a  serious  reduction  of  his 
already  attenuated  forces — that  is,  of  his  power  to 
continue  the  struggle  against  the  practically  inex- 
haustible strength  of  the  Allied  armies  then  con- 
verging upon  Paris.  The  game  played  by  the 
invaders  was  a  game  of  attrition  reminding  us  very 
much  of  that  played  by  General  Grant  when  brought 
face  to  face  with  Lee,  the  Napoleon  in  ability  of  the 
American  civil  war.  Like  General  Grant,  the  Allies 
were  always  ready  to  lose  one  thousand  of  their  men 
if  they  could  only  kill  half  that  number  of  their 
enemies. 

In  1 8 14  Napoleon's  army  was  a  mixture  of  seasoned 
soldiers  and  young  conscripts  in  a  proportion  of  about 
one  to  five,  and  France  has  good  reason  to  be  proud  of 
them  for  all  alike  fought  well.  When  overpowered 
and  beaten  they  did  not  condescend  to  attribute  their 
defeat — as  under  the  Second  Empire — to  the  treason 
of  their  leaders.  But  let  us  at  once  disabuse  ourselves 
of  the   notion    that    they    were    fighting    for    France. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1814.  127 

They  fought  for  and  at  the  bidding  of  the  man 
Napo'eon  Bonaparte,  the  great  the  magnificent 
Emperor  who  had  inundated  France  with  glory^with 
a  glory  that  has  never  been  surpassed  and  which 
possibly  may  never  again  be  equalled. 

The  Allies  set  to  work  in  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
to  provide  for  the  disposition  of  what  had  once  been 
Napoleon's  empire  and  there  was  much  bickering  over 
the  spoils.  The  Bourbons  and  the  returned  emigres 
settled  down  to  govern  France  again  as  if  no  Napoleon 
had  ever  been  born,  certainly  as  if  he  no  longer  existed. 
But  the  heterogeneous  elements  in  France,  the  survival 
of  the  Revolution  as  well  as  of  the  Empire,  were  quite 
beyond  the  power  of  their  narrow  minds  to  grasp, 
much  less  to  deal  with  effectively.  The  strong  hand 
of  a  soldier-dictator  like  Napoleon  was  required  to 
control  them.  The  task  was  far  beyond  the  powers 
of  the  few  returned  nobles  and  the  handful  of  lawyers 
who  now  essayed  to  govern  France  under  a  new 
Bourbon  king.  But  it  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of 
my  subject  to  deal  with  that  interesting  and  com- 
plicated story.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  it  was  the 
quarrels  of  the  Powers  assembled  in  Congress  at 
Vienna  and  the  manifest  incapacity  of  the  Bourbons 
and  of  their  followers  to  satisfy  and  control  France, 
that  eventually  gave  another  opportunity  to  the  great 
Soldier- King  whose  first  fall  I  have  here  endeavoured 
to  describe.  Of  his  wonderful  resurrection  for  the 
one  hundred  days  which  ended  at  Waterloo  I  shall 
speak  in  the  following  chapters. 


128       rHE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   HUNDRED   DAYS. — THE   BATTLE   OF   LIGNY. 

At  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  March  ist,  1815, 
three  httle  ships  cast  anchor  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Juan. 
They  carried  the  great  Napoleon  who,  with  some 
eleven  hundred  of  his  finest  soldiers,  had  escaped  from 
Elba,  his  badly-guarded  prison-house,  only  a  few  days 
before.  For  purposes  of  battle  this  handful  of  men 
would  have  been  useless  but  they  were  invaluable  to 
protect  their  master  from  police  interference  during  his 
advance  upon  Paris. 

His  return  to  France  was  not  influenced  by  any 
deep  patriotic  motive  but  was  the  outcome  of  a 
fiendish  and  inordinate  ambition  of  the  most  selfish 
kind.  It  meant  a  new  outburst  of  war,  more  blood- 
shed and  a  fresh  crop  of  misery  to  Europe.  France 
required  peace  above  all  things  after  her  many  years 
of  Revolutionary  horrors  and  devastating  strife  ;  but 
Napoleon  from  Elba  brought  her  war  with  England 
and  every  Continental  State.  His  return  begat  new 
trials  and  new  sufferings  for  humanity. 

The  troops   sent   by   Lewis  XVHI.  to   oppose  his 

advance  upon   Paris  greeted  him  with  shouts  of   Vive 

Evipereur.    Even  the  chivalrous  Ney,  who  had  sworn 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  129 

allegiance  to  his  new  master,  the  liourbon  King,  was 
drawn  into  the  great  military  whirlpool  of  revolt  and 
declared  for  the  leader  whose  fortunes  he  had  so  long 
followed  both  in  sunshine  and  in  gloom. 

Napoleon  entered  Paris  on  March  21st,  his  journey- 
having  been  a  sort  of  royal  and  triumphal  progress. 
When  he  reached  the  Tuileries  he  had  good  reason 
for  saying  to  Caulincourt  that  the  success  of  his  rash 
venture  was  a  return  once  more  of  that  dazzling  good- 
fortune  which  had  spoiled  him  during  so  many  years. 

As  soon  as  it  was  known  at  Vienna  that  Napoleon 
had  landed  in  France  the  Plenipotentiaries,  there 
assembled  in  Congress,  issued  a  formal  notice  of 
outlawry  against  him.  In  it  they  declared  that  "  as 
an  enemy  and  distuiber  of  the  tranquillity  of  the  world 
he  is  abandoned  to  public  vengeance."  All  European 
countries  rang  with  the  call  to  arms  to  crush  this 
tyrant  this  peace  destroyer  whom  no  Treaties  could 
bind.  To  help  the  nations  of  Europe,  England 
promised  to  pay  them  monthly,  in  proportion  to 
their  armies,  a  total  amount  of  over  ;^  11,000,000 
sterling. 

Napoleon's  first  great  want  was  time  :  to  re-establish 
his  authority  reorganise  his  government  and  create  a 
new  army  that  would  enable  him  to  meet  his  enemies 
in  the  field.  He  strove  to  divide  the  Coalition  against 
him  by  an  endeavour  to  treat  separately  with  each  of 
the  Allied  Powers.  But  they  were  not  to  be  taken 
in  by  his  specious  declarations  and  refused  even  to 
receive  his  Envoys. 

He  had  hoped  that,  once  in  the  Tuileries  again  as 
the  accepted  Sovereign  of   the  people    he  would    be 

K 


I30       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

able  to  take  up  the  reins  of  government  and  rule  as 
before.     He  felt  that  it  was  only  as  Dictator  he  could 
hope   to  steer    France   safely    through    the    thousand 
dangers  with  which  his  return  surrounded  her.  » A  wise 
man  of  action  he  was  neither  the  fool  nor  the  criminal 
to  imagine  that  the  talkers  and  thinkers  of  the  Senate 
or  those  who  in  the  Lower  House  babbled  of  liberty 
and   argued   about  the   abstract   principles   of  parlia- 
mentary government  were  the  men  to  rule  France  at 
such  a  conjuncture.     Had  those  who  then  directed  her 
destinies  been  wise  and  sincerely  and  heartily  in  his 
favour  they  would  with  one  voice  have  hailed  him  as 
Dictator.     But  he  soon  found  that  nothing  was  then 
further  from  their  thoughts.     To  his  soldiers  he  was 
still  the  Emperor  as  of  yore  but  the  jabbering  dreamers 
in  both  Houses  of  Parliament  persisted  in  regarding 
him  as  merely  the  elected  head   of  a  constitutional 
monarchy.     The  very  men  he  had  chosen  to  be  his 
ministers  would   not  have  him  as  Dictator,   and  his 
brother   Lucien — the  irreconcilable   Republican — was 
openly  opposed  to  any  re-establishment  of  the  Empire 
upon  its  former  basis.     He  soon    realised    that  until 
victory  had  decked  him  with  a  new  aureole  of  Imperial 
authority  he  could  not  hope  to  be  again  the  undisputed 
ruler  of  France  unless  indeed  he  would  stoop  to  appeal 
to  the  worst  passions  of  the  people  generally.     He 
knew  that  with  the  military  sentiment  of  the  country 
in  his  favour  he  might  easily  arouse  such  a  crusade 
against  the  rich   the  privileged  classes  and  all  those 
who  cried  for  a  Bourbon  King,  that  he  might  at  once 
become    again    the    unquestioned    and    all-powerful 
despot.     But  his  experience  of  the  Revolution  horrors 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  13 1, 

in  his  young  days  had  given  him  a  rooted  loathing  of 
unbridled  democracy  and  of  mob  rule.  As  he  said  at 
St.  Helena  he  had  no  wish  or  intention  to  be  the  King 
of  a  modern  Jacquerie. 

As  he  would  not  be  such  a  King  and  could  not  be 
again  the  absolute  Emperor  the  only  line  open  to  him 
was  that  of  Constitutional  Sovereign — a  position  which 
his  advisers  urged  him  to  assume.  His  first  and  most 
urgent  want  was  an  army  sufficiently  large  to  destroy 
his  enemies  in  the  field  and  to  obtain  this  he  felt  he 
must  bend  before  the  pressure  of  his  friends.  Promises 
always  sat  lightly  upon  him  and  he  was  now  prepared 
to  promise  anything  if  they  would  only  give  him  what 
he  needed  at  the  moment.  In  order  therefore  to 
satisfy  popular  opinion  he  promulgated,  on  April  22nd 
a  form  of  Constitution  which  on  nearly  all  important 
points  closely  resembled  the  Charter  that  had  been 
recently  published  by  Lewis  XVHI.  But  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  this  Constitution  would  not  have 
been  worth  the  paper  it  was  written  on  had  he  re- 
turned triumphant  to  Paris  after  Waterloo.  He 
would  then  have  quickly  and  rudely  silenced  those 
who  dared  to  babble  of  liberal  and  parliamentary 
institutions.  For  the  moment,  however,  it  answered 
his  purpose.  Indeed  many  were  even  foolish  enough 
to  believe  the  statement  in  his  new  charter  to  the 
effect  that  he  had  formerly  postponed  the  introduc- 
tion of  free  institutions  into  France  in  order  to 
establish  a  great  federal  system  in  Europe  ;  that  he 
was  anxious  to  establish  such  a  system  because  he 
had  always  thought  it  would  lead  generally  to 
progress   and   civilisation,  but    ihat   at   any   rate   he 

K  2 


J-X2        THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL    OF  NAPOLEON. 


would  in  future  restrict  his  efforts  to  increase  pros- 
perity and  strengthen  pubHc  Hberty  at  home.  How 
he  must  have  laughed  inwardly  as  he  wrote  this  ! 

Both  Houses  of  his  Parliament  went  out  of  their 
way  to  remind  him  that  he  was  merely  the  head 
of  a  constitutionally  governed  country  :  that  the  two 
Chambers  were  national  and  representative  institu- 
tions and  no  longer  Napoleonic  clubs  as  formerly. 
To  us  now  their  addresses  read  as  childishly  comic  ; 
by  him  they  were  simply  regarded  as  impertinent.  In 
one  of  his  dignified  answers  he  told  them  :  "  It  is  in 
times  of  difficult)'  that  great  nations,  like  great  men 
unfold  all  the  energy  of  their  character  and  become 
objects  of  admiration  to  posterity  !  "  He  warned  them 
not  to  imitate  the  example  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Byzantine  emp>ire  who  had  made  themselves  for  ever 
the  laughing-stock  of  posterity  by  persisting  in  the 
discussion  of  subtle  abstract  points  of  constitutional 
procedure  at  a  time  when  the  barbarians  were  pressing 
them  on  all  sides  and  at  the  very  moment  even  when 
their  battering-rams  were  breaking  down  the  gates  of 
the  capital.  But  much  as  he  hated  liberty  in  ever}' 
form,  he  did  not  then  feel  strong  enough  to  dismiss  his 
half-hearted  advisers  upon  the  eve  of  that  war  with  all 
Europe  which  his  escape  from  Elba  had  entailed  upon 
France.  What  were  his  inward  reservations  when  he 
swore  to  abide  b}-  this  new  constitution  may  be  judged 
from  what  he  said  aloud  :  "  I  am  not  the  man  to 
permit  a  pack  of  lawyers  to  make  my  laws  for  me 
nor  to  allow  the  factions  to  cut  off  my  head." 

Napoleon's  reconquest  of  France  was  thus  achieved 
without  bloodshed  ;  but  it  was  more  the  unpopularity 


THE  HUNDRED   DAYS.  133 


of  the  Bourbons  than  his  own  claims  upon  the  people's 
love  which  secured  him  this  easy  success.  Their 
conduct  had  been  as  foolish  as  it  was  unstatesmanlike. 
Napoleon  said  justly  of  them  that  they  had  learnt 
nothing  from  past  experience  and  had  forgotten 
nothing.  In  heaping  rewards  and  favours  upon  their 
loyal  adherents  from  whom  they  had  nothing  to  fear, 
they  neglected,  offended,  and  even  oppressed  their 
enemies  the  children  of  the  Revolution  who  could 
alone  have  kept  them  on  the  throne.  They  ignored 
the  effect  which  had  been  worked  in  the  mind  and 
sentiment  of  the  people  by  the  Revolution  as  well  as 
by  the  glory,  renown  and  pride  with  which  its  heir — 
Napoleon — had  covered  every  individual  Frenchman. 
Their  adherents,  the  returned  einign^s,  seemed  to 
treat  all  who  were  not  Royalists  as  enemies  and  to 
regard  France  as  a  country  they  had  reconquered. 
So  strong  was  the  anti-Bourbon  feeling,  especially  in 
Paris,  that  even  if  Napoleon  had  not  escaped  from 
Elba  it  is  tolerably  certain  a  new  revolution  would 
soon  have  chased  Lewis  XVIII.  from  the  throne  and 
made  Lewis-Philip  king.  Napoleon  said  of  himself, 
that  upon  reaching  Paris  it  was  not  Lewis  but  the 
Duke  of  Orleans  he  had  dethroned.  The  thousands 
of  regimental  officers  of  all  grades  who  had  been  dis- 
missed by  the  new  king  from  the  army  to  starve  on 
pittances  that  would  not  have  supported  so  many 
mechanics,  were  about  the  most  dangerous  men  to  the 
Bourbon  cause.  All  of  them  hailed  Napoleon's  return 
with  transports  of  joy.  There  were  also  thousands 
in  every  class  who,  during  the  Revolution,  having 
purchased   property  belonging  to   the  nobles  and  to 


134       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

the  Church  lived  in  dread  of  having  it  taken  from 
them  by  the  Royahsts.  Napoleon  quieted  their  fears 
by  confirming  them  in  its  possession — a  popular  aci 
which  secured  him  a  considerable  following  among 
the  men  of  influence  and  property. 

From  the  hour  of  his  arrival  in  Paris  he  worked 
like  a  galley-slave.  Few  men  indeed  in  the  world's 
history  have  effected  in  the  same  space  of  time  any- 
thing to  be  compared  with  what  he  accomplished 
during  the  eighty-four  days  of  his  stay  there.  He 
had  to  re-establish  his  authority  all  over  France,  to 
tranquillise  the  country  generally,  put  down  Royalist 
risings,  obtain  money  for  his  military  wants  adjust  the 
national  finances  and  restore  the  civil  administration 
everywhere.  All  this  he  had  to  do  at  a  time  when  the 
whole  of  his  energies  were  required  to  raise,  organise 
and  supply  with  all  fighting  requisites  an  army 
sufficiently  large  to  enable  him  to  meet  Europe  in 
arms  with  any  chance  of  success. 

He  succeeded  in  finding  over  ^3,000,000  by  Extra- 
ordinary Loans  and  by  forestalling  the  revenue  of 
future  years.  With  this  sum  and  about  half  that 
amount  which  he  found  in  the  Treasury  he  was  able 
to  fully  equip  the  army  of  200,000  men  with  which  he 
was  about  to  take  the  field  against  Blucher  and 
Wellington  in  Flanders. 

Whilst  he  was  thus  busily  employed  preparing  for 
the  coming  struggle  the  Allies  on  their  side  had  been 
slowly  gathering  their  forces  against  him.  Vast 
armies  of  Russians,  Austrians  and  Germans  were  in 
movement  towards  the  Rhine,  and  there  were  already 
assembled    in    Belgium    a    heterogeneous    army    of 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  135 

Belgians,  Dutch,  Hanoverians,  Germans  and  English- 
men under  Wellington,  and  if  not  a  very  good  at  least 
a  homogeneous  Prussian  army  under  Blucher.  For 
facility  of  feeding  and  supply,  the  troops  of  these  two 
armies  in  Belgium  were,  however,  so  scattered  in  can- 
tonments over  a  wide  extent  of  country  that  it  would 
take  at  least  four  days  to  concentrate  them  for  battle 
between  Brussels  and  the  French  frontier.  But  the 
fact  is,  the  Allies  did  not  expect  Napoleon  to  assume 
the  offensive  in  June  and  all  their  plans  were  made 
with  a  view  to  their  own  invasion  of  France  later  on, 
but  certainly  not  before  July  ist,  with  an  immense 
army  made  up  of  Russians  and  Austrians  as  well  as 
of  th  )se  nations  already  represented  by  the  Allied 
armies  in  Belgium. 

Strange  to  say  the  full  story  of  this  Waterloo 
campaign,  the  shortest  and  yet  one  of  the  most 
decisive  in  our  history,  has  yet  to  be  written.  It  may 
be  said  to  have  only  lasted  five — one  might  almost 
say  only  four — days.  Napoleon  left  Paris  on  June 
1 2th  for  the  valley  of  the  Sambre  and  was  back 
there  again  on  the  21st  as  a  fallen  and  defeated 
monarch. 

Nelson's  glorious  victory  at  Trafalgar  saved  Eng- 
land from  invasion  by  a  great  and  splendid  army 
under  the  first  of  all  commanders,  and  it  must  con- 
sequently be  for  ever  regarded  by  us  as  an  event  of 
the  first  importance  in  our  history.  But  Wellington's 
victory  at  Waterloo  concerned  the  whole  civilised 
world  and  was  fraught  with  the  paramount  import  of 
life  and  death  to  many  European  powers.  The 
interests  involved  in  that  one  battle  exceeded  all  that 


Y36       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEOI^. 

in  modern  history,  before  or  since,  have  ever  de- 
pended upon  one  day's  fighting.  Yet  it  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  explain  the  causes  which,  until  quite  recent 
years,  have  prevented  the  whole  truth  about  it  being 
generally   known.      During  this  campaign  there  was 


NELSON. 


considerable  friction  between  Wellington  and  Bluchers 
Chief  of  the  Staff,  Count  Gneisenau,  who  had  long 
been  prejudiced  against  our  great  Duke.  Circum- 
stances connected  with  the  battle  of  Waterloo  and  the 
events  immediately  preceding  it — to  which  I  shall 
allude   presently  —  tended   to   strengthen  this  angry 


THE  HUNDRED  DA  YS.  .  137 

feeling.  On  the  other  hand  nothing  could  exceed 
Prince  Bluchers  loyalty  to  Wellington  ;  and  Baron 
Muffling,  the  Prussian  representative  at  the  English 
headquarters,  united  with  the  Prince  in  his  profound 
admiration  for  the  Duke.  Muffling,  who  disliked 
Gneisenau  and  was  fully  aware  of  his  feelings  on  this 
point,  was  most  anxious  after  Waterloo,  in  the  interests 
of  both  countries,  to  cover  over  and  conceal  many  of 
the  actual  incidents  of  the  four  days  from  June  15th 
to  18th.  The  co-operation  of  the  two  armies  had 
resulted  in  one  of  the  most  glorious  one  of  the  most 
complete  victories  on  record — a  victory  which  became 
the  starting-point  of  modern  European  politics.  It 
was  but  natural,  therefore,  that  Gneisenau,  whose 
position  gave  him  so  much  authority  during  the 
campaign,  should  also  be  glad  to  accept  his  share  in 
the  glory  without  saying  much  about  his  feelings  at 
the  time  of  the  battle.  From  a  variety  of  causes 
Wellington  too  had  no  great  wish  to  discuss  any 
vexed  question  concerning  Waterloo  or  to  make  known 
the  full  truth  regarding  the  events  which  led  to  it. 
He  was  anxious  to  av^oid  having  anything  said  that 
might  offend  the  Belgians  as  many  of  the  Dutch- 
Belgian  troops,  they  had  served  under  Napoleon  in 
famous  wars  before  and  were  warmly  attached  to  his 
interests,  had  not  behaved  well  in  this  campaign 
against  him.  Moreover,  many  things  had  occurred  in 
the  British  army  that  were  not  in  accordance  with 
Wellington's  plans  or  intentions  and  he  must  have 
felt  that  some  of  his  own  proceedings  were  fairly  open 
to  hostile  criticism.  His  movements  had  been  slow 
and   he  had  been  mistaken  in   his  conception  of  his 


138       I'HE  DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON. 

great  opponent's  plan  of  operations.     Indeed,  he  had 
been    so    deceived    by    Napoleon's    cleverly    devised 
movements  that  up  to   almost  the  last    moment  he 
persisted  in  believing  that  the   French  army  would 
manoeuvre    round  the  English   right    in  order  to  cut 
him  off  from  his  line  of  retreat  upon  Ostend.     Besides, 
his  staff  had  not  served   him  well.      Many  of  them 
had  been    foisted    upon  him  from  home  by   private 
and   family   interests    and    even    against   his   wishes. 
Believing  in  their  statements  he  had  in  the  forenoon 
of  June   15th,  as  will  be  mentioned  later  on,  written 
Blucher  a  letter  in  which  the  positions  occupied  by 
his   troops   at   the    moment   were    incorrectly    stated. 
Altogether  he  had  abundant  reasons  for  wishing  his 
official   account    of  the   battle   and  of  the  operations 
which    preceded    it    to    be   accepted    as    final    and 
without  question.     In  after  years,  whenever  asked  to 
help   in    preparing   any   work   on    the   campaign,  he 
usually  answered  with  some  degree  of  testiness  that 
his  despatch  contained  all  that  was  necessary.      He 
well  knew  that  it  contained  many  inaccuracies  and,  in 
fact,   that   no   commander  writing  immediately  after 
any  great  battle  ever  can  know  nearly  all  that  has 
happened.      In  this  particular  instance  there  was  an 
unusual  number  of  mistakes   in    his   despatch.      He 
tells  us  in  it.  for  example,  that  at  Ouartre  Bras  he  was 
attacked,  amongst   other    troops,  by  D'Erlon's  corps 
which  we  know  was  not  there  at  all.     Very  serious 
errors  have  also  been  introduced  into  the  history  of 
this  campaign  which    have    their   sole    origin    in   the 
untruthful  statements    dictated    by   Napoleon    at    St. 
Helena.    Brilliant  as  were  the  Emperor's  plans  for  1815 


Tim  HUNDRED  DAYS.  139 


and  ably  as  he  directed  a  great  part  of  them,  he  yet 
made  some  very  serious  mistakes  during  their  general 
execution.  He  was  fully  aware  of  this,  and  with  his 
subtle  Italian  genius  tried  in  his  St.  Helena  writings 
to  prove  that  everything  he  did  was  right,  to  conceal 
these  mistakes  from  posterity  and  ungenerously  to 
throw  upon  subordinates  the  responsibility  for  all  that 
went  wrong.  So  absolutely  dishonest  and  misleading 
is  his  account  of  Waterloo  that  many  of  those  who 
hate  his  memory  and  the  system  his  name  represents 
have  unfairly  used  it  in  order  the  more  effectively  to 
decry  and  discredit  all  he  ever  said  or  wrote  about  his 
own  wars. 

As  far  as  concerns  the  historical  student  the 
practical  result  of  all  these  causes  is  that  much  of  the 
published  information  upon  which  we  have  to  rely 
has  been  seriously  tainted  at  its  source.  Statement 
and  counter-statement  have  followed  one  another 
in  quick  succession  until  the  literature  of  this  cam- 
paign alone  forms  quite  a  libraiy  in  itself 

On  the  Anglo-Prussian  side  Muffling  was  the  only 
man  who,  knowing  the  facts,  attempted  to  give  any 
account  of  what  actually  did  take  place  between  the 
two  Allied  commanders.  But  in  summarising  it  he 
purposely  slurred  over  much  that  was  of  importance 
Yet  he  has  been  generally  accepted  as  a  final 
authority  by  English  historians.  To  attempt  there- 
fore, to  give  such  a  brief  account  of  the  Waterloo 
story  as  is  alone  possible  in  these  pages  is  to  write 
with  feelings  somewhat  akin  to  those  of  the  man 
who  has  to  dance  amongst  eggs.  I  shall,  however, 
endeavour  to  avoid  stating  doubtful  stories,  though  I 


I40       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


cannot  hope  in  this  brief  narrative  to  satisfy  all  those 
who  have  vehemently  espoused  some  one  side  or 
another  in  the  various  controversies. 

The  French  army  with  which  Napoleon  took  the 
field  in  Belgium  consisted  of  six  army  corps,  one  of 
which  was  the  Imperial  Guard.  Three  of  them  were 
very  weak  and  none  were  strong.  The  Reserve 
Cavalry,  four  corps  of  13,500  sabres  in  all,  was  under 
Grouchy.  There  was  also  a  cavalry  division  with  each 
of  five  out  of  the  six  army  corps,  so  that  the  total 
force  in  this  arm  numbered  about  22,000  sabres.  The 
Infantry  was  about  85,000,  making  a  fighting  force 
of  344  guns  and  107,000  sabres  and  bayonets,  not 
including  some  ten  thousand  artillerymen  and  five  or 
six  thousand  train  and  engineers  ;  let  us  say,  an  army 
of  344  guns  and  of  about  123,000  men  of  all  arms, 
As  far  as  its  numbers  went.  Napoleon  had  never 
commanded  a  finer  body  of  well-trained  and  well- 
seasoned  soldiers.  All  were  Frenchmen  inspired  with 
the  splendid  fighting  spirit  of  their  nation,  and,  ex- 
cepting perhaps  a  few  of  the  superior  officers,  all 
devoted  to  Napoleon  and  believmg  that  his  cause  was 
their  cause  and  the  cause  of  France.  No  men  could 
have  fought  better  than  they  did,  and  although 
Waterloo  was  the  most  disastrous  defeat  France  had 
sustained  since  Blenheim  she  has  every  reason  to  be 
proud  of  the  manner  in  which  her  sons  fought  on 
that  memorable  June  Sunday. 

The  Prussian  army  under  Blucher,  which  as  well  as 
the  English  army  was  largely  composed  of  recruits  and 
militiamen,  was  divided  into  four  army  corps.  Unlike 
Wellington's  army,  however,  it  was  a  purely  national 


THE  HUNDRED   DAYS. 


141 


force,  intensely  German  in  feeling  and  inflamed  with  a 
deadly  hatred  of  the  French  and  with  a  splendid 
feeling  of  intense  patriotism.  The  first  corps,  under 
Ziethen,  held  Charleroi  and  the  Sambre  valley  above 
it  as  far  as  the  French  frontier  ;  the  second,  under 


BLUCHER, 

Pirch,  was  in  and  around  Namur;  the  third,  under 
Thielmann,  was  at  Ciney  and  in  its  vicinity  ;  and  the 
fourth,  under  Btilow,  was  on  the  extreme  left  at  Liege, 
nearly  sixty  miles  from  the  extreme  right  near  Char- 
leroi. Each  of  these  four  army  corps  was  scattered 
in  widely  extending  cantonments  and  would  require 
many  hours  of  hard  marching  to  concentrate  before  it 
could  move  upon  any  point  of  general  assembly  for 


142        THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

the  whole  army.  The  total  strength  of  this  Prussian 
army  may  be  reckoned  at  about  100,000  infantry, 
11,800  cavalry,  and  312  guns.  Owing  to  the  small 
proportion  of  well-trained  regular  soldiers  in  its  ranks, 
its  quality  as  a  fighting  force  was  much  inferior  to 
that  of  any  Prussian  army  which  had  ever  before 
taken  the  field  against  Napoleon. 

Wellington's  army  consisted  of  two  corps,  a  reserve, 
and  a  corps  of  cavalry.  The  gallant  but  inexperi- 
enced Prince  of  Orange  commanded  the  first,  which 
was  distributed  about  Mons,  Enghien  and  Nivelles  in 
continuation  westward  of  the  Prussian  line  ;  the 
second,  under  Lord  Hill,  prolonged  the  line  still 
further  westward  as  far  as  the  Scheldt.  The  English 
cavalry  and  that  of  the  German  Legion  were  under 
Lord  Uxbridge.  The  Hanoverian,  Brunswick  and 
Netherlands  cavalry  were  with  the  several  contingents 
furnished  by  each  country.  In  numbers,  this  motley 
army  of  many  nations  did  not  certainly  exceed 
80,000  foot,  14,000  horse,  and  about  9000  gunners, 
engineers,  and  train— say  in  all  94,000  sabres  and 
bayonets,  and  184  guns.  There  were  twelve  eighteen- 
pounders  besides ;  but  the  Duke,  for  some  unex- 
plained reason,  left  them  behind  at  Antwerp.  How 
often  he  must  have  wished  for  them  on  June  i8th,  for 
they  would  have  been  of  incalculable  value  many  times 
that  day !  Of  this  army  nearly  30,000  were  Dutch 
and  Belgian  soldiers  whose  sympathies  were  largely 
with  Napoleon,  and  only  about  31,000  were  British. 
The  inferior  quality  of  the  soldiers  composing  it,  the 
haste  with  which  it  had  been  so  recently  organised, 
and,  with  a  few  exceptions,  the  mediocrity  of  its  sub- 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  143 

ordinate  general  officers,  all  combined  to  make  it 
what  Wellington  contemptuously  pronounced  it — "  the 
worst  army  he  had  ever  commanded."  Its  14,000 
horsemen  compared  unfavourably  with  Napoleon's 
magnificent  body  of  22,000  cavalry,  though  Bluchers 
11,800  cavalry  were  of  good  stuff  and  well  com- 
manded. 

From  the  foregoing  statement  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  two  Allied  armies  extended  over  a  front  of  100 
miles  from  east  to  west,  and  covered  a  depth  of  about 
40  miles  from  north  to  south.  I  think  that  any 
military  critic  of  to-day  who  would  defend  this 
inordinate  dispersion  of  Wellington's  and  Blucher's 
armies,  especially  of  the  former,  must  be  blinded  by 
national  prejudices.  Had  the  Duke  been  beaten  at 
Waterloo  history  would  surely  have  condemned  the 
position  of  his  army  on  June  13th,  14th  and  r5th,  and 
also  his  decision  to  maintain  it  until  the  French  attack 
had  been  fully  developed  instead  of  at  once  con- 
centrating when  he  first  learned  that  the  enemy's 
columns  had  reached  Maubeuge. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Wellington  had  been 
misled  by  his  spies  and  other  sources  of  secret 
information  as  to  the  forwardness  of  Napoleon's 
preparations,  and  that  he  did  not  consequently  expect 
the  French  to  enter  Belgium  before  July  ist  at 
earliest.  But  when  he  ascertained  for  certain  that  the 
enemy  were  collecting  near  Maubeuge  it  seems  to 
have  been  unwise — to  use  a  mild  adjective — to  have 
left  his  army  in  the  scattered  cantonments  it  then 
occupied.  On  the  13th  each  of  the  two  Allied  armies 
should  have  concentrated  within  supporting  distance 


144       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

of  each  other.  From  the  numbers  I  have  given  the 
reader  will  see  that  it  was  Napoleon's  deliberate 
intention,  with  a  concentrated  army  of  about  22,000 
sabres,  85,000  bayonets  and  344  guns,  to  attack  the 
armies  of  Blucher  and  Wellington,  which,  though  very 
inferior  in  quality  to  his  army,  would  if  united  make 
up  a  total  force  of  25,800  sabres,  180,000  bayonets 
and  496  guns.  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  he  knew  the  two  Allied  armies  to  be  so  scattered 
as  to  afford  him  every  reason  for  hoping  he  would  be 
able  to  deal  with  each  separately  ;  that  he  was  also 
well  aware  of  how  inferior  their  soldiers  were  to  his 
old  and  well-seasoned  troops,  and  furthermore,  that 
the  fighting  worth  as  well  as  the  loyalty  of  some  of 
their  contingents  was  more  than  doubtful. 

Napoleon's  military  instinct  always  favoured  offen- 
sive operations  in  war.  His  defensive  campaign  of 
the  previous  year  was  carried  on  against  the  grain 
and  he  had  no  wish  to  repeat  it.  Besides,  he  was 
determined,  if  possible,  to  save  France  from  all  the 
horrors  of  another  invasion.  He  believed  that  he 
could  out-manoeuvre  Wellington  and  he  was  certain, 
from  previous  experience,  that  Blucher  would  be  but 
a  child  in  his  hands.  The  calculation  upon  which  he 
based  his  plan  of  campaign  was  briefly,  that  if  he 
could  obtain  a  brilliant  success  over  these  two  generals 
— then  so  near  his  frontier — his  returned  fortune  and 
the  elation  consequent  upon  victory  would  arouse  an 
enthusiasm  in  France  which  would  enable  him  to 
largely  increase  his  army  in  the  field  and  would  rails- 
the  Belgians,  the  Dutch,  and  possibly  others  to  his 
standard.     It   might   also   cause  some  of  the  armies 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  I45 

then  marching  upon  France  to  pause  and  might 
induce  some  to  make  peace,  or  at  least  it  might  sow 
dissension  amongst  the  Allies  and  would  surely  gain 
him  time  to  consolidate  his  power  and  increase  his 
army. 

Knowing  that  Wellington  and  Blucher  together  far 
exceeded  the  French  army  in  strength,  Napoleon's 
one  chance  of  success  lay  in  being  able  to  fight  them 
separately.  The  difficult  nature  of  the  countiy  known 
as  the  Ardennes  and  the  scantiness  of  the  supplies  to 
be  found  there  made  any  attack  upon  the  Allies'  left 
practically  impossible.  His  selection  of  a  line  of 
advance  and  the  part  of  the  enemy's  line  he  would 
fall  upon  was  consequently  limited  to  a  choice 
between  attacking  their  right,  which  would  bring  him 
upon  the  English  line  of  communication  with  the  sea- 
coast,  or  their  centre — that  is,  the  point  of  junction 
between  the  two  armies.  Wellington  believed  that 
his  great  opponent  would  try  the  first-mentioned 
alternative,  and  to  the  end  of  his  days  was  of  opinion 
that  he  ought  to  have  done  so,  I  cannot  enter  here 
into  his  many  reasons  for  these  conclusions,  but  most 
soldiers  well-trained  in  the  science  of  war  would  have 
then  thought  otherwise,  and  think  so  now.  An 
attack  upon  the  Allied  right  could  not  possibly  have 
afforded  Napoleon  the  same  rapid  and  conclusive 
results  that  a  severance  of  the  Allied  armies,  by  a  suc- 
cessful attack  upon  the  point  where  they  joined,  would 
have  secured.  Napoleon  had  accurate  information  as 
to  the  exact  positions  occupied  by  those  armies,  and 
it  did  not  require  his  genius  to  perceive  that  the 
road    from  Charleroi  to  Brussels  was   practically  the 


146        THE  DECLINE  AND   FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


dividing  line  between  Blucher  and  Wellington. 
Charleroi,  thirty-four  miles  by  a  very  good  road 
from  the  Belgian  capital,  was  therefore  his  first 
objective  point,  and  there  and  in  its  immediate  neigh- 
bourhood he  meant  to  cross  the  Sambre. 

The  tendency,  as  he  well  knew,  of  all  Allied  armies 
when  so  struck  at  is  for  each  at  once  to  look  after  its 
own  line  of  communication  and  its  own  special  safety. 
Blucher  drew  his  supplies  from  a  base  on  the  Rhine  ; 
Wellington  drew  his  from  England  via  Ostend  and 
Antwerp,  which  places  constituted  his  base  on  the  sea. 
Napoleon  expected  that  the  effect  of  his  army 
suddenly  crossing  the  Sambre  near  Charleroi  to 
advance  upon  Brussels  would  be  to  cause  each  of  the 
Allied  armies  to  curl  up,  as  it  were,  within  itself,  and 
so  leave  a  gap  between  them  into  which  he  would 
be  able  to  penetrate,  and  wedge-like  to  sever  all 
communication  between  the  two  armies.  This  done, 
he  did  not  anticipate  any  difficulty  in  destroying  them 
one  after  the  other.  From  all  that  he  had  heard  of 
Wellington's  operations  in  the  Peninsula  he  counted 
upon  his  acting  with  great  caution  ;  and  former  ex- 
perience of  Blucher  as  an  antagonist  made  him  certain 
that  the  impetuous  Prussian  would  rush  wildly  into 
the  fray.  He  therefore  counted  upon  being  able  to 
dispose  of  the  Prussian  army  before  the  slowly  and 
cautiously  moving  English  could  arrive  to  support  it. 

With  Brussels  in  his  possession  he  believed  the 
Belgians  would  again  throw  in  their  lot  with  him  and 
the  Rhine  would  once  more  become  his  eastern 
frontier.  The  effect  of  this  upon  Europe  would  be 
great   and    might    lead    to   the    fall   of  the    English 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  147 

ministry,  which  hated  him,  and  their  replacement  by 
those  unworthy  men  who  were  his  friends,  and  who 
then  clamoured  loudly  for  peace  at  any  price  with 
France.  The  whole  essence  of  Napoleon's  plan  was 
secrecy  and  celerity.  His  intentions  to  be  successful 
must  be  carefully  veiled  from  the  enemy  who  must 
be  thoroughly  deceived  until  the  moment  when  the 
sudden  blow  was  to  be  struck.  Fortunately  for  his 
enterprise  the  old  line  of  Vauban's  frontier  fortresses 
between  the  Meuse  and  Dunkirk  still  existed,  and 
they  were  in  fair  order.  Their  possession  enabled  him 
to  conceal  his  doings  and  designs,  and  he  could  con- 
centrate troops  behind  them  without  their  being 
immediately  discovered  by  the  enemy.  He  was 
able  also,  by  a  skilful  distribution  of  national  guards 
along  the  open  frontier  near  Mons,  between  the 
Sambre  and  the  Scheldt,  to  make  Wellington  believe 
that  the  blow  was  about  to  fall  on  his  right.  It  was 
this  conviction  of  Wellington's  which  accounts  for  the 
want  of  cohesion  between  the  Allied  armies  when  the 
French  troops  had  reached  their  appointed  rendezvous 
immediately  south  of  the  Sambre  on  the  evening  of 
June  14th. 

Napoleon  left  Paris  for  Charleroi  on  June  12th,  well 
neither  in  body  nor  in  mind.  He  was  fully  aware 
that  he  was  not  the  man  physically  he  had  been  at 
Marengo  or  at  Austerlitz,  and  his  mind  was  full  of 
care.  A  firm  believer  in  luck,  all  had  gone  so  much 
against  him  during  the  three  previous  years  that  he 
scarcely  dared  to  trust  in  fortune.  "  Ah,"  said  he, 
"you  do  not  know  what  a  force  good  luck  is!  It 
alone  imparts  courage.     It  is  the  feeling  that  fortune 

L   2 


148       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

is  with  us  which  gives  us  the  hardihood  to  dare.  Not 
to  dare  is  to  do  nothing  of  moment,  and  one  never 
dares  except  as  the  result  of  good  kick.  Misfortune 
depresses  and  blights  the  soul,  and  from  thence- 
forward one  does  nothing  good."  A  few  days  before 
he  left  Paris  he  told  Davoust  and  the  Count  de  Segur 
— the  elder — that  he  had  no  longer  any  confidence  in 
his  star,  and  his  worn  depressed  look  was  in  keeping 
with  his  words.  We  are  told  he  was  superstitious : 
how  much  therefore  this  feeling  must  have  acted 
upon  him !  Indeed,  he  admitted  that  he  "  felt  an 
abatement  of  spirit,  and  had  an  instinct  of  an  un- 
propitious  issue." 

By  a  series  of  very  cleverly  devised  movements,  in 
the  execution  of  which  however  his  lieutenants  made 
many  mistakes.  Napoleon  brought  his  army  together 
on  the  evening  of  June  14th  within  a  short  march  of 
Charleroi.  Gerard's  corps  *  which  formed  the  right  of 
the  line  and  was  coming  from  the  J\ioselle  south  of  the 
Ardennes,  had  not  yet  quite  reached  Philippeville,  its 
allotted  place  of  rendezvous,  owing  to  the  badness  of 
the  roads  ;  but  the  centre  consisting  of  Vandamme's, 
Lobau's  and  the  Guard  Corps  was  at  Beaumont, 
where  Napoleon  fixed  his  headquarters  for  the  night  ; 
and  the  extreme  left,  made  up  of  D'Erlon's  and 
Reille's  Corps  which  had  been  stationed  on  the  open 
Belgian  frontier,  had  reached  Solre-sur-Sambre.  All 
these  three  places  of  rendezvous  were  within  French 
territory  and   were   nearly  equidistant,    about   fifteen 

*  The  reader  must  not  confuse  General  Gerard  who  com- 
manded the  4th  Corps,  with  General  Girard  who  only  com- 
manded a  Division  (the  7th)  in  Reille's  Corps  (the  2ndj, 


THM  HUNDRED  DAYS.  149 


miles,  from  Charleroi.  His  first  object  was  to  get  his 
army  across  the  Sambre  and  to  seize  Ouatre  Bras  and 
Sombrefife— they  were  eight  miles  apart  and  both 
about  thirteen  miles  beyond  Charleroi — as  their  pos- 
session would  give  him  the  Namur-Nivelles  road,  the 
chief  line  of  intercommunication  between  the  two 
Allied  armies.  Ouatre  Bras  was  only  twenty-one 
miles  from  Brussels. 

The  Prussian  outposts  soon  detected  the  fact  that 
a  great  army  was  being  assembled  in  their  neighbour- 
hood, but  they  failed  to  discover  the  French  right 
wing  which,  under  Gerard,  was  so  much  nearer  to 
Charleroi  than  to  Mons  that  its  discovery  would 
certainly  have  indicated  the  fact  that  Charleroi  and 
not  Mons  was  the  point  aimed  at.  As  it  was,  the 
French  troops  at  Solre  discovered  by  the  Prussian 
cavalry  were  as  near  Mons  in  point  of  distance  and 
nearer  it  in  time  of  marching  than  they  were  to 
Charleroi.  Now  as  Mons  was  held  by  the  English, 
an  attack  in  that  direction  would  have  implied  the 
intention  of  assailing  Wellington's  army  in  the  first 
instance  before  any  attempt  was  made  against 
Blucher.  As  already  mentioned,  the  English  general 
was  so  convinced  that  the  attack  would  be  made  on 
his  right  that  it  was  only  with  difficulty  and  very 
slowly  that  he  brought  his  mind  to  realise  how  mis- 
taken he  was.  At  last,  when  it  was  nearly  being  too 
late,  he  perceived  that  it  was  the  right  of  the  Prussian 
line  and  the  point  of  junction  between  it  and  the  left 
of  his  own  army  which  Napoleon  aimed  at. 

The  possibility  of  Napoleon  advancing  into  Belgium 
by  Charleroi  and  the  bridges  over  the  Sambre  in  its 


ISO       THE  DECLLXE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

neighbourhood  in  order  to  sever  and  drive  apart  the 
two  Allied  armies,  had  been  discussed  by  Wellington 
and  Blucher  as  far  back  as  the  beginning  of  May. 
At  this  conference  a  plan  of  action  to  meet  such  a 
contingency  was  decided  upon.  The  Prussian  army 
was  to  concentrate  between  Sombreffe  and  Charleroi, 
and  the  English  between  Gosselies  and  the  bridge  at 
Marchiennes.  This  would  bring  the  two  Allied 
armies  so  close  together  that  no  attack  upon  one 
could  be  made  by  Napoleon  without  having  the  other 
on  his  flank.  Yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  by  3  p.m.  on 
the  15th  only  one  Prussian  corps  was  near  the  in- 
tended point  of  concentration,  and  of  Wellington's 
army  but  one  division  was  in  the  vicinity,  although 
40,000  French  had  already  crossed  the  Sambre  at 
Marchiennes  and  70,000  more  were  then  entering 
Charleroi.  This  is  a  circumstance  which  cannot  be 
ignored  by  the  worshippers  of  Wellington,  for  it 
clearly  shows  how  indifferent  were  his  arrangements 
for  giving  effect  to  a  plan  of  such  first  importance  and 
so  maturely  considered  and  deliberately  adopted  as 
this  plan  had  been.  The  fact  is,  Wellington  at 
Brussels  was  too  far  from  the  theatre  of  action  :  he 
ought  to  have  been  at  Nivelles  or  still  better  at 
Quatre  Bras  all  the  15th.  Had  he  been  at  the  latter 
place  he  would  not  certainly  have  allowed  the  day  to 
pass  without  orders  for  the  immediate  concentration 
of  his  army  there  or  in  its  neighbourhood.  But 
throughout  this  first  day  Wellington  does  not  seem 
to  have  realised  the  importance  of  Quatre  Bras  to  his 
army. 

Before  any  move  had  been  made  by  the  Allies  to 


THE  HUNDkEJD  DAYS.  151 

oppose  him,  Napoleon  was  thus  with  his  whole  army 
within  striking  distance  of  Ziethen's  single  corps  of 
only  32,000  men,  and,  from  what  he  knew  of  the 
character  of  his  two  antagonists,  he  fully  hoped  to 
bring  the  bulk  of  his  army  into  such  a  position  as 
would  enable  him  to  crush  Blucher  before  Wellington 
could  support  him,  and  perhaps  even  before  the  whole 
Prussian  army  had  been  concentrated. 

Napoleon's  orders  were  that  his  army  should  move 
to  the  attack  on  June  15th,  at  3  a.m.  But,  unfor- 
tunately for  him,  Vandammc,  whose  corps  lay  in 
front  of  the  central  column,  did  not  receive  this  order. 
Gerard's  corps,  on  the  right,  was  delayed  both  by  the 
fact  that  his  divisions  had  not  been  properly  closed 
up  the  evening  before  and  by  the  desertion  on  the 
march  of  General  Bourmont  who  was  leading  the 
advance.  Reille's  corps,  which  led  the  left  wing, 
moved  off  in  good  time,  and  D'Erlon  followed  slowly 
behind  him. 

Ziethen,  in  a  most  skilful  manner,  took  good 
advantage  of  the  opportunities  which  the  French 
passage  of  the  Sambre  afforded  him.  He  succeeded 
in  not  only  seriously  delaying  the  enemy's  advance 
but  in  safely  withdrawing  his  own  corps  in  admirable 
order  and  with  little  loss  considering  the  over- 
whelming force  opposed  to  him  and  the  ability  of  its 
leader.  He  made  one  serious  mistake,  however,  in 
not  destroying  the  bridges  over  the  Sambre  at 
Marchiennes,  Charleroi  and  at  Chatelet. 

During  the  afternoon  of  this  day,  the  15th,  Ney 
joined  the  Emperor  near  Charleroi,  probably  about 
5  p.m.     Having  only  received  his  orders  at  the  last 


IS2        THE  DECLINE  A.VlJ   t^ALL   OF  NaPOLEO!^. 

moment,  he  had  hurried  forward  with  no  staff  but  one 
aide-de-camp.  Napoleon  at  once  assigned  him  the 
command  of  the  left  wing  of  the  army,  consisting  of 
Reille's  and  D'Erlon's  corps,  and  ordered  him  to  push 
the  enemy  along  the  Quatre  Bras  road.  Whether  he 
d»id  or  did  not  order  Ney  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  that 
night  is  a  much  disputed  point.  At  any  rate,  riding 
forward  towards  it  at  a  brisk  pace,  Ney  overtook  the 
leading  troops  of  his  command  at  a  moment  when 
Reille,  having  already  cleared  the  road  of  the  re- 
treating Prussians  who  fell  back  eastwards,  was 
moving  upon  Gosselies. 

Pushing  on  with  Bachelu's  division  and  Pire's 
cavalry  Ney  found  the  village  of  Frasnes  occupied 
by  Wellington's  outposts,  which  upon  his  approach 
fell  back  towards  Quatre  Bras.  Not  being  able  in 
the  darkness  of  the  evening  to  make  out  the  strength 
of  the  troops  holding  the  last-named  place,  Ney 
restricted  his  operations  for  that  day  to  the  occupation 
of  Frasnes  by  Bachelu's  infantry  and  some  cavalry  in 
support.  Of  the  remainder  of  Reille's  corps,  Girard's 
division  was  in  pursuit  of  the  Prussians  who  had,  as 
already  mentioned,  gone  off  in  an  easterly  direction, 
and  its  two  remaining  infantry  divisions  were  still  in 
rear  of  Gosselies.  D'Erlon's  corps,  moving  in  rear  of 
Reille,  had  been  much  more  delayed — indeed  part  of 
it  was  still  south  of  the  Sambre.  The  small  detach- 
ments of  Wellington's  army  which  the  French  had 
actually  encountered  had  been  moved  backwards 
without  the  Duke's  orders  and  contrary  to  his  wishes, 
by  their  own  commander  Prince  Bernhard  of  Saxe- 
Weimar.     Though  Napoleon  was  not  yet  aware  of  it 


TtfK  titJNDRED  bAYS.  153 


Blucher  had  ordered  all  his  three  other  army  corps  to 
support  that  of  Ziethen.  Of  these,  Biilow's  corps  at 
Liege  had  been  seriously  delayed  b}'  a  mistake  in  the 
nature  of  the  orders  sent  to  it. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  what  Napoleon  wished  and 
had  calculated  on  had  so  far  been  realised  :  namely 
that  whilst  Wellington's  army  had  been  very  slow  in 
its  movements,  Blucher,  with  his  usual  impetuosity, 
was  hurrying  forward  with  only  three  of  his  army 
corps  to  the  very  locality  where  Napoleon  wished  to 
fight  him.  Although,  according  to  Napoleon's  ex- 
plicit orders,  the  whole  of  his  army  was  to  have  been 
north  of  the  Sambre  before  noon,  some  35,000  French 
soldiers  slept  that  night  on  the  other  side  of  that 
river.  But  on  the  whole,  despite  these  and  some 
other  vexatious  delays,  Napoleon  had  good  reason  to 
be  well  satisfied  with  the  result  of  the  operations  on 
June  15th. 

Before  noon  of  the  following  day,  the  i6th,  three 
Prussian  army  corps  were  gathered  on  what  is  now 
known  as  the  famous  battlefield  of  Lign\-,  and  about 
noon  Blucher  received  a  letter  which  Wellington  hac 
despatched  at  10.30  a.m.  from  the  heights  north  of 
Frasnes,  that  is,  about  a  couple  of  miles  south  of 
Quatre  Bras.  This  letter,  unknown  to  the  earlier 
historians  of  the  campaign  and  onl}'  unearthed  from 
the  Prussian  archives  in  1876,  has  been  since  then  the 
subject  of  much  controversy  both  in  Germany  and  \v 
England.  I  have  not  space  to  discuss  it  here  or 
even  to  give  the  contents  in  full.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that,  as  stated  already,  it  mentioned  the  position> 
which  the  Duke  then  beheved  were  occupied  by  his 


IS4       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

Still  widely  disseminated  army.  It  went  on  to  give 
Prince  Blucher  every  reason  to  hope  that  a  large 
portion  at  least  of  the  English  army  would  be  able  to 
arrive  in  time  to  actually  support  the  Prussians  at 
Ligny.  That  if  unable  to  do  so,  Wellington  would  at 
least  effect  so  powerful  a  diversion  in  their  favour 
that  Napoleon  would  be  unable  to  employ  against 
them  more  than  a  moiety  of  his  army.  Wellington, 
an  English  gentleman  of  the  highest  type,  was  wholly 
and  absolutely  incapable  of  anything  bordering  on 
untruth  or  deceit  in  dealing  with  his  Allies,  and 
without  any  doubt  whatever  believed  unqualifiedly  in 
all  that  he  stated  in  this  letter.  He  must  therefore 
have  been  misled  by  his  inefficient  staff  in  this 
matter. 

Following  his  letter,  the  Duke  at  i  p.m.  had  him- 
self a  conversation  with  Blucher.  The  nature  of  that 
conversation  is  very  uncertain  in  many  respects  and 
its  character  is  variously  recorded  by  different  writers. 
It  is  safer  therefore  to  assume  that  both  these  leaders 
planned  and  acted  under  the  impression  that  the 
statements  contained  in  this  letter  were  actually 
correct.  Under  that  impression  they  arranged  for 
the  direction  in  which  the  English  army  should  move 
to  support  Blucher  at  Ligny.  Wellington  either 
made  a  conditional  promise  to  come  to  Blucher's  aid 
provided  he  was  not  himself  attacked,  or  he  simply 
made  arrangements  for  the  intended  movement.  It 
is  evident  that  at  the  time  he  supposed  nearly  the 
whole  of  the  French  army  was  being  directed  against 
the  Prussians,  for  he  had  written  from  Frasnes  that 
he  saw  few  French  troops  in  that  direction.     It  is  a 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  I55 

noteworthy  fact  that  having  conferred  with  Bluchcr 
and  examined  his  dispositions  at  Ligny  and  seen  all 
he  could  of  the  French  army  there,  he  predicted 
Blucher's  defeat. 

Blucher  had  originally  arranged  for  the  concentra- 
tion of  his  army  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Sombreffe, 
but  he  had  done  so  at  a  time  when  he  fully  expected 
he  could  assemble  all  his  four  army  corps  there  in 
line  of  battle  and  when  he  counted  also  upon  re- 
ceiving considerable  assistance  from  Wellington.  This 
expectation  of  support  was  increased  by  the  receijit 
of  Wellington's  letter  about  noon  on  the  i6th.  But 
it  is  simply  preposterous  to  assert  that  Blucher  fought 
at  Ligny  because  of  that  letter  or  of  any  promise 
made  to  him  by  Wellington  that  day,  no  matter  what 
may  have  passed  between  the  two  generals  at  Ligny, 
because  when  Wellington  was  there,  at  I  p.m.,  the 
French  columns  were  already  actually  advancing  to 
the  attack.  Blucher's  decision  to  fight  must  therefore 
have  been  arrived  at  long  before. 

Though  the  whole  story  of  this  letter  has  been 
sprung  upon  us  lately,  I  dwell  upon  the  question  it 
raises  because  it  is  one  that  very  closely  concerns  our 
national  honour.  The  positions  which  Wellington's 
letter  specified  as  then  occupied  by  his  troops  had  not 
been  reached  by  all  of  them  when  he  wrote  it,  and  in 
several  cases  they  were  not  reached  for  many  hours 
later.  In  fact,  there  was  no  prospect  whatever  that 
Wellington  could  afford  Blucher  the  support  he  hoped 
for  at  Ligny.  Gneisenau,  already  suspicious  of  the 
English  commander,  was  naturally  affected  in  his 
after   conduct   of    the    campaign    by   the   doubts   of 


ts^       Tffte  1)£CU.V£  AXD  K4LL  OP  MdPOLEOX. 

Wellingtons  honestj'  occasioned  by  this  letter  and  the 
Prus<  :   '   jHiy.     He  carried  to  his  grave 

the  <.  -  :  great  Duke  haul  deliberately 

decei\^  ;       \    ;^.ucher  in  order  to  make  him  fight 
ot  "  -  :       English  army — ^unduly  scattered 

:     crr.ceritrste.     The  publication 
v~:    .■  ■.  ~-         -  -  -.i:-  .-.:.:  the  disco\~er%- cf 


ire  it  i; 


f  Iter  vre  car. 


'.^«sed ;  tBae  mniessean^effs  t. 


.  .    :                   ■  _        ■       :       : 

-    ■ 

-   -            .--:%'  disgKsse--    : 

:    •  ; 

^  to  fidts.  350)  3«:v3ie«r  tl~ .    - 

-:..-- 

-    .-t^  Xi.-  - 

an  opts- 

-    'Mil  t3Be 


"■nay  cai 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  1^7 

the  15th.  He  had  succeeded  beyond  all  reasonable 
expectations  in  placing  it  where  he  was  able  to  deal 
with  Blucher  whilst  one-fourth  of  the  Prussian  force 
was  distant  and  beyond  all  chance  of  taking  part  in 
the  battle  and  before  Wellington  could  support 
his  Ally. 

In  the  first  place  the  French  army  had  not  closed 
up  to  its  front  by  the  evening  of  the  15th,  as  ordered 
by  Napoleon.  Without  doubt  the  men  were  some- 
what overdone  by  their  immense  exertions  of  the  few 
previous  days  and  they  wanted  rest.  But  the  delay 
on  the  part  of  D'Erlon,  who  had  been  ordered  to 
close  on  Reille's  Corps,  is  unaccountable,  and  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  excuse  that  general  for  it,  even 
though  his  troops  were  weary  and  had  to  work  over 
bad  roads  much  cut  up  by  the  corps  immediately  in 
front  of  them.  On  the  other  hand  all  experienced 
soldiers  are  well  aware  of  the  delays  inseparable  from 
marches  undertaken  under  these  circumstances. 

Ney,  who  was  in  command  of  both  Reille's  and 
D'Erlon's  army  corps,  had  spent  about  an  hour  and  a 
half  on  the  evening  of  the  15th  with  Napoleon  at 
Charleroi,  and  returned  to  Gosselies  about  2  a.m.  on  the 
1 6th  without  any  positive  orders  from  the  Emperor 
for  that  day's  operations.  During  the  early  morning 
those  French  who  had  bivouacked  south  of  the 
Sambre  crossed  that  river  at  Charleroi  and  Chatelet. 
At  8  a.m.  on  the  i6th  Soult,  the  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  Staff,  informed  Ney  that  Kellerman's 
corps  of  cavalry  had  been  ordered  to  join  his  com- 
mand and  at  the  same  time  asked  him  for  news  as 
to  whether  D'Erlon's  corps  had  yet  closed  up,  and 


IS8       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


what  was  the  position  of  D'Erlon  and  of  Reille,  and 
also  of  the  enemy. 

Napoleon  was  far  from  well  at  this  time.  When  he 
returned  from  the  front  ro  Charleroi  on  the  evening  of 
the  15th  he  was  overwhelmed  with  fatigue  and  threw 
himself    on    his    bed    exhausted.     On    the    follovvine 


SOULT. 


morning,  when  ever}'  moment  of  da}-light  was  of  the 
utmost  consequence,  we  have  it  on  good  authorit}- 
that  he  was  prostrated  with  languor  and  unable  to 
attend  to  any  business.  It  was  daylight  on  June  i6th 
shortly  after  3  a.m..  but  yet  no  movement  in  advance 
was  made  until  near  1 1  a.m.  Between  seven  and 
eight  hours  were  thus  lost  to  Napoleon  during  which 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  159 

Blucher  was  enabled  to  perfect  his  arrangements  for 
the  coming  battle  at  Ligny.  The  two  French  wings 
were  each  waiting  for  the  other  to  move.  Napoleon, 
not  very  correctly  informed  as  to  the  possible 
strength  of  the  Prussians,  and  whom  as  late  as  about 
8  or  9  o'clock  a.m.  he  estimated  at  only  40,000  men, 
was  anxious  to  have  Ney's  troops  well  forward  on  the 
Quatre  Bras  road,  and  to  get  his  own  columns, 
designed  for  an  attack  on  Blucher,  well  closed  up 
before  they  engaged.  He  informed  Ney  that  as  soon 
as  he  had  brushed  aside  the  Prussians  then  before  him 
he  would  march  to  join  Ney  with  the  Reserve  and 
push  on  with  him  to  Brussels.  Ney,  however,  and 
Reille  also  held  back  for  some  time  owing  to  the 
reports  they  received  from  Girard,  who  had  been 
watching  the  Prussians  all  the  morning  as  they  formed 
for  battle  near  Ligny.  The  movements  of  the  French 
Left  on  the  Charleroi-Brussels  road  were  consequently 
slower  than  Napoleon  had  a  right  to  expect,  so  that 
it  was  not  until  2  p.m.  that  Ney,  with  only  two  out  of 
the  four  divisions  of  Reille's  corps  and  Pire's  cavalry, 
assailed  the  Dutch-Belgian  troops  at  Quatre  Bras. 
Prince  Jerome's  division  did  not  arrive  until  an  hour 
later,  and  Girard's  division,  engaged  in  watching  the 
Prussians,  as  already  stated,  became  eventually 
involved  in  the  battle  of  Ligny.  This  appears  to 
have  been  entirely  the  result  of  Ney's  and  Reille's 
action,  as  they  wished  to  retain  Girard  near  the 
Prussians  to  protect  their  own  right  flank  during  theii- 
advance  upon  Quatre  Bras. 

Had  Napoleon   set  his  troops  in   motion   at   5   or 
even   6   a.m.    on   the    i6th,  the   result   of  the   day's 


i6o       THE  DECLINE  AND   FALL    OF  NAPOLEON. 

fighting  must  have  been  very  different.  At  a  time 
when  every  hour  was  worth  a  reinforcement  of  1 0,000 
men,  he  allowed  at  least  seven  hours  of  daylight  to 


JEROMK, 


slip  by  to  little  purpose.  As  it  was,  this  delay  gave 
Wellington  time  to  reach  Ouatre  Bras  again  about 
2.30  p.m.,  and  before  the  Dutch-Belgian  division  there 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  l6l 

had  been  completely  crushed  by  the  superior  numbers 
and  especially  by  the  better  fighting  quality  of  the 
French  soldiers  engaged.  About  an  hour  later 
Picton's  division  arrived,  and  from  that  time  on 
successive  reinforcements  of  English  troops  came 
up.  This  gave  Wellington  a  continuously  increasing 
advantage  over  the  cavalry  and  three  unsupported 
divisions  of  Reille's  corps,  then  in  action,  until  at  last 
he  was  able  in  the  evening  to  assume  the  offensive 
and  drive  Ney  back.  Strange  occurrences  had 
deprived  not  only  Ney  but  both  wings  of  the 
French  army  of  any  help  from  D'Erlon  whose  corps 
all  through  the  day  seemed  to  have  worked  only 
mischief  for  Napoleon. 

The  corps  of  Vandamme  and  Gerard  had  been 
assigned  to  Grouchy,  just  as  those  of  Reille  and 
D'Erlon  had  been  placed  under  Ney's  command. 
Early  in  the  morning  Napoleon  ordered  Grouchy  to 
attack  the  Prussians  in  front  of  him,  intending,  for 
the  day  at  least,  to  support  him  with  the  remainder 
of  the  army  which  he  held  in  his  own  hands  as  a 
Reserve.  As  soon  as  the  Prussians  had  been 
crushed  it  was  Napoleon's  intention  to  transfer  that 
Reserve  to  his  left  wing  and  then  force  his  own  way 
to  Brussels. 

About  2  p.m.  Napoleon  sent  an  order  to  Ney 
directing  him,  with  the  corps  of  D'Erlon  and  Reille 
and  the  cavalry  attached  to  him,  to  drive  the  English 
from  Quatre  Bras  and  then  sweep  round  in  rear  of 
the  Prussians  whilst  Grouchy  attacked  them  in  front 
at  2.30  p.m.  When  at  3.15  p.m.  the  strength  of  the 
Prussian  army  had  become  more  evident  this  order 

M 


i62        THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

was  reiterated.  Upon  reaching  the  headquarters  of 
D'Erlon's  corps,  as  it  was  apj^roaching  Frasnes.  the 
aide-de-camp  who  carried  this  last-mentioned  despatch 
took  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  turning  it  off 
at  once  towards  the  right  wing,  thus  completely 
misinterpreting  the  nature  of  Napoleon's  order  and 
sending  D'Erlon  and  his  corps  into  a  false  position 
as  regarded  the  general  scheme  of  advance.  About 
6.30  p.m.  D'Erlon's  corps  reached  the  outskirts  of  the 
field  of  Ligny  to  the  serious  alarm  of  Vandamme 
who  took  it  to  be  a  portion  of  Wellington's  army  that 
had  somehow  broken  through  the  French  line  and 
was  about  to  fall  on  his  rear.  He  reported  this  to 
Napoleon.  The  moment  was  critical  for  the  Emperor 
was  in  the  act  of  preparing  for  the  final  attack  of  his 
Guard  upon  the  Prussians.  This  alarm  compelled 
him  to  postpone  the  attack,  and  it  was  not  until 
7.30  p.m.,  when  he  had  obtained  correct  information, 
that  he  ordered  the  movement  to  be  resumed.  Thus 
another  precious  hour  of  daylight  was  lost.  In  the 
meantime  Ney,  horrified  at  the  absence  of  the  very 
troops  that  had  been  placed  at  his  disposal  to 
carry  out  Napoleon's  plan  of  attack,  despatched  a 
peremptory  order  to  D'Erlon  to  return  forthwith. 
This  order  only  reached  D'Erlon  as  he  was  de- 
ploying to  take  part  in  the  battle  then  raging  at 
Ligny.  His  men  were  tired  after  their  long  day's 
march  and  it  took  a  long  time  to  reform  column  of 
route  and  join  Marshal  Ney.  It  was  late  in  the 
evening  when  he  did  so  and  not  until  Wellington 
had  had  time  to  defeat  Ney  who  had  done  his  best 
to    effect   with    three    divisions   what    Napoleon    in- 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  163 

tended  he  should  have  attempted  with  eight.  This 
is  a  good  illustration  of  the  mishaps  which  abound 
in  war. 

Before  night  fell  Napoleon  had  broken  the  Prussian 
centre  and.  driving  the  wings  apart  had  gained  a  com- 
plete but  by  no  means  a  crushing  victory  at  Ligny.  It 
is  obvious  that  the  whole  character  of  the  results  of  the 
day's  operations  had  been  changed  by  the  loss  of  the 
services  of  D'Erlon's  corps  and  by  the  misuse  of 
Girard's  division.  So  late  were  all  Wellington's 
arrangements  for  the  concentration  of  his  army  that 
had  Ney's  two  corps  been  concentrated  as  early  as 
Napoleon  intended,  and  as  they  well  might  have  been, 
they  could  easily  have  seized  Quatre  Bras  and  brushed 
aside  the  few  Allied  troops  that  were  then  alone 
available  in  that  quarter.  How  certain  this  is  may  be 
estimated  from  the  fact  that  the  Duke  in  his  official 
report  states  that  he  was  attacked  at  Quatre  Bras  by 
the  whole  of  both  D'Erlon's  and  Reille's  two  corps— 
that  is  by  nearer  three  times  than  twice  as  many 
infantry  as  he  was  actually  engaged  with.  Had 
D'Erlon  and  Girard  been  with  Ney  early  in  the  day 
Wellington  must  have  been  driven  away  from  Quatre 
Bras  by  4  or  5  p.m.  D'Erlon  would  then  have  had 
time  to  have  arrived  by  the  main  road  in  the  rear  of 
Blucher  just  as  he  was  receiving  his  final  blow  from 
Napoleon  in  the  gloaming  of  the  evening.  Had  all 
this  taken  place  as  Napoleon  intended  it  is  hardly  too 
much  to  say  that  both  Ziethen's  and  Pirck's  corps, 
which  formed  Bluchers  right  wing,  must  have  been 
destroyed  and  in  all  probability  the  headquarters 
staff,  including  Prince  Blucher  and  General  Gneisenau, 

M  2 


1 64       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

would  have  been  captured.  As  it  was,  the  following 
morning  Thielmann  told  Biilow  that  he  believed  it 
was  Blucher's  intention  to  make  for  the  Rhine  via 
St.  Trond.  Had  this  retreat  been  decided  on  there 
would  have  been  no  Battle  of  Waterloo,  for  certainly 
Wellington  would  not  have  fought  there  without 
a  positive  promise  of  Prussian  support.  He  would 
have  fallen  back  upon  the  coast  abandoning  Brussels 
to  its  fate.  Had  this  been  the  result  of  Ligny 
the  campaign  might  have  ended  in  glorious  triumph 
for  Napoleon  ;  from  that  misfortune  Europe  was 
saved  by  the  heroic  public  spirit  of  Prince  Blucher, 
the  most  patriotic,  noble  and  chivalrous  of  gallant 
soldiers. 

In  the  final  charge  Blucher  was  unhorsed,  wounded, 
and  supposed  to  have  been  taken  prisoner.  For  the 
moment  the  command  devolved  on  Gneisenau,  his 
chief  of  the  staff.  Standing  on  a  hillock  surrounded 
by  the  generals  and  staff  of  the  only  two  corps 
with  which  he  could  communicate  for  the  moment, 
Gneisenau  gave  what  became  the  decisive  order  of  the 
campaign.  He  ordered  the  retreat  upon  Wavre, 
thereby  abandoning  his  direct  lines  of  communication 
through  both  Namur  and  Liege.  Until  recently  it 
was  always  assumed  that  in  giving  this  order  he 
designed  to  prepare  the  way  for  that  junction  with 
Wellington  which  two  days  afterwards  decided  the 
issue  of  the  campaign.  His  late  biographer,  however, 
has  made  it  known  that  his  original  order  was  for  a 
retreat  on  Tilly  which  he  subsequently  changed  to 
Wavre  when  he  found  that  Tilly  was  not  marked  on 
their  working  maps.     It  would  therefore  seem  that 


THE  HUNDRED  DAYS.  165 

Wavre  was  named  as  the  general  direction,  that  is 
northwards,  which  the  retreating  columns  were  to 
take  In  fact,  in  no  other  direction  could  he  hope  to 
safely  reunite  the  two  separated  wings  of  the  Prussian 
army.  Moreover,  in  moving  upon  Wavre  he  did  not 
abandon  his  possible  retreat  on  the  Rhine,  for,  as  a 
matter  of  fact  he  did  at  once  re-establish  his  main  line 
of  communications  with  his  base  through  St.  Trond  on 
Maestricht.  The  retreat  of  the  two  corps,  those  of 
Thielmann  and  Biilow,  then  with  the  Prussian  head- 
quarters was  carried  that  evening  just  far  enough  to 
relieve  them  for  the  time  of  all  pressure  from  the 
French.  The  following  morning  all  the  four  Prussian 
corps  resumed  their  march  towards  Wavre  and  so 
ended  the  battle  of  Ligny. 

Napoleon's  plan  for  the  battle  of  Ligny  was  quite 
in  his  best  style  but  the  mode  in  which  it  was  executed 
was  unworthy  of  his  reputation.  He  must  be  held 
responsible  for  the  delays  which  so  long  deferred  the 
opening  attack  and  which  subsequently  postponed 
the  final  blow  until  darkness  had  set  in.  Some  of 
those  who  are  dazzled  by  the  "  Napoleonic  Legend  " 
may  possibly  traverse  this  conclusion,  but  few  indeed 
can  hold  him  blameless  for  having  failed  to  follow  up 
the  defeated  Prussians  at  once  in  order  to  complete 
their  rout.  Instead  of  pursuing  them  with  every 
available  man  he  allowed  them  to  effect  their  retreat 
without  molestation.  Grouchy,  though  a  very  second- 
rate  commander,  wished  to  follow  them ;  but,  as 
Napoleon,  who  had  left  the  field  without  issuing  any 
orders,  was  ill  and  asleep  at  Fleuras  and  as  no  one 
dared  to  waken  him  this  much-abused  marshal  could 


do   nothing.     The  object  of  the  battle  was  to  com 
pletely  ovenvhelm  Blucher  and    prevent  hi      uncT 

,::^r  urof'r p '"  '^^•'*°"  "^  in';:- " 

Xh  "'^P™"'''- "hen  he  had  defeated  them 

failed  to  reap  that  great  object  from  the  battle. 


(     i67    ) 


CHAPTER  VI. 

WATERLOO. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  June  17th,  Wellington,  who 
had  gone  back  to  sleep  at  Genappe  after  his  success 
at  Quatre  Bras,  rode  to  the  field  of  his  previous  day's 
battle.  The  Prussian  messenger  sent  to  inform  him  of 
Blucher's  defeat  had  been  wounded,  so  he  first  learnt 
the  news  from  his  own  staff.  Upon  his  arrival  at 
Quatre  Bras,  finding  that  there  was  no  serious  move- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  French  in  that  direction,  he 
made  dispositions  to  fall  back  at  his  own  leisure  and 
when  he  deemed  it  necessary  to  do  so.  At  9  a.m.  an 
officer  from  Blucher  arrived  to  tell  him  that  the 
Prussian  army  was  gathering  at  Wavre.  In  reply 
Wellington  said  he  would  stand  and  fight  south  of 
the  forest  of  Soignes,  near  Mont  St.  Jean,  if  Blucher 
would  support  him  by  one,  or  as  some  accounts  have 
it,  by  two  Prussian  Army  Corps.  It  was  not  until 
late  at  night  that  Blucher  was  in  a  position  to  send 
Wellington  an  answer,  for  the  Prussian  artillery  trains 
only  reached  Wavre  at  5  \).m.  and  it  was  not  until 
1 1.30  p.m.  that  Billow  reported  the  arrival  of  his  corps 
at  Diont  le  Mont.     It  was  not,  therefore,  until  after 


168       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OE  NAPOLEON. 

that  hour  and  after  Muffling  had  reported  to  Blucher 
that  the  English  army  was  in  position  at  Mont 
St.  Jean,  that  Blucher  sent  Wellington  the  assurance 
of  Prussian  support.  Blucher's  despatch  assured 
Wellington  that  Billow's  corps  would  march  at  day- 
break for  St  Lambert,  that  Pirch's  corps  would 
support  Billow  and  that  the  other  two  corps  would  be 
held  in  readiness  to  move.  At  what  hour  this  despatch 
reached  Muffling  we  do  not  know,  but  as  the  bearer 
of  it  must  have  travelled  by  night  over  ten  miles  of 
bad  road,  its  contents  can  hardly  have  been  communi- 
cated to  the  Duke  much  before  3  a.m.  on  the  i8th. 
As  for  Napoleon,  he  was  so  prostrated  from  the 
exertions  of  the  day  that  he  went  to  bed  as  soon 
as  the  battle  of  Ligny  was  over  and  was  in  such  an 
exharsted  condition  that  no  one  would  venture  on 
rousing  him  to  ask  for  orders.  The  next  morning  it 
was  the  same  :  he  could  not  be  roused  to  active  work 
at  this  critical  moment  when  rapid  decision  was 
essential  to  success. 

The  morning  of  the  17th  was  passed  in  inactivity  by 
both  wings  of  the  French  army.  Pajol  indeed,  with 
a  force  of  light  cavalry,  had  started  early,  in  pursuit  of 
Blucher,  but  as  he  took  the  road  to  Namur  and  made 
some  chance  and  deceptive  captures  on  it,  his  reports 
only  tended  to  mislead  the  Emperor  as  to  the  direction 
of  the  Prussian  retreat.  Ney,  by  some  strange  care- 
lessness, had  not  been  informed  of  the  result  of  the 
battle  of  Ligny.  He  was  thoroughly  out  of  humour 
because  he  had  been  deprived  of  D'Erlon's  corps  on 
the  previous  day,  and  he  made  no  attempt  to  beat  up 
the    English  at  Quatre   Bras.     Napoleon,  apparently 


-^Wll   ''^[1.°   ' 

f'':^^  oar.'  "     --1  '^ 


c.^'^  ■  ''^      -r*T    Tier      //     ■    -'    Hi""^ 

^o  '-^     =  ^  //  /^■U^*^  waasa./  C^'^^'^    uiiJ 


'brcsssls 


THE   FIELD  OF  WATERLOO. 


I70       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  NAPOLEON. 

taking  for  granted  that  the  English  must  now  retreat, 
spent  the  morning  in  talking  politics.  Some  time  was 
of  course  required  to  reorganise  the  regiments  that 
had  been  engaged,  and  to  refill  the  men's  cartouches 
and  the  artillery  ammunition  waggons.  But  Napoleon 
allowed  the  delays  to  run  on  till  midday,  at  which 
hour  he  at  last  despatched  Grouchy,  with  the  corps  of 
Vandamme  and  Gerard  and  the  cavalry  of  Pajol  and 
Excelmans,  in  pursuit  of  the  Prussians  by  the 
Gembloux  road.  It  was  not  until  2  p.m.  that 
Grouchy  was  able  to  march,  and  when  he  did,  torrents 
of  rain  so  impeded  the  movement  that  he  did  not 
reach  Gembloux  until  late  in  the  evening.  Though 
fit  to  command  a  Division  in  action  he  was  quite 
unequal  to  the  task  now  imposed  upon  him.  The 
verbal  orders  he  received  from  Napoleon  were  to 
overtake  the  retreating  Prussians  and  keep  them  in 
view  wherever  they  went.  At  this  time  all  the 
evidence  pointed  to  Namur  as  the  direction  of  their 
retreat.  These  orders  were  hardly  spoken  when 
reports  from  his  cavalry  informed  the  Emperor  that 
at  9  a.m.  a  force  of  some  20,000  Prussians  had  been 
seen  at  Gembloux.  He  accordingly  sent  a  written 
order  to  Grouchy  desiring  him  from  Gembloux  to 
explore  in  the  Namur  and  Maestricht  direction.  He 
added  however  these  words  :  "  It  is  important  to 
penetrate  what  the  enemy  intend  to  do  :  whether  they 
are  separating  themselves  from  the  English,  or 
whether  they  still  intend  to  unite  in  order  to  cover 
Brussels  and  Liege  trying  the  chances  of  another 
battle."  It  will  be  seen  that  he  gave  Grouchy  no 
instructions  to  interpose  in  any  event   between   him 


WATERLOO.  171 


and  the  Prussians.  To  complete  first  the  stoiy  of 
Grouchy  for  the  17th:  upon  reaching  Gembloux  he 
ascertained  that  some  of  the  Prussians  had  taken  the 
road  to  Wavre  and  some  were,  as  he  thought,  moving 
on  Maestricht.  In  reporting  his  proceedings  to 
Napoleon  he  said  :  "  If  the  mass  of  the  Prussians  is 
retiring  on  Wavre  I  shall  follow  in  that  direction  in 
order  to  prevent  them  reaching  Brussels  and  in  order 
to  separate  them  from  Wellington."  In  accordance 
with  this  intention  he  issued  orders  for  the  move- 
ment on  Wavre  the  following  day,  the  memorable 
June  1 8th.  When  Napoleon  had  issued  his  orders  to 
Grouchy  on  the  17th  he  at  once  started  for  Marbais 
with  the  Guard,  Lobau's  Corps  and  the  Reserve 
Cavalry,  in  order  to  support  Ney's  attack  upon  the 
English  at  Quatre  Bras.  During  the  morning  he  had 
repeatedly  ordered  Ney  to  make  this  attack  ;  but, 
perhaps  from  ill-temper  about  his  defeat  the  previous 
day,  that  general  made  no  movement  until  i  p.m.,  when 
he  saw  Napoleon  approaching.  The  force  collected  by 
Wellington  at  Quatre  Bras,  amounting  to  45,000  men, 
began  to  fall  back  on  Mont  St.  Jean  about  10  a.m. 
on  the  17th.  The  movement  was  leisurely  and 
admirably  carried  out  under  the  Duke's  personal 
direction,  and  by  the  time  that  Ncy  actually  began  to 
move  against  him  Wellington's  cavalry  alone  remained 
on  the  position.  By  2  p.m.  the  pursuit  was  retarded  by 
the  same  torrential  rain  that  had  burst  upon  Grouchy's 
columns  as  he  was  setting  out  for  Gembloux.  With 
the  exception  of  an  insignificant  skirmish  at  Genappe 
and  such  artillery  fire  as  the  French  could  bring  to 
bear  upon  our  retreating  cavalry,  nothing  of  interest 


172       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

marked  this  movement  upon  Mont  St.  Jean.  Save 
for  a  detachment  of  1 8,000  men,  whom  the  Duke 
kept  at  Hal,  being  still  anxious  about  his  right,  all 


WELLINGTON. 


his  army  was  at  last  concentrated  on  what  was  to 
become  the  glorious  battle-ground  of  the  morrow. 
The  French,  toiling  along  over  heavy,  muddy  roads 


WATERLOO. 


173 


during  the  evening  and  night  of  the  17th,  did  not  get 
fully  into  position  until  very  late  that  night  or  early 
the  next  morning. 

As  already  stated,  it  is  certain  that  Wellington  had 
no  intention  of  accepting  battle  on  the  iSth  unless  he 
was  quite  sure  of  Prussian  assistance.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  now  know  that  he  cannot  have  received  any 
letter  giving  him  a  specific  promise  of  such  support 
until  about  3  a.m.  that  morning— that  is  to  say,  at  an 
hour  when,  if  he  meant  to  retreat,  his  arrangements  for 
that  operation  ought  to  have  been  begun.  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  understand  his  action  according  to  the  current 
history,  but  reports  of  conversations  attributed  to  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  in  after  years,  from  more  than 
one  quarter,  have  given  rise  to  the  following  story  : 
that  late  in  the  evening  of  the  17th  he  rode  over  to 
see  Blucher  and  satisfied  himself  of  the  Prince's  ability 
and  intention  to  support  him  if  he  stood  to  fight  on 
the  1 8th  south  of  the  forest  of  Soignes.  The  latest 
American  historian  of  these  events,  Mr.  Ropes  in  his 
very  careful  book,  and  using  materials  published  by 
Colonel  Maurice  in  his  intensely  interesting  articles 
on  Waterloo  in  the  United  Service  Magazine,  declares 
his  belief  in  the  story  of  this  ride.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  it  would  explain  many  things  which  it  is  other- 
wise difficult  to  understand.  I  am  not,  however, 
myself  prepared  to  adopt  it  without  some  further 
proof,  although,  on  the  whole,  the  balance  of  evidence 
seems  rather  in  its  favour.  As  further  evidence  for 
or  against  it  ought  to  be  somewhere  in  existence,  it 
would  be  a  great  service  to  historical  truth  as  regard? 
this  ever  interesting   campaign,   if  those  who   could 


174       THE  DECLmE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

throw  light  on  the  matter  would  publish  what  they 
know. 

In  any  case,  by  lO  a.m.  of  the  i8th  instant  the 
head  of  Billow's  corps  had  reached  St.  Lambert  and 
Wellington  was  aware  of  the  fact.  The  whole  of  his 
corps  did  not  however  reach  that  village  until  the 
battle  of  Waterloo  was  far  advanced.  But  Wellington 
did  not  know  that  Gneisenau,  full  of  anxiety  for  the 
position  in  which  the  Prussian  army  would  be  if  the 
English  retreated  and  Blucher  were  to  find  Napoleon 
in  front  whilst  Grouchy  attacked  him  in  rear,  had 
ordered  Biilow  not  to  advance  beyond  St.  Lambert 
until  it  was  quite  evident  that  Wellington  meant 
really  to  fight  it  out  at  Waterloo  and  that  the  battle 
was  fairly  engaged.  Whilst  this  storm  was  gathering 
on  his  flank  Napoleon  allowed  himself  to  be  delayed 
in  making  his  attack  upon  the  English  army  by  the 
state  of  the  ground  which  made  all  movements 
difficult,  especially  for  artillery.  At  lo  a.m.  he  sent 
off  a  letter  to  Grouchy  approving  of  his  movement  on 
Wavre  "  in  order  to  approach  us."  The  fact  is  that  at 
this  time  neither  Napoleon  nor  Grouchy  dreamed  of 
Bluchers  bold  and  public-spirited  movement,  with 
all  its  risks,  from  Wavre  to  Waterloo.  Their 
only  dream  of  a  junction  by  the  Prussians  with 
Wellington's  army  was  in  the  direction  of  Brussels. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  original  orders  sent  to 
Grouchy  he  had  been  directed  to  post  detachments  of 
cavalry  to  keep  up  communication  with  headquarters, 
and  General  Marbot  tells  us  in  his  delightful  memoirs 
that  by  Napoleon's  orders  he  had  established  cavalry 
connection    between    the    Imperial    headquarters   and 


WATERLOO.  175 


the  Dyle  at  Mouster  and  Ottignies.  Had  Grouch \' 
carried  out  his  orders  on  this  point,  his  messengers 
must  have  encountered  Marbot's  horsemen  at  those 
villages.  It  was  not  till  i  p.m.  that  Napoleon  received 
information  of  Bulow's  arrival  at  St.  Lambert  with 
the  head  of  his  column  ;  seeing  that  an  attack  upon 
his  right  flank  was  thus  imminent,  he  sent  at  once  to 
tell  Grouchy,  but  the  news  reached  that  officer  too 
late  to  affect  his  movements. 

Before  this,  about  11.30  a.m.,  Napoleon  had  ordered 
the  great  battle  to  begin  on  which  he  must  have  felt 
his  whole  future  depended.  He  directed  Reille  with 
his  corps  to  attack  Hougoumont  as  a  diversion  to  his 
principle  attack  by  D'Erlon's  corps  upon  Wellington's 
left  centre  and  centre  at  the  village  of  Mont  St.  Jean. 

The  forces  now  standing  face  to  face  were  not  very 
unequal  numerically  except  in  guns.  After  his  losses 
at  Ligny  and  Quatre  Bras,  and  without  Grouchy 
whom  he  had  detached  to  look  after  the  Prussians, 
Napoleon  was  still  able  to  bring  into  this  new  field  of 
battle  nearly  49,000  foot,  15,700  horse,  and  246  guns. 
On  the  other  hand,  not  counting  the  detachment  of 
18,000  men  at  Hal,  Wellington  had  at  Waterloo  over 
49,000  foot,  12,000  horse  and  156  guns.  Of  the 
infantiy,  however,  only  15,000  were  English,  and  of 
the  cavalry  not  quite  half.  His  motley  heterogeneous 
army  was  no  more  by  itself  a  match  for  the  French 
army  in  front  of  it  in  Wellington's  judgment  than  it 
was  in  that  of  Napoleon. 

The  battle  of  Waterloo,  as  a  detailed  study  of  war, 
can  only  be  described  in  greater  space  than  I  can 
here  afford  it.     On  the  whole  the  facts  concerning  its 


176       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

many  stirring  episodes  and  heroic  phases  are  much 
better  known  and  more  clearly  established  than  they 
are  about  the  other  matters  on  which  I  have  touched. 
I  can  only  attempt  to  briefly  summarise  them  here. 

Reille's  attack  upon  Hougoumont  was  badly  exe- 
cuted, and  he  wasted  the  full  strength  of  his  corps 
upon  it  during  nearly  the  whole  day.  To  prepare  the 
main  attack  by  D'Erlon  upon  Wellington's  centre 
Napoleon,  out  of  his  proportionately  immense  strength 
in  artilleiy,  pushed  forward  a  battery  of  'jZ  guns 
within  600  yards  of  the  crest-line  of  the  English 
position.  Up  to  1.30  p.m.  their  fire  was  maintained 
without  any  reply  from  Wellington,  his  artilleiy  being 
expressly  ordered  not  to  fire  on  the  French  batteries, 
but  only  on  their  columns  as  they  advanced  to  the 
attack.  The  greater  part  of  the  British  foot  were  well 
screened  by  the  nature  of  the  ground  ;  but  Bylandt's 
Dutch-Belgian  Brigade  was  in  front  of  the  crest  and 
much  exposed.  When  D'Erlon's  corps  advanced  in 
four  huge  columns,  with  the  left  thrown  forward,  this 
brigade  fairly  bolted.  But  when  this  unwieldy  mass 
of  French  reached  the  crest  it  was  utterly  unable  to 
deploy  under  the  withering  fire  of  artillery  and  small 
arms  with  which  it  was  received.  Charged  with  the 
bayonet  by  Picton's  division  whilst  it  was  in  hopeless 
confusion,  and  finally  by  Ponsonby's  and  Somerset's 
cavalry,  it  was  sent  reeling  back  with  the  loss  of  two 
eagles  and  numerous  prisoners.  The  English  horse- 
men pressing  on  their  success  too  far  were  roughly 
handled.  About  3  p.m.,  when  D'Erlon's  corps  was 
thus  severely  shaken  and  whilst  Reille  was  still 
busily  occupied  with  trying  to  capture  Hougoumont 


WA  TERLOO.  \TJ 


and  Lobau's  corps,  with  which  Napoleon  had  meant 
to  support  Reille,  had  been  turned  off  eastward  to 
oppose  the  advancing  Prussians,  Ney  sent  to  ask  the 
Emperor  for  the  support  of  a  cavalry  division.  From 
the  French  lines  at  this  time  it  looked  as  if  the  whole 
of  the  English  position  had  been  abandoned,  for  all 
Wellingtons  troops  had  quietly  fallen  back  to  their 
former  stations  behind  the  crest-line.  To  the  French 
cavalry  it  seemed  as  if  they  had  only  to  push  forward 
and  reap  the  fruits  of  a  victory  already  won.  When, 
therefore,  this  small  body  of  cavalry,  demanded  by 
Ney,  moved  to  the  front  the  whole  of  the  remaining 
French  cavalry  also  dashed  forward,  either  misunder- 
standing Napoleon's  orders  or  without  any  orders  at 
all  ;  but  in  any  case  the  movement  was  unchecked 
by  the  Emperor  who  was  probably  at  the  moment 
absorbed  by  the  danger  then  threatening  his  right. 
How  the  splendid  courage  and  wild  career  of  these 
French  horsemen  broke  upon  the  English  squares  is 
a  well-known,  an  oft-told  story.  Not  only  one  cavalry 
division  but  four  were  thus  shattered.  Nevertheless 
the  infantry  and  artillery  fire  told  severely  upon  these 
British  squares  during  the  intervals  between  the 
cavalry  charges.  As  the  day  wore  on  Napoleon 
found  himself  obliged  to  support  Lobau  in  his  en- 
deavours to  keep  back  the  Prussians,  first  with  the 
Young  Guard  and  then  with  three  more  battalions, 
and  with  five  batteries  in  all.  Before  7  p.m.  these 
had  cleared  the  Prussians  out  of  Planchenoit  which 
had  been  taken  from  Lobau  an  hour  before.  As  soon 
as  Napoleon  had  quite  satisfied  himself  that  the 
Prussian  attack  on  his  right  flank  had  been  repulsed 

N 


178       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

and  believing,  as  his  previous  information  had  given 
him  to  understand  that  this  attack  had  been  made 
by  Billow's  corps  only,  he  turned  to  again  direct  the 
battle  against  Wellington. 

There  is  much  discrepancy  as  to  the  hour  when  La 
Haye  Sainte  was  captured.  General  Kennedy  on 
the  English  side  and  Colonel  Heymes,  Ney  s  aide- 
de-camp,  on  that  of  the  French  put  the  hour  at 
6  p.m. — that  is,  towards  the  end  of  the  period  of  the 
French  cavalry  charges.  Others  put  it  as  early  as 
4  p.m.  There  is,  however,  one  piece  of  evidence 
about  which  there  can  be  little  dispute  :  it  is  the  copy 
of  a  letter  from  Lieutenant  Grseme  of  the  Hanov^erian 
service  who  took  part  in  the  defence  of  that  place,  a 
letter  which  has  appeared  in  Siborne's  recently 
published  "Waterloo  Letters"  (p.  409).  In  it  he 
mentions  that  when  he  was  retreating  from  La  Haye 
Sainte  "  all  the  army  was  formed  in  squares."  It  is 
clear,  therefore,  that  the  place  fell  during  the  period 
of  the  cavalry  charges.  The  whole  story  of  the 
defence  and  its  details  shows  that  it  must  have  been 
towards  evening  that  the  French  carried  it.  Owing 
to  the  length  of  the  struggle  for  its  possession  and 
the  neglect  to  provide  a  postern,  the  defenders  were 
at  last  left  without  any  ammunition.  The  denseness 
of  the  fog  and  smoke  prevented  any  but  those  who 
were  on  the  spot  from  seeing  what  was  going  on 
there  ;  and,  taking  all  the  evidence  we  have  on  this 
point  I  am  led  to  think  that  6  p.m.  must  have  been 
about  the  hour  when  La  Haye  Sainte  fell.  In  fact 
the  French  took  advantage  of  the  circumstance  that 
their    cavalry   were   at   the    moment    occupying   the 


WATERLOO.  179 


attention  of  Wellington  and  his  army  to  renew 
and  push  home  their  direct  attack  upon  this  rather 
isolated  outpost.  Having  once  carried  it  they  filled 
it  with  sharp-shooters.  These  made  a  neighbouring 
knoll  untenable  and  enabled  the  French  artillery  to 
bring  so  heavy  a  fire  upon  a  portion  of  the  English 
position  as  to  compel  a  square,  composed  of  the  30th 
and  73rd  regiments,  to  withdraw  to  a  bank  in  rear, 
more  or  less  in  confusion.  At  the  same  moment 
some  Brunswickers  near  this  spot  were  driven  back, 
and  the  consequence  was  a  dangerous  gap  in  the  line 
of  battle.  It  was  a  critical  moment  and  if  fresh 
French  troops  could  have  been  immediately  thrown 
into  the  gap  it  is  practically  certain  that  the  English 
front  must  have  been  broken.  Wellington  met  the 
danger  with  admirable  coolness  and  skill.  The 
arrival  just  at  this  juncture  of  one  of  Ziethen's 
brigades  on  his  left  released  Vivian's  and  Vandeleur's 
brigades  of  horsemen  and  they  were  at  once  thrown 
into  the  gap.""  By  the  time  that  Napoleon  was  able  to 
turn  his  attention  from  the  Prussian  attack  at 
Planchenoit  to  this  final  attack  upon  the  British  who 
stood  between  him  and  Brussels,  Wellington  had 
thoroughly  reformed  his  fighting  line  and  Ziethen 
was  within  close  supporting  distance  of  him,  while 
Pirch  was  closmg  up  in  support  of  Bulow  for  a 
renewed  attack  on  Napoleon's  right. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  the  final 
attack  by  the  Imperial  Guard  was  made.  It  was 
preceded  by  a  vigorous  attack  from  two  of  D'Erlon's 
divisions  on  the  English  left  which  attack  was  main- 
tained as  long  as  the  Guard  attack  continued.     Only 

N  2 


i8o       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

eight  out  of  the  twenty-four  battalions  of  which  the 
Guard  consisted  had  been  available  for  this  final  effort. 
Each  attacking  battalion  was  in  a  column  of  double 
companies  and  the  whole  advanced  in  echelon  from 
the  right.  They  moved  diagonally  across  the  front 
towards  Wellington's  right  centre,  and  as  they  neared 
the  British  line  they  appear  to  have  broken  into  two 
masses.  The  mass  on  the  French  right  was  received 
with  a  tremendous  volley  from  the  English  Guards 
under  Lord  Saltoun  and  then  charged.  The  leading 
French  battalion,  at  least,  was  driven  back  in  con- 
fusion and  pursued  ;  but  the  effect  of  this  check  to 
the  leading  column  of  the  echelon  was  to  bring  up 
the  other  columns  nearly  into  line  with  it.  Saltoun's 
Guards,  therefore,  finding  themselves  for  the  moment 
threatened  in  flank  by  this  seemingly  fresh  body,  fell 
back  to  their  old  position.  But  as  this  new  column 
advanced  it  in  turn  lent  a  flank  to  Adams'  brigade,  to 
which  the  52nd  -  now  the  Oxfordshire  Light  Infantr\' 
under  Colborne  (Lord  Seaton)  belonged.  Seizing 
the  opportunity  that  able  soldier  poured  in  a  tre- 
mendous volley  at  close  range  into  the  flank  of  the 
Imperial  Guard.  The  column  halted  and  endeavoured 
to  front  this  unexpected  attack,  but  Colborne,  sup- 
ported by  the  remainder  of  Adams'  Brigade,  charged 
the  French  whilst  still  in  confusion,  and  the  result 
was  a  complete  rout.  Wellington  at  once  sent  the 
cavalry  brigades  of  Vivian  and  Vandeleur  in  pursuit. 
Almost  at  the  same  moment  the  main  body  of 
Ziethen's  corps  arrived,  forcing  itself  in  between  the 
right  of  D'Erlon  in  his  attack  on  the  English  left  and 
the   left   of  Lobau's   corps    in    its   contest    with   the 


tVAT£J?LOO.  181 


Prussians  under  Biilow.  Ziethen  thus  turned  both 
those  French  corps.  The  Duke  seized  the  moment 
to  order  the  general  advance  of  his  whole  hne. 
Despite  the  heroic  efforts  made  by  many  splendid 
French  soldiers,  the  rout  soon  became  a  mere  sauve 
qui  pent. 

Whilst  Napoleon's  destruction  was  thus  being 
accomplished  at  Waterloo,  Grouchy  had  become 
involved  in  a  simple  rearguard  action  with  Theilmann 
at  Wavre.  At  a  spot  which  has  been  very  skilfully 
identified  by  J\Ir.  Ropes  as  a  certain  house  in  Sart- 
les-Walhains,  Grouchy,  when  at  breakfast,  first  heard 
the  cannonade  at  Waterloo.  He  was  urged  by  Gerard 
and  Vandamme  to  march  towards  the  battle  which 
the  sound  indicated  to  be  taking  place  near  Plan- 
chenoit.  But  still  hoping  that  by  the  occupation  of 
Wavre  he  would  be  able  to  prevent  the  Prussians 
from  joining  Wellington,  Grouchy  determined  to 
carry  out  his  orders  from  Napoleon  and  push  on  for 
that  place.  The  result  of  that  decision  was  disastrous 
to  Napoleon,  as  Grouchy 's  whole  force,  amounting  to 
over  30,000  men  with  ninety-six  guns,  was  through- 
out this  eventful  day  as  entirely  useless  to  Napoleon 
as  if  it  had  not  existed.  M.  Thiers,  with  the  excessive 
and  unscrupulous  partisanship  which  characterises 
his  Napoleonic  epic,  most  unfairly  throws  upon 
Grouchy  the  blame  for  the  final  overthrow  of  his 
hero.  Space  does  not  allow  me  to  enlarge  upon  this 
interesting  and  much  disputed  point.  Mr.  Ropes 
urges  very  forcibly  that  the  words  I  have  already 
quoted  from  Soult's  written  order  of  the  17th  left 
Grouchy  properly  no  choice  but  to  march  on  the  i8th 


tSi       THE  i)£CLllVE  AND  PALL   OF  NAPOLEOM. 

by  the  bridges  of  Mouster  and  Ottignies  to  join 
Napoleon.  This  is.  however,  to  assume  that  the 
Prussian  move  to  join  Wellington,  as  it  was  actually 
made,  was  one  that  might  and  ought  fairly  to  have 
been  anticipated  by  a  rather  commonplace  general. 
But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  until  I  p.m.  on  the  i8th  there 
is  nothing  to  show  that  Napoleon  himself  anticipated 
any  such  move  on  the  part  of  Blucher.  Even  at  that 
hour  he  thought  it  was  only  Billow's  corps  that  had 
marched  against  his  right.  No  one  can  be  better 
aware,  no  one  can  be  prouder  than  I  am,  of  the 
magnificent  courage  and  steadiness  of  the  British 
soldier  at  Waterloo  ;  but  when  every  allowance  is 
made  for  it  the  honest  historian  must  admit  that  it 
was  the  splendid  audacity  of  this  Prussian  move  upon 
St.  Lambert  and  the  French  right,  due  to  the 
personal  loyalty  of  Prince  Blucher  to  Wellington  and 
in  opposition  to  the  strategic  views  of  Gneisenau,  that 
determined  the  fate  of  Napoleon's  army  at  Waterloo. 
It  is  certain  that  Napoleon  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
i8th  did  expect  Grouchy  to  march  upon  those  bridges 
over  the  River  Lasnes,  but  it  was  a  move  that  only  a 
far  greater  soldier  than  Grouchy  and  one  ready  to 
incur  a  vast  responsibility,  would  have  ventured  upon. 
According  to  our  present  knowledge  of  the  real  posi- 
tion there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Grouchy  ought  to 
have  disregarded  his  orders  and  moved  with  all  speed 
towards  the  sound  of  the  guns.  By  doing  so  he  might 
have  so  occupied  the  Prussians  as  to  gain  for  his 
master  sufficient  time  to  achieve  a  victory  at  Waterloo. 
But  it  was  not  to  be  so.  The  French  army  was  so 
hopelessly  beaten   and  Wellington's  victory  was   so 


PVA  TERLOO.  183 


complete  that  it  was  beyond  even  Napoleon's  powers 
to  recover  from  it.  Grouchy  indeed  successfully  led 
back  into  France  the  force  under  his  command,  but 
there  was  no  army  existing  there  that  could  hope  to 
meet  the  host  of  invaders  then  ready  to  pour  in  over 
her  frontiers.  How  Napoleon  at  length  surrendered 
himself  as  a  fugitive  on  board  an  English  man-of-war 
and  was  ultimately  deported  to  the  beautiful  and  >*^- 
healthy/lsland  of  St.  Helena,  where  he  died  nearly  six 
years  afterwards,  is  familiar  to  every  English  child. 

Looking  back  now  over  the  eventful  period  of  "  the 
hundred  days,"  we  are  struck  by  the  same  features 
we  have  remarked  in  the  previous  campaigns  I  have 
here  discussed.  Was  ever  a  man's  personal  ascen- 
dency more  wonderfully  displayed  than  it  was  by 
the  fact  that  Napoleon,  who  disembarked  in  France 
almost  alone  and  as  a  fugitive  from  his  little  island 
realm,  was  able  in  a  few  weeks  to  overturn  with- 
out shedding  blood  the  whole  organised  power  of 
France  under  its  legitimate  king .''  But  all  throughout 
this  his  last  campaign  the  ascendency  he  exercised 
over  the  Allies,  compelling  them  to  conform  to  his 
initiative,  is  not  less  remarkable  than  the  narrowness 
by  which  he  missed  crushing  them.  What  would 
have  been  the  end  of  this  extraordinary  man  had  not 
D'Erlon's  corps  been  wasted  as  it  was  on  June  i6th  ? 
With  a  little  more  vigour  in  the  French  cavalry 
reconnaissances  of  the  17th,  what  would  have  been 
the  fate  of  the  Prussian  army  if  Napoleon  had  at  once 
discovered  its  actual  situation  .'  I  do  not  see  how  any 
one  who  closely  follows  the  story  of  this  four  days' 
campaign,  as  it  is  now  known  to  us,  can  doubt  that 


t84       THk  DECLINE  A  Mi)  FALL   OP  NaPOLEOK. 

Ney,  D'Erlon,  Grouchy,  and  several  others  of  Napo- 
leon's subordinates  failed  to  serve  their  old  master 
with  the  vigour  and  enthusiastic  zeal  of  former  years. 
They  as  well  as  Europe  generally  were  alike  weary 
of  him.  But  as  to  himself,  suffering  as  he  certainly 
was  both  in  mind  and  body  and  by  no  means  in  any 
way  the  man  to  command  victory  as  he  had  done  in 
his  early  career,  it  is  still  round  him  and  his  initiative 
we  find  centred  all  that  was  most  brilliant  on  the 
French  side  in  this  campaign.  And  yet  there  can  be 
now  no  doubt  that  over  him  was  cast  a  weariness  and 
a  lethargy,  the  result  of  ill-health,  which  weakened  him 
and  exercised  an  unfortunate  spell  over  his  actions. 

Had  Napoleon  never  made  this  bold  attempt  to 
seize  again  the  throne  of  France,  something  woulJ 
have  been  wanting  to  the  dramatic  interest  and  com- 
pleteness of  his  fall.  Nevertheless  this  Waterloo 
campaign  is  a  thing  apart,  for  Napoleon  had  in  reality 
fallen  before  it  began.  As  said  by  his  eulogistic 
historian  M.  Thiers,  who  will  see  no  fault  in  him  as  a 
general,  his  reign,  attempted  despite  France  as  much 
as  despite  Europe,  had  become  for  the  future  im- 
possible even  before  the  campaign  began. 

To  the  preachers  of  Napoleonism,  the  final  failure 
and  overthrow  of  their  idol  was  the  result  of  a  malig- 
nant destiny  which  influenced  the  elements  as  well  as 
it  did  the  conduct  of  subordinates  who  had  formerly 
been  his  able  assistants.  They  base  their  conclusions 
upon  the  statements,  absolutely  untruthful  on  some  of 
the  most  important  points,  dictated  by  Napoleon  at 
St.  Helena.  His  narrative  of  the  events  of  this 
campaign    is  admirable  as  a  romance  ;  its  one  geeat 


WATERLOO.  185 


object  was  to  make  the  world  believe  the  lie  which 
runs  through  it — I  mean  that  he  was  himself  infallible 
as  a  leader  and  in  no  way  responsible  for  that  terrible 
defeat  the  very  name  of  which  still  rankles  in  the 
breast  of  Frenchmen.  As  far  as  France  was  con- 
cerned he  was  successful  in  this  object ;  even  so 
famous  a  national  historian  as  M,  Thiers  has  lent  his 
great  literary  power  to  flatter  the  national  vanity  of 
his  countrymen  by  throwing  the  blame  of  Napoleon's 
failure  upon  Grouchy,  and  in  so  doing  has  rendered 
that  untruth  immortal.  At  this  moment  the  story  of 
Waterloo  as  told  by  Thiers  is  firmly  believed  in  by 
the  great  bulk  of  the  French  nation,  and  it  is  rare  to 
find  a  Frenchman,  no  matter  how  anti-Napoleonic  or 
how  republican  he  may  be  in  feeling,  who  does  not 
believe  that  Waterloo  was  lost  because  Grouchy 
failed  or  refused  to  obey  orders.  Indeed,  many  of  the 
uneducated  still  believe  that  he  was  bribed  by  England 
to  play  the  traitor's  part  towards  his  oid  master.  And 
so  has  been  written  in  France  the  history  of  even  the 
early  part  of  this  century  ! 

The  military  critic  who  m'nutely  examines  Napo- 
leon's proceedings  during  this  campaign  discovers  so 
much  to  find  fault  with  that  it  is  only  j^ossible  to 
account  for  his  shortcomings  by  believing  that  they 
were  due  to  the  mysteriously  recurring  malady  re- 
ferred to  already  several  times  in  these  pages.  The 
evidence  corroborating  this  view  is.  to  my  mind, 
irrefutable.  This  disease,  from  which  he  had  Ion" 
suffered  more  or  less  and  which  had  been  the  cause 
of  so  much  disaster  to  him  both  in  Russia  and  at  the 
battle  of  Dresden,  now  attacked  him  oftener  and  with 


i86       THE  DECLINE  AMD  PALL   OE  NAPOLEON: 

greater  virulence.  When  under  its  influence  he  was 
incapable  of  all  useful  mental  or  bodily  exertion,  had 
great  difficulty  in  keeping  awake,  and  his  drawn 
features  and  dull  expression  bespoke  both  physical 
pain  and  mental  depression.  His  strength,  no  longer 
what  it  was  ten  years  before,  had  been  seriously  over- 
strained by  fifteen  hours  of  daily  work  and  worry 
during  his  anxious  stay  in  Paris.  But  when  not  under 
the  influence  of  this  disease  his  fine  intellect  was  as 
clear,  his  fertility  of  resource  as  marvellous,  his  genius 
as  brilliant  and  his  conceptions  as  grand  as  ever. 
Seated  in  his  cabinet  he  could  plan  and  devise  as  of 
yore,  with  almost  unerring  wisdom  and  keen  apprecia- 
tion of  what  was  necessaiy  for  success.  He  could  still 
grasp  the  position  with  all  his  former  insight.  But 
the  anguish  of  his  late  failures  in  the  field  had  not 
only  seriously  afi"ected  his  health  but  had  robbed 
him  largely  of  that  self-confidence  which  is  so 
necessary  for  any  great  and  continued  success  in  war. 
He  was  no  longer  the  thin,  sleek,  active  little  man 
he  had  been  at  Rivoli.  His  now  bloated  face,  large 
stomach  and  fat  and  rounded  legs  bespoke  a  man 
unfitted  for  hard  work  on  horseback.  His  unwieldy 
body  no  longer  obeyed  his  behests  as  formerly.  He 
was  already  old  for  his  forty-seven  years,  and  from 
being  the  most  self-contained  self-reliant  and  peremp- 
tory of  leaders  he  had  now  to  some  marked  extent 
already  fallen  into  the  garrulity  of  the  greybeard,  and 
was  prone  to  ask  opinions  from  those  to  whom  he 
had  been  wont  to  issue  orders. 

I    have  thus  dwelt  upon   the   state  of  Napoleon's 
health    in   what    I    may   term   the   lasr.  act    of    his 


Pt^A  TERLOO.  18/ 


curiously  histrionic  career,  because  I  believe  it  to 
have  been  the  primary  cause  of  his  final  overthrow 
at  Waterloo.  The  more  I  study  his  grandly  con- 
ceived plan  of  campaign  for  18 15  the  more  convinced 
I  am  that  the  overwhelming  defeat  in  which  it  ended 
was  primarily  the  result  of  bodily  disease  and  the 
failure  of  mental  power  which  resulted  from  it  at 
supreme  moments  when  rapid  and  energetic  decision 
was  imperatively  necessary  for  success.  Had  he  been 
able  to  bring  the  mental  and  bodily  energy  of  his 
early  career  to  bear  upon  the  great  plan  he  had 
conceived  for  the  destruction  of  Wellington  and 
Blucher  in  Belgium,  judging  of  what  those  com- 
manders would  have  done  by  what  they  did  do,  I 
beheve  the  cautious  Englishman  would  at  least  have 
had  to  retreat  in  haste  for  the  purpose  of  re-embarking 
at  Ostend,  whilst  the  fieiy  and  impetuous  Prussian 
would  have  been  almost  destroyed  at  Ligny  and  only 
too  glad  to  place  the  Rhine  between  the  remnants  of 
his  beaten  army  and  the  victor  of  Jena. 

In  no  other  way  can  I  satisfactorily  account  for  the 
valuable  hours  squandered  by  Napoleon  or  the  care- 
less faultiness  of  many  of  his  most  important  orders 
during  this  campaign.  Nor  can  I  otherwise  explain 
to  myself  how  two  armies  situated  as  were  those  of 
Wellington  and  Blucher  on  June  14th  15th  and  i6th 
were  allowed  to  escape  during  the  two  following  days 
from  the  destruction  with  which  Napoleon's  most 
ably  devised  scheme  of  operations  ought  to  have 
overwhelmed  them.  His  fatigued  and  lethargic  con- 
dition on  the  early  morning  of  the  17th  accounts  for 
the  many  hours  of  daylight  that  were  trifled  away  and 


t88       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OP  NAPOLEON. 

were  then  uselessly  squandered.  Grouchy,  anxious 
to  begin  the  pursuit,  strove  to  see  Napoleon  at  day- 
break, but  was  not  admitted  to  his  presence  until 
8  a.m.,  and  even  then  it  was  impossible  to  elicit  any 
definite  instructions  from  him.  Indeed,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  no  orders  were  issued  until  noon,  Grouchy 
receiving  his  verbally  about  i  p.m. — a  delay  which 
enabled  Blucher  to  reach  Waterloo  in  time  the 
following  day  to  give  the  French  their  final  despatch 
there.  Well  indeed  may  Vandamme  have  said  to 
those  around  him  :  "  The  Napoleon  whom  we  have 
known  exists  no  more, — our  yesterday's  (the  i6th) 
success  will  have  no  result."  I  believe  it  was  not  so 
much  the  deep  condition  of  the  country  after  the 
heavy  rain  as  a  recurrence  of  this  fatal  malady  on 
the  morning  of  Waterloo,  added  of  course  to  the 
fact  that  he  did  not  expect  Bluchers  arrival  on 
the  field  of  battle  that  day,  which  caused  him  to 
begin  the  action  so  late  and  so  purposelessly  to 
throw  away  hours  which  might  have  been  employed 
in  destroying  Wellington  before  the  Prussians  could 
arrive.  We  know  that  during  the  progress  of  the 
battle  itself  he  remained  seated  for  hours  motionless 
at  a  table  placed  for  him  in  the  open,  often  asleep 
with  his  head  resting  upon  his  arms  ;  that  also  when 
flying  beaten  from  the  field  he  suffered  so  much  from 
drowsiness  it  was  with  difficulty  his  attendants  pre- 
vented him  from  tumbling  from  his  horse.  During 
the  progress  of  the  battle  he  was  little  on  horseback, 
for  riding  caused  him  pain.  He  was  thus  debarred 
trom  seeing  for  himself  much  of  the  Prussian  advance 
upon  Plaricherioit,    and    consequently  did    not    fully 


WATERLOO.  189 


realise  what  the  dangers  of  his  position  were  as  early 
as  he  should  have  done  had  he  been  able  to  ride 
rapidly  from  point  to  point  upon  the  field  of  battle 
to  obtain  information  for  himself  Indeed,  it  is  to 
this  cause  only  we  can  attribute  the  fact  that  he 
began  this  battle  without  having  himself  previously 
reconnoitred  or  examined  Wellington's  position,  re- 
lying on  General  Haxo's  report  upon  it. 

Napoleon's  character  is  a  puzzle  to  most  men  and 
the  composition  of  his  brain  is  difficult  to  analyse. 
He  had  no  real  appreciation  of  what  was  beautiful 
in  nature,  felt  little  of  the  true  poetry  of  life,  and 
cared  nothing  for  what  we  regard  as  virtue  ;  but  all 
we  know  of  what  he  said  or  wrote  regarding  histoiy 
in  which  he  had  no  part,  or  about  those  who  made  it, 
or  regarding  the  science  of  government,  and  the  insti- 
tutions and  general  machinery  which  keep  civilised 
states  going,  displays  wisdom  and  liberality.  He 
thoroughly  understood  the  minds  and  hearts  of  men, 
especially  of  Frenchmen,  and  was  fully  alive  to  those 
influences  which  form  and  mould  the  human  cha- 
racter to  make  the  individual  either  good  or  bad,  and 
which,  in  doing  so,  make  nations  either  great  or  little. 

He  knew  full  well  how  thoroughly  he  had  satisfied 
French  aspirations  after  military  glory,  but  he  could 
not  have  foreseen  that  what  he  did,  together  with  the 
renown  of  his  name,  would  have  enabled  a  nephew 
in  the  next  generation  to  bring  about  another  Bona- 
partist  Empire.  If  he  be  now  conscious  of  what  takes 
place  on  earth,  how  much  the  poignant  remembrance 
of  Waterloo  must  be  salved  by  the  knowledge  (I 
judge  from  current  French  literature)  that  all  which 


igo       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 

Frenchmen  care  most  still  to  remember  of  the  past 
is  directly  connected  with  his  immortal  name !  It 
was  he  who  gave  France  the  foremost  position  in 
Europe — a  position  the  like  of  which  no  one  nation 
before  or  since  has  ever  occupied,  and  before  which 
all  European  nations,  England  excepted,  had  humbly 
bent  the  knee.  He  found  France  in  the  throes  of 
a  foul,  sanguinary  revolution  with  all  its  horribly 
legalised  crimes  of  murder  and  robbery,  and  from 
it,  by  his  genius  for  government,  he  evolved  order 
joined  with  progress.  The  fascination  which  in  life  he 
personally  exercised  over  his  own  followers  we  often 
feel  ourselves,  even  now,  when  we  contemplate  his 
soaring  genius  and  attempt  to  measure  his  greatness. 

For  the  part  of  the  heroic  conqueror,  in  which 
character  he  wished  to  be  for  ever  remembered,  death 
upon  the  battlefield  was  a  necessity.  Leonidas  the 
Spartan,  Epaminondas  the  Theban,  Turenne  the 
Frenchman.  Wolfe  and  Moore  the  Englishmen,  and 
above  all  of  our  national  heroes  the  great  Nelson, — 
all  had  fallen  upon  the  field  of  their  glory  and  their 
fame.  Upon  many  remarkable  occasions  Napoleon 
showed  his  contempt  of  danger  and  how  recklessly  he 
could  expose  his  own  body  when  his  doing  so  was 
calculated  to  help  him  to  success.  He  knew  how  to 
win  the  imagination  of  Frenchmen  and  how  with 
French  armies  to  conquer  ;  but  he  did  not  know  how 
to  die  a  hero's  death.  Why,  oh  why  did  he  not  end 
his  days  with  those  gallant  souls  who,  when  everything 
was  lost,  tried  in  his  cause  on  the  evening  of  that  ap- 
palling overthrow  to  stem  the  overwhelming  current 
of  pursuit  ?     Why  did  he  not  die  with  those  who  died 


WATERLOO. 


191 


for  him  upon  that  most  eventful  day  of  his  Hfe  ?     But 
as    a    patriot    how    Httle    worthy  was    he    of    all    the 


NAPOLEON  AT  ST.   HELENA   {from  a  contemporary  drawing). 


reverence  and  devoted  love  bestowed  upon  him  by  his 
brave,  faithful  and  loyal  army !     It  is  as  natural  to  die 


192       THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL   OF  NAPOLEON. 


as  to  be  born  and  it  can  matter  little  whether  you 
fal]  like  a  soldier  on  the  field  of  battle  when  young 
and  vigorous,  or  "  sicken  years  away  "  to  die  in  your 
bed.  If  the  average  of  human  life  were  a  hundred 
instead  of  thirty-three  this  question  might  be  of  some 
general  importance  ;  but  it  is  not  so.  Bonaparte's 
march  through  the  world  was  marked  by  the  blood- 
trail  of  tens  of  thousands  of  gallant  soldiers  who,  had 
it  not  been  for  his  inordinate  personal  ambition,  might 
have  lived  for  years  longer.  Yet  it  is  not  for  this 
reason  or  because  he  wasted  upon  horrible  war  the 
means  of  national  prosperity  and  of  individual  enjoy- 
ment that  men  specially  loathe  his  memory.  It  is 
because  his  whole  career,  from  childhood  to  the  day 
of  his  death,  was  one  great  untruth,  and  was  made  up 
of  deceit,  treachery,  and  the  most  appalling  and  selfish 
indifference  to  the  feelings  and  wants  of  others — was, 
in  fact,  one  great  unholy  deception.  Even  his  most 
ardent  admirers  must  freely  admit  that  the  great 
cause  of  Righteousness  and  of  Peace  never  gained 
anything  at  his  hands.  A  studied  and  finished  actor 
in  all  his  relations  with  men  and  women,  he  assumed 
at  times  an  apparent  kindly  interest  in  the  fate  of 
those  about  him.  He  could  even  cleverly  pretend  a 
feeling  of  generous  and  magnanimous  impulse  when 
he  thought  it  would  pay  him  to  do  so.  Throughout 
life  he  was  always  playing  to  an  audience  whether  it 
were  to  his  army  by  stirring  general  orders,  or  to 
F"rance  by  lying  bulletins,  or  to  the  world,  present  and 
to  come,  by  his  childish  con  'uct  at  St.  Helena  and  by 
the  fictions  he  concocted  there.  The  instrument  he 
played  upon  was  man,  and  no  other  human  being  has 


WATERLOO.  193 


ever  understood  its  gamut  better  or  how  to  call  forth 
its  strong  tones  or  to  get  more  effect  out  of  it.  He 
knew  the  springs  that  moved  man's  moral  machinery, 
especially  the  emotional  side  of  humanity,  and  above 
all  things  the  Frenchman's  love  of  high-flown,  melting 
sentiment.  He  was  thus  able  to  endear  himself  to 
France  and  especially  to  her  splendid  soldiers  who 
loved  him  with  a  love  the  like  of  which  we  only  find 
in  the  devotion  with  which  the  Tenth  Legion  loved 
Caesar. 

The  name  of  this  pre-eminently  bad  man  fills  a 
space  in  the  world's  histoiy  far  greater  than  that 
occupied  by  all  the  men  of  action,  all  the  thinkers, 
poets  or  writers  of  every  age.  Yet  this  man,  who  is 
still  regarded  by  myriads  as  the  greatest  of  human 
beings,  failed  in  the  mission  he  had  set  himself  to 
accomplish — was  even  beaten  at  his  own  special  trade 
— was  declared  an  outlaw  by  all  Europe,  and  died  in 
prison.  The  public  career  of  no  great  leader  of  men 
teaches  us  so  painful  a  moral  lesson  upon  the  mockery 
of  all  earthly  ambition,  whilst  the  story  of  his  private 
hfe  indeed  proclaims  "  how  little  are  the  Great."  He 
died  as  he  had  lived,  untruthful  to  the  last.  "  Mene 
Mene,  Tekel,  Upharsin.  God  hath  numbered  thy 
kingdom,  and  finished  it.  Thou  art  weighed  in  the 
balances,  and  art  found  wanting."  So  wrote  the  finger 
on  the  wall  about  the  proud  King  of  Babylon.  It 
might  with  equal  truth  have  been  written  of  him 
whose  overthrow  at  Waterloo  is  thus  described  in 
verse : — 

"  Since  he  miscalled  the  morning  star, 
Nor  man  nor  fiend  hath  fallen  so  far." 


INDEX. 


Adams'  brigade  at  Waterloo,  i8o 

Alexander,  Czar,  7,  8,  109;  army  for,  14,  17;  Napoleon's  misconcep- 
tion of  his  character,  29,  30 ;  with  Schwa  zenberg's  army  in 
Bohemia,  55 

Allemaat,  Marshals  Marmont  and  Moitier  d  ivf-n  haciv  upon,  114 

Allied  armies  in  Germany,  August  li,  1813.  54,  55 

march  of  Paris,  1814,  113-iib 

in  Waterloo  campaign,  140-145 

Arches,  Napoleon  hemmed  in  at,  by  the  Allied  Armies,  log,  iii 

Areola,  bridge  of,  Bonaparte  at,  1 1 

Augereau,  Marshal,  10,  86,  88,  100 

Austria ;  forces  of,  for  the  invasion  of  Russia,  9,  38,  39  ;  assumes  a 
position  of  armed  neutrality,  40,  51,  72;  and  Italy,  99,  100 

Bachelu's  Infantry  division,  152 

Bagration,  army  of,  22 

Bale,  column  under  Schwarzenberg  at,  93 

Barclay  de  Tolly's  policy  of  cautious  retreat,   l3,   20,   21,   24.   35,    37; 

junction  with  the  armies  of  IJagration  at  Smolensi<,  22 
Bar-sur-Aube,  Marmont's  corps  falls  bajk  upon,  83 
Bautzen,  the  Allies  at.  46  ;  battle  of,  47-49 
Bavarians,  Napoleon  and  the,  69,  70  ;  secession  of,  99 
Beauharnais,  Prince  Eugene  de,  35,  38,  40,  86-88 
Beaumont,  Napoleon's  headquaters  at,  148 
Belgium,  Blucher's  army  in,  134,  135 
Bellegrade,  Austrian  troops  under,  88 
Bennigsen,  Russian  army  under,  69 
Beresford  at  Bo  deanx,  iio 

Beresina,  the  ;  Napoleon's  retreating  army  at,  33 
Berlin,  Bernadotte's  army  at,  54    55 

O   2 


196  INDEX. 

Bernadotte ;  his  army  at  Berlin,  54,  55  ;  defeats  French  corps  under 
Oudinot  at  Gross  Beeien,  65,  66  ;  defeats  Ney  at  Dennewitz,  67  ; 
sends  two  corps  to   support  Blucher's  march  on  Paris,  loO 

Bernhard,  Prince  of  Saxe- Weimar,  152 

Berthier,  Napoleon's  Chiefof-Staff,   117 

Blucher,  Prince  ;  Prussian  army  attacked  by  Ney  at  Bautzen,  48,  50 ; 
army  under,  in  Silesia,  54-56,  58,  61  ;  defeats  French  corps  under 
Macdonald,  66,  67  ;  Najioleon's  repeated  efforts  to  crush,  68,  69  ; 
column  under,  at  Coblentz,  93  ;  character  of,  96  ;  his  march  for 
Paris,  97-102;  takes  Soissons,  loi,  I02  ;  battle  of  Laon,  104-106; 
army  under,  in  Belgium,  134,  135,  140-142  ;  inaccurate  despatch 
of,  138  ;  Napoleon's  attack  on  June  15,  151-153  ;  battle  of  Ligny, 
153-163 ;  wounded,  164 ;  promises  to  support  Wellington  at 
Waterloo,  167,  168,  173 

Bohemia,  Schwarzenberg's  army  in,  54,  55 

Bonaparte,  Jerome,  159,  160 

,   Joseph,    defends     Paris,    no,     in,    114;    evacuates    the 

city,  115 

,  Lucien,  130 

,  Napoleon,  see  Napoleon. 

,  Victor,  41,  58,  83,  99 

Borodino,  battle  of,  betv^een  Napoleon  and  Kutusof,  27-29 

Bourbons,  the  restoration  of  the,  119,  127,  133 

Bourmont,  General,  151 

Brienne,  indecisive  action  at,  98 

Billow,  Prussian  corps  under,  100-102,  141,  153,  164,  165,  174,  175, 
179 

Campaign  of  1813  ;  Napoleon's  scheme,  57,  58;  account  of,  37-74 

of  1814,  6  ;  the  only   defensive   one  waged  by  Napoleon, 

81-92  ;  disposition  of  his  army,  83,  86  ;  defends  Paris  against  the 
Allies,  94-119;  desertion  of  his  generals,  118-120;  Napoleon's 
strategy  in,  125-6;  composition  of  his  army,  126,  127 

of  1815  ;  the  hundred  days,  128-193 

Campo  Formio,  Treaty  of,  3 

Catalonia,  French  troops  under  Suchet  in,  86,  89 

Caulincourt,  129 

Chalons,  112,  113  ;   Victor's  corps  falls  back  upon,  83 

Champ-Aubert,  Russians  destroyed  at,  98 

Character,  Napoleon  a  bad  judge  of,  30 

Charleroi,  148,  149 

Charenton,  Marshals  Marmont  and  Mortier  at,  114 


IXDEX.  197 

Chaumont  seized  by  Na;ioleon's  cavalry,  1 15 

Coblentz,  Blucher  at,  93 

Coburg,  Napoleon's  army  at,  40 

Colborne  (Lord  Seaton),  180 

Compans,  General,  112,  115 

Conscription,  the,  in  France,  1814,  9,  10,  84 

"  Continental   system,"   designed    for    the    purpose  of  destroying    the 

comme.cial    prosperity   of    England,   7-9 ;    the   inexpediency  and 

unwisdom  of,  84,  85 
Craonne,  Wo, onsoff  defeated,  I04 

Danzih,  French  garrison  at,  55 

Davoust,  Marshal,  lo,  40,  148  ;  captures  Hamburg,  47 

Dennevvitz,  Ney  defeated  by  Bernadotte  at,  67 

D'Erlon's  corps,  148,  151,  152,  157,  161-163,   175,  176,  179 

Desaix,  Marshal,  10 

Doulevent,  Napoleon  at,  116 

Dresden;  pageant   of.    May  1812,   13;  Napoleon's   triumphant   entry 

into,  46,  47  ;  ba'lles  round,  in  1813,  61,  62,  67 
Drissa,  Russian  camp  at,  20 

Elba,  Napoleon  sent  to,  121-125  ;  escape  from,  128 

Elbe,  French  fortresses  on  the,  38,  70,  86 

England,   Napoleon's  "Continental  system"  and,  7,  8;  national  debt 

during  the  invasion  of  Russia,  1812,  9  ;  the  Peninsula  War,  53,  54  ; 

the  "  Hundred  Days,"  128-193 
Epernay,  Napoleon  marches  to,  I08 
Erfurth,  Napoleon's  army  at,  40 
Excelsman,  cavalry  of,  170 

Fere-Champenoise,  Marshal  Marmont  defeated  at,  114 

Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  I   i 

Finland,  a  my  of,  .^o 

Fontainbleau,  Napoleon  at,  117,  119 

F"o:tifications,  absence  of,  in  I'aris,  1814,  1 15 

France,   condition    of,   in   1S14,    76,  77  ,  enormous    taxes    in,   84  ,   the 

conscription  in,  9,   lO,   84  ;   manilesto  issued  to  peo;de  of,  by  the 

Allies  in  1814,93;  leco.iquered  in   1815   without   bloodshed,  132. 

133  ;  attack  of  imperial  (Jnard  at  Waterloo,  179,  iSo 
Francis,  Emperor,  40,  75,  8.->,  125  ;  at  Dresden,  13;  with  Schwarzen- 

berg's  army  in  liohemia,  55  ;   llee^  to  Dijon,  1 13 
Frankfort,  the  Allied  Armies  at,  75 
F"rasnes,  village  of,  152 


198  IXDEX. 

GEMnLOUX,  Grouchy  at,  170,, 171 

Genappe,  skirmish  at,  171 

Generals,  Napoleon's,  10,  25,  37,  52,  I17  ;  inefficiency  of,  42  ;  treason 

of,  118,  119;  force  Najioleon  to  abdicate,  II9-121 
Gerard's    corps    of   French    troops    destroyed    by    Bernadotte,  65  ;    at 

Waterloo,  148,  149,  151,  159,' 161,  163,  170,  181 
Germany,  Napoleon's  new  army  in,  43  ;  account  of  the  1813  campaign 

in,  43-74 
Globokoe,  21 
Gneisenau,  Count,  and  the  Prussian  Short-Service  System,  52  ;  advises 

Blucher,   96,    163;  friction   with  Wellington,    136,  137,  155,  156; 

orders  the  retreat  upon  Wavre,  164,  165  ;   174,  182 
Gotha,  Napoleon's  army  at,  40 

Graeme,  Lieutenant,  and  the  fall  of  La  Haye  Sainte,  178,  179 
"Grand   Army,"   for   the  invasion  of  Russia,  14,  27,  28;  losses  from 

sickness  and    desertion,  24  ;  disastrous  retreat  from  Moscow,  31- 

36  ;  remains  of,  at  Smorgoni,  33,  37,  38,  40 
Gross  Beeren,  Bernadotte  defeats  Oudinot  at,  65,  66 
Grouchy,   Marshal,  lo,  140,  165  ;    at   Gembloux,   170,   [71  ;  movement 

on  Wavre,  174,  181,  182;  retreat  to  France,  183 
Guard,  Imperial,  at  Waterloo,  attack  of,  t79,  iSo 
Guignes,  Napoleon  at,  99 

Hamburg,  captured  by  Davoust,  47  ;  French  garrison  at,  55 

Hamley,  Sir  E.,  on  the  campaign  of  1814,  91 

Heymes,  Colonel,  178 

Hill,  Lord,  corps  of,  142 

Holland  joins  the  coalition  against  Napoleon  in  1S14,  93 

Horses,  want  of,  during  the  invasion  of  Russia,  21,  33 

Hougoumont,  attack  upon,  175,  176 

Italy;  Viceroy  of,  at  Dresden,  13;  troops  from,  join  the  remains  of 
the  "  Grand  Army,"  35  ;  Austria  and,  99,  100 

Katzbach,  the,  Macdonald's  army  defeated  by  Blucher  at,  66 

Kellerman's  corps  of  cavalry,  157 

Kennedy,  General,  178 

Kovno,  Napoleon's  "  Grand  Army  "  at,  17  ;  remains  of,  33  ;  bravery  of 

Marshal  Ney  at,  34 
Kulm,  Vandamme's  defeat  at,  62-66 
Kutusof,  General,  battle  with  Napoleon  at  Borodino,  27,  30 ;    falls  a 

victim  to  fever,  44 


IXDEX.  199 

La  Have  Sainte,  fall  of,  178,  179 

La  Rothiere,  Napoleon's  defeat  at,  98 

La  Vendee,  IIO 

Laon,  Bu]ow  at,  lOl  ;  battle  of,  104-106 

Leipzig,  Napoleon's  advance  on,  44,  46  ;  falls  I  ack  on,  69  ;  battle  of, 

69,  70 
Louis  XVIIL,  128,  131,  133 
Ligny,  battle  of  153-163,  165 
Lithuania,  Polish  province  of,  18 
Loban's  Lorps  of  French  troops,  148,  171,  177 
Lutzen,  battle  of,  45,  46,  49 

Macdonalp,  French  corps  under,  57,  61,   83,  99,   108;  defeated  bv 

Blucher,  66,  67. 
Madgeburg,  remains  of  "  Grand  Army  "  at,  40 
Marbot,  General,  174,  175 
Marmont,   Marshal;  corps   of,    falls   back    upon    Bar-sur-Aube,    83; 

pursues  Blucher,  98 ;  attacked  by  Blucher,   loi  ;  defeated  at  the 

battle  of  Laon,  104,  105;  retreat  to  Paris  I14-I19;  desertion  of 

Napoleon,  II9,  120 
Massena,  General,  at  Torres  V'edras,  27 
Mayence,  Napoleon  and  the  Bavarians  at,  70 
Metternich,  and  Schwarzenberg's  movements,   96,  99,    loo ;    flees  to 

Dijon,  113 
Military  system  of  every  great  European  Power  in  1813,  43 
Money,  General,  in  command  of  the  National  Guard  at  Paris,  115 
Mont  St.  Jean,  167     Wellington's  forces  fall  back  on,  171  ;  attacked 

by  Napoleon,  175 
Moreau,  General,  surrenders  Soissons,  lOI,  I02 
Mormant,  the  Allies  surprised  at,  99 
Mortier,    Marshal,    French   corps  under,    83,    98,    HI,    II4,    I16;    at 

Soissons,  loi,  102. 
Moscow,    distance   from    Smolensk,    26 ;    entered    by  Napoleon,  29 ; 

capture  of,  20,  27  ;  Napoleon's  disastrous  retreat  from,  31-36 
Muffling,  Baron,  and  Blucher,  96  ;  and  Wellington,  1 37-139,  167,  168 
Murat,  Maishal,  10,  26,  33,  37,  62 

Napoleon,  subject  to  periodic  attacks  of  a  mysterious  malady,  I-3,  28, 
29,  65,  74,  147,  148,  158,  159,  165,  16S,  184-186  ;  one  of  the 
greatest  figures  in  history,  5  ;  at  Dresden  in  May  1812,  13 ; 
diplomatic  difticulties,  14  ;  plan  of  attack  at  Borodino,  28  ;  a  bad 
judge  of  character,   30 ;  returns  to  France,  33 ;    his  invasion  of 


2CX>  INDEX. 

Russia  ends  in  disastrous  failure,  36  ;  creation  and  organisation  of 
a  new  a-my  in  Paris  in  1S13,  40-43  ;  the  peace  negotiations  at 
Prague,  one  of  the  most  fatal  mistakes  made  by,  51-53  ;  army  in 
August  1813,  55  ;  scheme  of  cam;^aign,  57,  58  ;  rapid  march  to 
Dresden,  61,  67  ;  and  ^'andamme,  65  ;  efi'oris  to  secure  the  earliest 
and  best  intelligence  of  an  enemy  in  time  of  war,  67,  68  ;  repeated 
efforts  to  overwhelm  Llucher,  68,  69  ;  composition  of  his  armies 
in  1812  and  1813,  71  ;  mistakes  made  by,  in  1813,  72,  73;  his 
critical  ]-iosition  at  the  opening  of  1 8 14,  75-80  ;  return  to  Paris  for 
fresh  troops,  80  ;  the  nine  weeks'  campaign  of  1814,  the  only 
defensive  one  waged  by,  81-92  ;  dis]iosition  of  his  army  in  1814, 
83,  86  ;  the  unwisdom  and  inexpediency  of  his  "  Continental 
system,"  84,  85  ;  defends  his  capital  against  the  Allies  in  1814, 
94-119;  rapid  movements  of,  106,  107;  his  project  disclosed  by 
an  intercepted  despatch,  II2;  desertion  of  his  generals,  118-120; 
sent  to  island  of  Elba,  121-125  ;  his  strategy  in  the  1814  campaign, 
125-127 ;  escapes  from  Elba,  128 ;  re-enters  Paris,  129,  134 ; 
promulgates  a  form  of  Constitution,  130-132 ;  prepares  for  the 
Waterloo  campaign,  134,  135  ;  mistakes  made  by,  in  1815,  138, 
139;  his  army,  140 ;  plan  of  campaign,  1^4-149;  attack  on  the 
Prussians,  151-153;  battle  of  Ligny,  153-163  ;  battle  of  Waterloo, 
175-183  ;  sent  to  St.  Helena,  1S3  ;  overthrow  at  Waterloo 
attributed  to  illness,  185-188  ;  character  of,  189-193 

Nelson,  victory  at  Trafalgar,  135 

Ney,  Marshall,  10  ;  at  the  battle  of  Bo'odino,  29  ;  bravery  of,  at  Kovno, 
34)  35  )  captures  Torgau,  47  ;  attack  on  the  Allied  Armies,  47, 
48,  63  ;  defeated  by  Bernadotte  at  Dennewitz,  77  ;  his  corps  falls 
back  upon  Verdun,  83;  joins  Napoleon  in  1815,  128;  joins 
Napoleon  near  Charleroi,  151,  157;  attack  on  Quatre  Bras,  152, 
159-164,  168,  171,  177,  178 

Niemen  River,  "Grand  Army  "  collected  for  the  invasion  of  Russia,  14  ; 
passage  of  the,  17,  18  ;  Marshal  Ney  covers  the  retreat  across,  34 

Oder,  fortresses  on  the,  38,  70,  72 
Orange,  Prince  of,  corps  of,  I42 
Orleans,  Napoleon  and,  117 
Orleans,  Duke  of,  133 

Orthez,  Soult  beaten  by  Wellington  at,  IIO 

Oudinot,  French  corps  under,   57,   83,  99,    108 ;  defeated   by    Berna- 
dotte, 65 
Ourousofl,  Russians  under,  98 

Pajol,  cavalry  of,  168,  170 


INDEX.  20 1 

Paris,  Napoleon  organises  a  new  army  in  1813,  40-43  ;  returns  to,  in 
1814,  for  fresh  levies,  80;  his  defence  of,  in  1814,  94-119, 
Nanol con's  return  to,  Aom  Elba,  12S,  129 

Peninsular  War,  the,  53,  54,  88,  89 

Picton's  division  at  Waterloo,  176 

Piedmont,  Napoleon's  troojis  from,  87 

Pirch,  Prussian  corps  under,  141,  163,  179 

Pire's  cavalry  corps,  152,  159 

Planchenoit,  Prussian  attack  at,  179,  181 

Polish  question.  Napoleon  and  the,  19,  20 

Poniatowski,  French  corps  under,  58 

Ponsonby's  cavalry  at  Waterloo,  176 

Prague,  peace  negotiations  at,  51,  52 

Prussia,  King  of,  at  Dresden,  13 ;  with  Schwar/.enberg's  aroiy  in 
Bohemia,  55 

,   forces   of,   for   the   invas'on   of  Russia,  9,  38,  39 ;  swept   of 

ho'.ses,  21  ;  declares  against  Napoleon,  40  ;  army  attacked  by  Ney 
at  Bautzen,  48,  50 ;  effect  of  the  peace  negotiations  at  Prague  on, 
51.  52 

QuATRE  Bras,  battle  at,  149,  150,  159,  160-163,  ^7^ 

Reille's  corps,  148,  151,  152,  157,  159,  168;    attack  upon  Hougou- 

mont,  175,  176 
Rheims,  General  Priest  takes,  107  ;  recaptured  by  Napoleon,  107,  108 
Rhine,  Napoleon's  army  driven  towards  the,  70,  75,  82 ;  the  Allies 

cross  the,  93 
Rope=,  Mr.,  articles  on  Waterloo,  173,  l8l 
Russia;  invasion  of,  in  1812  :  an  appalling  failure,  5-7,  36;   military 

forces  required  for,  9  ;    Napoleo.i's  "  Grand  Army  "  collected  on 

the  Niemen,  I4,  17,  71  ;  and  Poland,  19,  20;  want  of  horses,  21  ; 

fighting    near   Smolensk,    24,    25  ;    battle   of   Borodino,    27-29  ; 

Moscow  entered,  29  ;  Napoleon's  disastrous;  retreat  from   Moscow, 

31-36  ;  battle  of  Lutzen,  45  ;  army  attacked  by  Ney  at  Bautzen, 

49,  50  ;  ]iea,e  negotiations  at  Prague,  5I>  5^ 
Russians  at  Champ-Aubert,  (lestro\e(l  bv  Napoleon,  98 

ALFELD,  Napoleon  s  army  ai,  40 
Sacken,  cor[)s  under,  98 

St.  Cyr,  Marshal,  10,  58;  holds  Dresden,  61,  62. 
St.  Dizier,  Napul^n  at,  II3,  116 
St.  Helena,  Napoleon  sent  to.  183,  191 
St.  l.anilert,  Bulovv's  corps  at,  174,  175,  1S2 


202  INDEX. 

St.  Priest,  corps  of,  loo,  loi  ;  takes  Rheims,  107  ;  defeated  by 
Napoleon,  107,  108 

Saltoun,  Lord,  180 

Saxon  contingent  at  the  battle  of  Leipzig,  69 

Saxony,  sectssion  of,  99  ;  King  of,  at  Dresden,  13,  46 

Scharnhorst  and  the  Prussian  Short-Service  System,  52 

Schwarzenberg,  Au.-t  ian  army  under,  38,  39  ;  in  Bohemia,  54-56  ; 
column  under,  at  Bale  in  1814,  93  ;  a  timid  strategist,  95,  move- 
ments of,  towards  Paris,  96-99,  107-I16  ;  Metterniv.h  and,  96,  99, 
100  ;  attacked  by  Napoleon,  107-109 

Seaton,  Lord,  180 

Secret  societies  at  work  in  Central  Europe,  1813,  49,  52 

Segur,  Count  de,  148 

Silesia,  Blucher's  army  in,  54-56 

Smolensk,  17,  18,  22,  23;  fighting  near,  24,  25,  47;  return  march 
upon,  31,  33 

Smorgoni,  Napoleon  leaves  his  army  at,  33,  37,  38 

Soissons,  Wintzingerode's  corps  at,  100 ;  town  recaptured  by  Mortier, 
loi  ;  surrenders  to  Blucher,  102,  103 

Somerset's  cavalry  at  Waterloo,  1 76  *• 

Soude-Sainte-Croix,  battle  at,  1 13,  1 14 

Soult  and  Wellington  in  the  Peninsula,  86,  89,  95  ;  defeated  at  Orthez, 
lio;  army  shattered  at  Toulouse,    122;  chief  of  Imperial  Staft 
157,  181 

Spain,  Wellington's  victories  in,  53,  54  ;  Napoleon's  army  in,  88,  89 

Stein,  and  the  Prussian  Short-Service  System,  52 ;  able  statesmanship 
of,  92 

Suchet,  French  troops  held  by,  in  Catalonia,  86,  89 

Swedish  army  with  Bernadotte  at  Berlin,  55 

Switzerland  joins  the  coalition  against  Napoleon  in  1 8 14,  93 

Talleyrand  summons  the  Allies  to  Paris,  116  ;  and  the  restoration  of 

the  Bourbons,  119 
Tchichagof,  army  of,  30 

Thielmann,  Prussian  corps  under,  141,  164,  165,  181 
Thiers,  M.,  the  historian,  on  Moreau's  surrender,  102,  103  ;  on  the  1814 

campaign,  122,  126  ;  on  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon,  181,  184,  185 
Tilsit,  alliance  hatched  at,  8 
Torgau,  Ney's  captuve  of,  47 
Toul'use,  Wellington  advances  on,  iio;  Soult's  army  shattered  at,  by 

Wellington,  122 
Trafalgar,  Nelson's  victory  at,  135 


INDEX.  203 

Treaty  of  Campo  Formio,  3 
Troyes,  Napoleon  at,  loi 
Turenne's  battle  at  Entzheim,  63,  64 
Tuscany,  Napoleon's  troops  from,  87 

UXBRIDGE,  Lord,  cavalry  under,  142 

Vandamme,  Marshal,  10,  58,  61,   181,   188;  defeated  at  Kulm,  62-65 

Vandamme's  corps,  148,  151,  161,  162,  170 

Vandeleur's  cavalry  brigades  at  Waterloo,  179,  180 

Vauchamp,  Blucher  at,  9S 

Verdun,  Ney's  corps  falls  back  upon,  83 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  127 

Vistula,  fortresses  on  the,  38,  70,  72 

Vittoria,  battle  of,  54,  88,  89 

Vivian's  cavalry  brigade  at  Waterloo,  I "9,  rSo 

Waterloo  campaign,  full  story  of,  yet  to  be  written,  135  ;  the  French 
army,  140 ;  armies  of  the  Allies,  140-143 ;  Napoleon's  plans  for, 
144-149;  account  of  the  battle,  175-183 

Wavre,  retreat  upon,  164-166,  174,  181 

Weimar,  Napoleon's  army  at,  40 

Wellington,  Duke  of :  defeat  of  Massena  at  Torres  ^'edras,  27  ;  and 
Napoleon's  power  in  Europe  at  the  beginning  of  1812,  39;  the 
Peninsular  War,  53,  54,  88,  89  ;  threatens  Paris  from  the  south, 
76,  89;  defeats  Soult  at  Orthez,  IIO;  shatters  Soult's  army  at 
Toulouse,  122  ;  army  of,  in  Flanders,  134.  135,  I42,  I43  ;  friction 
with  Count  (ineisenau,  136-138  ;  letter  despatched  by,  to  Hlucher, 
153,  154  ;  attacked  at  Quatre  Bras,  160  165  ;  battle  of  Waterloo, 
175-183 

Wilna  entered  by  Napoleon,  18,  19;  dejiarture  from,  20;  distance  of 
Borodino  from,  27  ;  remains  of  the  "  Grand  Army  "  at,  33 

Wintzingerode's  corps  at  Soissons,  lco-102  ;  sent  to  St.  Dizier,  1 13; 
cavalry  of,  defeated  by  Najioleon,  1 16 

Witepsk,  Napoleon  at,  20,  22,  23 

Wittgenstein,  Russian  general,  44;  battle  of  Lut/.en,  45,  50 

Woronzoff,  corps  of,  lOO ;  defeated  at  Craonne,  104 

Wurtemberg,  contingent  at  the  battle  ot  Leipzig,  69 ;  secession  of,  99 

York,  General,  Prussian  army  under,  38,  39  ;  column  in  Silesia,  56 
ZlETHEN,  Prussian  corps  under,  141,  151,  163  ;  at  Waterloo,  179-181 


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